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ABSTRACT 
 
The Impact of Biofuel and Greenhouse Gas Policies on Land Management, Agricultural 
Production, and Environmental Quality. (May 2011) 
Justin Scott Baker, B.S., Texas Tech University;  
M.S., Texas Tech University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Bruce A. McCarl 
 
This dissertation explores the combined effects of biofuel mandates and 
terrestrial greenhouse gas GHG mitigation incentives on land use, management intensity, 
commodity markets, welfare, and the full costs of GHG abatement through conceptual 
and empirical modeling. First, a simple conceptual model of land allocation and 
management is used to illustrate how bioenergy policies and GHG mitigation incentives 
could influence market prices, shift the land supply between alternative uses, alter 
management intensity, and boost equilibrium commodity prices. 
Later, a major empirical modeling section uses the U.S. Forest and Agricultural 
Sector Optimization Model with Greenhouse Gases (FASOMGHG) to simulate land use 
and production responses to various biofuel and climate policy scenarios. Simulations 
are performed to assess the effects of imposing biofuel mandates in the U.S. consistent 
with the Renewable Fuels Standard of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007 (RFS2). Simulations are run for several climate mitigation policy scenarios (with 
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varying GHG (CO2) prices and eligibility restrictions for GHG offset activities) with and 
without conservation land recultivation.  
Important simulation outputs include time trajectories for land use, GHG 
emissions and mitigation, commodity prices, production, net exports, sectoral economic 
welfare, and shifts in management practices and intensity.  Direct and indirect 
consequences of RFS2 and carbon policy are highlighted, including regional production 
shifts that can influence water consumption and nutrient use in regions already plagued 
by water scarcity and quality concerns. Results suggest that the potential magnitude of 
climate mitigation on commodity markets and exports is substantially higher than under 
biofuel expansion in isolation, raising concerns of international leakage and stimulating 
the “Food vs. Carbon” debate.   
Finally, a reduced-form dynamic emissions trading model of the U.S. economy is 
developed using simulation output from FASOMGHG and the National Energy 
Modeling System to test the effect of biofuel mandate expansion and domestic offset 
eligibility restrictions on total economy-wide GHG abatement costs.  Findings are that 
while the RFS2 raises the marginal costs of offsets, full abatement costs depend on a 
number of policy factors. GHG payment incentives for forest management and non-CO2 
agricultural offsets can increase full abatement costs by more than 20%.       
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last several years the global agricultural and forestry (AF) sectors have 
experienced a shift in economic conditions categorized by increased commodity price 
and energy input cost volatility, growing populations with changing food preferences, 
and a rapidly developing market for bioenergy. Efforts to reduce net anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions could provide new incentives for alternative AF 
activities.  
 The ties between emerging policy efforts and AF production decisions create 
strong linkages between climate change mitigation, energy, and natural resource usage. 
The U.S. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 established a Renewable Fuels 
Standard (commonly called RFS2) that, if followed, will drastically increase the 
production of biofuels from AF feedstocks, calling for a total of 30 billion gallons a year 
to be produced and used by 2022. Biofuels (and more broadly, bioenergy) can provide a 
reduced carbon alternative to fossil fuels that contribute to energy security goals.  
However, promoting bioenergy production can induce AF land use change and pressure 
scarce water resource supplies.  
Meanwhile, comprehensive climate policy such as an economy-wide cap-and-
trade or carbon tax will reinforce the demand for low carbon fossil fuel substitutes, and 
could provide incentives for AF producers to adopt management practices that provide 
______________                             
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GHG emissions offsets (where offsets are defined as net GHG emissions reductions in 
non-capped sectors of the economy that can be purchased by capped entities for 
compliance purposes under a GHG cap-and-trade scheme). AF GHG mitigation options 
can have opposite directional effects on land use change when compared to biofuel 
mandates by internalizing the value of carbon stored in terrestrial sources, and can lead 
to local environmental co-benefits such as water quality improvements by reducing 
GHG emitting agricultural inputs like nitrogen (N) fertilizer (Greenhalgh and Sauer, 
2003, Pattanayak et al., 2005).  
The market and environmental consequences of combining biofuel mandates and 
terrestrial GHG mitigation incentives are not well understood at this time. However, 
since GHG offsets from AF sources are considered a low-cost source of GHG abatement 
(EPA, 2009; EPA, 2010b), it is important to consider how biofuel mandates that are 
highly consumptive of AF resources might impact the costs of supplying GHG offsets to 
capped sectors.   
 There is a strong need for policy analysis that considers the interrelationships 
between climate and energy policy, land conservation, and environmental quality.  There 
is a prominent literature on the potential market inefficiencies and environmental 
consequences of biofuel mandates and climate mitigation efforts, reinforcing the need 
for policy design to minimize these impacts (Cui et al., 2010; de Gorter and Just, 2009, 
2010; Fargione et al., 2008, McCarl and Gan, 2007;  Moschini et al. 2009; Murray et al., 
2004; Searchinger et al., 2008; Pattanayak et al., 2005).  
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The task facing AF landowners and policy makers is to use land and water 
resources effectively to provide sufficient food, fiber, energy, and GHG emissions 
offsets. It appears inevitable that competition for such resources will continue to grow 
given these competing demands. In addition, while the AF sectors could play a 
prominent role in economy-wide GHG abatement, few studies have considered the 
implications of biofuel mandates on the full costs of GHG abatement and vice versa.  
This dissertation uses conceptual and empirical modeling techniques to analyze 
economic and environmental trade-offs between AF bioenergy production and GHG 
mitigation.   
1.1 Research Objectives and Procedures  
The objective of this dissertation is to improve the understanding of how combined 
biofuel and climate mitigation policies might affect the domestic AF sectors.  This will 
involve consideration of implications for land use, production patterns, management 
intensity, water usage, total production, prices and exports, along with consumer and 
producer welfare. To improve such understanding, several procedures are undertaken:   
1. A conceptual model is developed of biofuel policies and terrestrial GHG 
mitigation incentives and is used to analytically examine the potential 
interactions, synergies, and trade-offs of such policies,    
2. The policies are formally modeled in an empirical framework that allows 
examination of economic and environmental impacts, plus associated trade-offs, 
and  
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3. Additional modeling is used to assess the implications of biofuel mandates and 
GHG offset restrictions on the economy-wide costs of GHG abatement. 
1.2 Overview of Dissertation   
The dissertation is organized into nine chapters that will address the above 
objectives:  
• Chapter II focuses on the current policy landscape by discussing major 
provisions of the EISA RFS2 and recent U.S. federal climate policy proposals; 
• Chapter III presents a focused literature review examining bioenergy and AF 
carbon offset activities plus their interactions and impacts on AF sector 
performance and commodity prices, land use decisions, water resources, and net 
GHG emissions.  
• Chapter IV presents an analytical model of agricultural land management 
decisions and explores the consequences of policies.  
• Chapter V lays out an empirical modeling framework for the policy simulation.  
• Chapter VI uses the empirical framework to examine biofuel policy.  
• Chapter VII uses the empirical framework to examine GHG mitigation policy.  
• Chapter VIII unifies the results of chapters VI and VII in an analysis of the 
impact of biofuel mandates and domestic (U.S.) offset eligibility, and   
• Chapter IX provides general conclusions for this dissertation and directions for 
future research efforts.      
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CHAPTER II 
RESOURCE TRENDS AND POLICY BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter provides a general policy and institutional background for this 
research by discussing current trends in the AF sectors and drivers of land use 
competition and water use, and through a brief discussion of emerging or possible 
polices toward bioenergy and GHG mitigation.   
2.1 Trends in the AF Sectors and Land Resource Use  
Land resources will be pressured by the growing demand for food and fiber. 
World population growth is projected to grow beyond 9 billion by 2050and global food 
demand could grow 59-99% from 2000 levels by 2050 (Southgate et al., 2007, Southgate 
2009). In addition, income-driven changing diet preferences in rapidly developing 
economies such as Brazil, India, and China, have expanded global meat demand in 
recent years. Projections indicate that meat demand could more than double in India and 
China by 2020 (Delgado et al., 1999). Recent literature has shown that growth in the 
livestock industry has contributed to land use change and deforestation in many regions 
of the world (Trostle, 2008). Continued population growth and the diversion of grains 
previously used for feed or human consumption could exacerbate this trend of 
deforestation for livestock grazing1. Technological growth and improvements in yield 
                                                 
1
 For a comprehensive review of expected global livestock production trends, see Dickson-Hoyle, and 
Reenberg, 2009.  
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productivity could alleviate deforestation and keep commodity prices in line with 
historical trends, but ultimately natural resource use will be affected by growing 
demands for food.  
 Urban development pressures will also drive competition for scarce land 
resources. In the U.S., total cropland acreage (cultivated and non-cultivated) dropped 
from greater than 420 million acres in 1982 to approximately 368 million acres in 2003, 
a net decrease of 12% (Natural Resource Inventory, 2003), with a great deal of that land 
converting to alternative uses. Non-federal grazing lands also dropped steeply, falling 
from 611 million acres to 576 million acres over the same time frame (Natural Resource 
Inventory, 2003). This decline is expected to continue as rural farm and grazing lands 
are converted to developed uses.  In the U.S., it is estimated that in 2020, an annual 
average of 348,000 acres a year of dedicated cropland will be developed for residential 
use. An average of 240,000 and 108,000 acres of pasture and rangeland could 
accompany this shift to development as well (Alig et al., 2010). In the U.S., 
deforestation for residential and commercial development is expected to occur at 1.4 
million acres per year ( Alig and  Butler, 2010). In general, these development trends 
indicate that the total stock of land available for productive AF uses in the U.S. will 
decline over time under business as usual conditions, increasing competition for land 
resources further.     
2.1.1  Current Resource Pressures  
Biofuel mandates and carbon reduction policies could require a significant area 
of U.S. agricultural lands. As a relevant example, Table 1 displays the direct land use 
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requirements for two biofuels (corn ethanol and soybean biodiesel),  comparing crop 
yields (using 2009 NASS state averages) in two important agricultural states with 
significantly different yield productivity, Texas and Iowa. These data show that at 
current yield levels, massive amounts of land will be required to satisfy the RFS2 
mandatory levels of soybean biodiesel (1 BGY) and corn ethanol (15 BGY). Taking the 
midpoint of each fuel type, results show that approximately 61 million acres would need 
to be dedicated to corn and soybean production purely for biofuel feedstock production, 
representing 15-20% of the current cropland base in production. The implication of this 
table is that even some of the most productive lands in the world require a large 
allocation of land to produce a significant amount of liquid transportation fuels (though a 
billion gallons of gasoline equivalent is less than 0.5% of the current U.S. transportation 
fuel consumption). As land productivity is not homogeneous, the share of land allocated 
to bioenergy feedstocks will vary significantly by region. 
 
Table 1: Land Requirements for Corn Ethanol and Soybean Biodiesel under 
Alternative Yields  
 Using TEXAS 
yields 
Using IOWA 
yields 
Using TEXAS 
yields 
Using IOWA 
yields 
 Corn Ethanol Corn Ethanol Soybean 
Biodiesel 
Soybean 
Biodiesel 
Crop Yield 
(Bushel/Acre)  
120  200  25 48 
Fuel Yield 
(Gallons/Bushel) 
2.77 2.77 1.31 1.31 
Fuel Land Use 
(Gallons/Acre)  
332 554 32.8 63 
Acres per 1 
Billion Gallons 
3.01Million 1.81 Million  30.48 Million  20.83 Million  
Acres per 15 
Billion Gallons 
45.12 Million  27.08 Million ------------------ -------------------- 
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Where will this land come from? As of 2003, the total stock of non-federal land 
in the U.S. amounted to approximately 1.4 billion acres.  Figure 1 displays the 
distribution of nonfederal land by type from the 2003 Natural Resource Inventory 
(NRI)2. Generally there are about 400 million acres of non-federal forest lands, between 
300 and 400 million acres of dedicated cropland, with remaining lands falling into 
various rangeland and pasture categories, though the productive land base has decreased 
over time due primarily to development pressures3. 
 
 
Figure 1: NRI land use distribution for the U.S. (source: NRI, 2003) 
 
                                                 
2
 Non-federal lands include those that are privately owned, state or locally owned lands, and tribal and 
trust lands.  
3
 Differences in land use data and our empirical depiction of U.S. land use are discussed in a subsequent 
chapter.  
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Water resources will also be pressured by policies that affect land management 
decisions. In the absence of U.S. biofuel mandates, it was estimated that global water use 
for irrigation could increase by 17% by 2025 over 2000 levels to satisfy growing 
agricultural demands (de Fraiture et al., 2001). Arid and semi-arid countries will be 
forced to rely more heavily on imported food products, as irrigation supplies could be 
inadequate to support increased levels of production, even without biofuel expansion.   
 In addition to managing dwindling supplies, water quality degradation from 
agricultural production activities is pervasive in many parts of the world. Increased use 
of nitrogen (N) fertilizer or other agricultural chemicals stimulated by bioenergy 
development or land use intensification presents serious environmental concerns, as 
potentially harmful N constituents can enter the atmospheric and aquatic environment in 
many forms. In some regions nitrogen runoff from agriculture is the predominant source 
of water pollution, and the problem is worsening (Aneja et al., 2008, S. Greenhalgh and 
A. Sauer, 2003). In the United States, Gulf of Mexico hypoxia, caused primarily by 
upstream agricultural runoff, threatens aquatic ecosystems and critical food supplies 
(Robertson andVitousek, 2009). Globally, this problem is acute in a number of regions; 
more than 400 hypoxic zones have been identified, and hypoxic activity has increased 
exponentially since the 1960s (Robert J. Diaz and Rutger Rosenberg, 2008). Nitrate 
contamination in surface- and groundwater systems poses a serious and diverse set of 
health risks, and is another environmental cost of agricultural N use (Alan R. Townsend 
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et al., 2003). Thus, higher water use stimulated by bioenergy expansion is not the only 
concern; higher levels of agricultural input use will degrade water quality.  
2.2 Bioenergy Expansion Policies 
Both liquid biofuels and bioelectricity from AF biomass will likely play a key role 
in our energy future, though several pervasive issues remain. First, I describe some basic 
definitions of bioenergy and current socioeconomic concerns that have been raised. 
Liquid biofuels typically fall into three main categories: 
1. Grain or Sugar Based Ethanol- Typically derived from a wet or dry mill 
fermentation process where the actual grain, or food-stuff is used to process 
the fuel—competes with food and fiber production 
2. Cellulosic Ethanol- Ethanol is produced from lignocellulosic materials 
available in all forms of AF biomass, but requires a more involved, much 
higher cost conversion process than grain ethanol  
3. Biodiesel- Diesel fuel processed out of corn and soybean oil, animal fats, or a 
number of industrial and municipal wastes (including yellow grease).  
Bioelectricity is the replacement of coal-fired electricity using AF biomass. 
Bioenergy expansion policies have been designed in part to increase energy 
independence and reduce GHG emissions from fossil fuel combustion.  In general, the 
term bioenergy can be broken down into two main categories: 1) biofuels, and 2) 
bioelectricity.  Policy efforts are currently in place or under debate that will drive 
expansion of both. As a relatively high-cost substitute for fossil fuels, biofuel processors 
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and distributors have relied on a number of policy mechanisms that boost the economic 
viability of their fuels, including production tax credits, blending requirements with 
gasoline and motor diesel, and CAFE standards (e.g., lower CAFE standards for flex-
fuel vehicles that use a higher biofuel mix, or “flex fuels”).  
 Biofuel mandates currently represent the most effective measure for increasing 
production.  Mandates can be imposed via blending requirements, low carbon fuel 
standards (LCFS), or production quotas. Blending requirements mandate that a 
consistent volumetric portion of motor gasoline be blended with the biofuel ethanol. 
Blending ethanol in gasoline stimulates the demand for ethanol and has the 
environmental advantage of replacing another gasoline additive, Methyl Tertiary Butyl 
Ether (MTBE), which can pollute surface and groundwater systems. LCFS are difficult 
to implement and enforce, as the overall carbon content of biofuels can be difficult to 
quantify. 
 While many policies and institutions have pushed for biofuel expansion, no 
greater incentive exists than the national Renewable Fuels Standard established under 
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007; henceforth referred to as RFS2.  The 
RFS2 includes stringent production mandates on multiple types of biofuels.  Mandates 
for total renewable biofuels increase out to 2022 then the policy requires a minimum of 
30 billion gallon per year (BGY) of biofuels be produced domestically from AF products 
for consumption in the transportation sector.  EISA-RFS2 follows the original 
Renewable Fuels Standard of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (RFS1), which imposed 
mandatory production levels of ethanol, biodiesel, and cellulosic ethanol, while 
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extending tax incentives for those fuels. However, these production mandates were 
miniscule in comparison to those imposed by the RFS2 (EPA, 2010a).  
EISA-RFS2 dictates different volumes of biofuels by type (grain/starch ethanol, 
cellulosic ethanol, and biodiesel), from a variety of AF feedstocks, establishes specific 
mandates for the use of “advanced” biofuels (e.g., cellulosic ethanol), and adds GHG 
emission reduction thresholds (or the full life cycle GHG emissions of a unit of biofuel 
derived energy relative to an energy equivalent amount of fossil energy) for several 
classes of biofuels. A maximum of 15 BGY of corn ethanol will be eligible for 
compliance under the RFS2, with the remaining coming from AF by-products and 
residues. The latter, denoted “advanced biofuels” are anticipated to come primarily from 
cellulosic ethanol processed from a variety of AF biomass sources. 
 Already, the RFS2 and high energy prices are significantly affecting AF 
development and production decisions (and hence land use), commodity prices, and net 
farm income in the U.S. and elsewhere (Biomass Research and Development Board 
BRDB, 2009). Bioelectricity is another form of renewable energy from AF feedstocks 
being driven by current policy efforts. Recent climate and energy legislation has called 
for a Renewable Electricity or Renewable Portfolio Standards, which will mandate that a 
proportion of U.S. electricity generation come from renewable resources such as forest 
biomass, agricultural residues, or municipal and industrial wastes. RPS related policies 
are also supported by recent climate mitigation incentives (H.R. 2454 and S. 1733). As 
the next chapter will discuss, biofuel expansion has the potential to raise food prices and 
impose significant natural resource costs. Continued policy-driven expansion will 
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continue to raise important questions regarding the social and environmental trade-offs 
of cultivated biofuels.  
2.3 GHG Mitigation Policy  
 Multiple policies to reduce U.S. GHG emissions are either in place, being 
developed, or being debated.  Thirty-four states have enacted GHG emissions reduction 
efforts, including the Western Climate Initiative, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
in the northeast, and the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (Baker et al., 
2010).  A comprehensive federal cap-and-trade initiative was approved in June 2009 by 
the U.S. House of Representatives and is being considered in the U.S. Senate. The House 
bill is known formally as HR 2454 “American Clean Energy and Security Act” (ACES) 
and informally as the Waxman-Markey climate bill after its chief sponsors. Under 
ACES, the agricultural sector is excluded from a GHG emissions cap, but would be 
primarily affected through changes in energy prices, stimulated bioenergy demand, and 
the creation of a market for the sale of GHG emission offsets. Offsets are GHG 
mitigation activities in uncapped sectors (such as agriculture) that can be purchased by 
capped entities to offset emissions. As mentioned previously, HR 2454 and other recent 
climate mitigation bills have also proposed establishing a Renewable Portfolio Energy 
Standard (RPS) that would mandate a certain percentage of U.S. electrical power from 
renewable sources.   
 Climate legislation, if adopted, will likely affect the AF sectors in three primary 
ways: (1) by directly raising the costs of fossil-fuel intensive inputs and nitrogen 
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fertilizer, through allowing GHG offsets from uncapped sectors such as AF, and by 
raising the price of fossil energy and indirectly stimulating the demand for biofuels and 
biomass for bioelectricity generation.   
H.R. 254 Waxman-Markey, 2009, and similar bills such as S 2191 Lieberman-
Warner, 2008 have all included significant provision of domestic and international 
offsets. Offsets are activities outside of capped economic sectors (or entities) that can 
either reduce emissions or increase the carbon uptake of terrestrial ecosystems. Capped 
entities might purchase offsets if the market price for offsets falls below the costs of 
abating the same amount of emissions.   
Through domestic offset provisions, AF landowners could receive incentives for 
an array of activities, including: 
• Divert agricultural land to forests and grasslands,  
• Reduce use of histosols, 
• Modify existing forest management to increase carbon sequestration, 
• Reduce methane emissions from livestock, manure handling, and rice cultivation, 
• Sequester carbon through cropland tillage change or set-asides, and  
• Reduce nitrous oxide emissions from fertilizer use and manure/livestock 
operations.   
2.4 Conjunctive Bioenergy Expansion and GHG Mitigation  
It is unclear how bioenergy expansion efforts and GHG mitigation policy efforts 
might perform if enacted independently Biofuel mandates under the RFS2 or other 
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regional efforts (such as the California Low Carbon Fuels Standard) have GHG 
reduction thresholds that certain fuels must meet to be eligible. For the RFS2 legislation, 
conventional ethanol and cellulosic must meet GHG reduction thresholds of 20% and 
60% relative to energy equivalent sources of fossil energy. Criteria are in place for 
measuring the full life-cycle GHG reductions of such biofuels, including discounts for 
indirect LUC emissions. 
Recent analysis argues indirect emissions (that is, emissions that fall outside of 
the production system boundaries—such as land use change emissions in response to a 
commodity price surge stimulated by biofuels) are prevalent in fossil fuels, not just 
biofuels, and that a more comprehensive GHG accounting methodology that compares 
final “system-wide” GHG responses to cap-and-trade and biofuel consumption is an 
improvement over life-cycle analysis that has systematic bounds and is thus unable to 
truly measure all emissions (or emissions reductions) associated with renewable energy 
consumption (DeCicco, 2009). The argument in Decicco, 2009 is that the cap itself 
should dictate the role of alternative energy supplies in the transportation sector, and that 
allowances (or allowable GHG emissions under an economy-wide GHG cap) should 
cover only the carbon content of the final fuel use on an energy equivalent basis. 
This dissertation addresses a gap in the research on synergies and conflicts 
between renewable energy mandates and climate mitigation incentives. Renewable 
energy mandates are the most effective means for ensuring that biofuels play a principal 
role in our energy portfolio, but are inefficient at promoting GHG reductions because of 
the potential for leakage (both in terms of  land use change emissions, and the rebound 
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effect of higher fossil energy consumption). Additionally, mandates impose certainty 
into the market place by dictating fuel sources. To avoid indirect market consequences 
of biofuel expansion, Decicco (2009) proposes a “Land Protection Fund” by which 
international forest offset credits would be purchased in an effort to buy-back those 
emissions that occurred as an indirect consequence of U.S. biofuel expansion.  
However, RFS2 mandates create two problems for economy-wide GHG 
mitigation goals. First, mandates might be more efficient than other distortionary biofuel 
expansion incentives, but they can induce higher levels of fuel consumption and 
potentially increase emissions in the transportation sector (de Gorter and Just, 2009). 
This occurs because mandates can lower the demand for fossil energy in market 
equilibrium initially, leading to a lower market price. At this lower price, more 
transportation fuels will be consumed, leading to new fuel market equilibriums and 
higher net emissions. Obviously, such a shift would be inconsistent with mitigation 
efforts, and could increase the costs of a cap-and-trade scheme by placing more pressure 
on the rest of the system to achieve reductions. Also, the RFS2 would require valuable 
land resources that could otherwise be used for carbon offsets. This raises the costs of 
domestic (and international) offsets and hence total compliance costs under cap-and-
trade. The extent to which biofuel policies affect mitigation costs in AF is discussed in 
later chapters.  
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CHAPTER III  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 This chapter discusses how unintended market impacts of bioenergy and AF 
GHG mitigation activities together could devalue the benefits of the each policy 
mechanism. This chapter begins with a discussion of global AF’s role in a low carbon 
economy, reviews recent literature regarding the economics of bioenergy and terrestrial 
GHG mitigation, then provides a discussion of the emerging relationship between AF 
commodity and energy markets. This growing market interdependency is particularly 
important for this dissertation; policies that effectively raise the price of fossil energy 
can affect production decisions and the economic viability of bioenergy. Understanding 
this correlation helps evaluate the manner in which national policies can affect 
production and land use decisions at local and aggregate scales.  
 Then, this review continues by highlighting important social trade-offs to 
consider in the pursuit of terrestrial GHG mitigation and bioenergy, including “Food vs. 
Fuel”—or potentially “Food vs. Carbon”, socioeconomic equity concerns, and the 
potential implications of such measures on land and water resources. The latter is the 
primary empirical focus of the remainder of this dissertation, but results herein can 
provide insight into potential commodity market shifts that help inform the Food vs. 
Fuel vs. Carbon debate.    
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3.1 Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in Agriculture and Forestry 
 Agriculture currently accounts for 7-8 percent of GHG emissions in the United 
States and 10- 12 percent globally (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) 
so the sector emissions can play an important role in global climate policy. More 
importantly, altering AF practices can boost the terrestrial carbon stock and provide a 
significant source of GHG offsets to entities seeking to reduce their individual carbon 
footprint. In addition to lowering GHG emissions, mitigation activities in agriculture can 
generally enhance ecosystem services on agricultural soils. Previous studies of U.S. and 
global AF GHG mitigation potential have shown that AF offset activities and bioenergy 
can play a vital role in overall GHG emissions reduction (McCarl and Schneider, 2001, 
Murray et al., 2005, Schneider and Kumar, 2008, Pete Smith et al., 2008).    
 Globally, deforestation is responsible for 15-20% of total GHG emissions, 
representing a higher proportion of net emissions than the global transportation sector 
(IPCC, 2007). Tropical deforestation represents overwhelming majority of emissions in 
Brazil and Indonesia, which are the world’s third and fourth highest emitters (Olander et 
al., 2009, van der Werf et al., 2009). Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) is an incentive mechanism currently being discussed in global 
climate mitigation talks. REDD proposes paying landowners in developing countries for 
the carbon value of their lands to keep forests intact and maintain forest carbon stocks. 
Additionally, domestic and international policy incentives that alter forest management 
strategies to improve carbon sequestration potential of forest stands can be an effective 
means of offsetting GHG emissions (Galik et al., 2009b, Murray et al., 2005).  
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 Briefly, this chapter discusses two broad categories of AF activities that could 
contribute to low carbon policies: (1) Direct net emissions reduction, and (2) Bioenergy.  
Each option presents a number of institutional complications and can introduce new 
market or non-market externalities into the system, which is the focus of the empirical 
chapters of this dissertation.  
3.1.1 Net Emissions Reduction  
 Options for directly reducing net emissions from AF include altering crop mix 
strategies to those that emit less in the production process, direct reductions in fossil fuel 
and input use, altering livestock production practices (through alternative feed blends, 
managing manure systems for reduced emissions,  decreased rice cultivation, and 
avoided deforestation4. Direct emissions reduction involves production responses and 
altered crop mix decisions as a result of changing economic conditions as GHG intensive 
input costs increase. An example would be reduced emissions from lower N fertilizer 
use as the price of such inputs increases. A switch from dryland to irrigated production 
under elevated energy costs also qualifies as an indirect mitigation activity.  Such actions 
can indirectly (or under the right incentive structure, directly) reduce emissions from AF 
practices, and it is important to account for shifts within a full GHG accounting 
framework.  
Direct emissions reduction from shifting practices can also occur as a direct 
response to a policy lever that influences AF practices (for instance, an offset payment 
                                                 
4
 Avoided deforestation can also be considered a traditional “offset” activity, though I categorize it as 
direct emissions reduction under the assumption that deforestation emissions would occur under business 
as usual conditions.  
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that would subsidize the landowner for carbon sequestration or emissions reductions 
beyond baseline practices. Some examples of offsets include the following. 
3.1.1.1 Soil Carbon Management  
 The soil carbon stock is an extremely important global carbon account. As soils 
are intensively managed, soil carbon is lost to the atmosphere. For crop production, 
alternative tillage practices can boost the agricultural soil carbon account by eliminating 
soil disturbances that release CO2 as land is tilled between planting seasons. There is a 
variety of conservation tillage method practices possible, including ceased use of tillage, 
strip-tilling (where planted rows exist between  strips of untilled soil), or ridge till 
(where crops are planted on top of ridges—the base remains undisturbed).   
Other options for managing soil carbon include the use of cover crops in the non-
growing season to improve soil nutrient content, or increased residue retention by which 
crop residues are allowed to remain on the ground, and ultimately contribute to the soil 
organic carbon stock. Previous research has praised conservation tillage methods for its 
potential to offset ~10% of global fossil fuel emissions, while enhancing the quality of 
degraded soils and boosting yields on marginal croplands (Lal, 2004). However, the Lal, 
2004 results are not consistent across all regions and cropping systems, and more 
contemporary estimates by Lal, 2004 and others have painted a more pessimistic picture 
of soil carbon sequestrations ability to contribute to economy-wide abatement goals.  
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The net carbon gains to conservation and no-till production practices are 
relatively small (0.6-1.1 tCO2e acre-1 year-1), and the system will ultimately become 
saturated and unable to store additional carbon (Murray et al., 2005). The relatively 
small per-acre carbon gains means many landowners would be needed to create a 
meaningful mitigation contract, which would require significant high transaction costs. 
Additionally, reduced tillage practices are typically seen as economically viable 
mitigation strategies at lower CO2 prices, but are less so as the carbon price increases; 
bioenergy and forest offset opportunities dominate the mitigation portfolio at higher CO2 
prices (McCarl and Schneider, 2001, Murray et al., 2005). Figure 2, taken from the EPA 
2005 assessment of U.S. GHG mitigation potential in agriculture and forestry, illustrates 
the potential difference in per-acre GHG offset potential among various forms of AF 
carbon sequestration. Notice that changing tillage practices only competes with forestry 
offsets from a pure GHG standpoint (specifically, reforestation) at 1.1 tCO2e, which is 
the high end estimate for no-till carbon gains.  
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Figure 2: Estimated carbon sequestration potential from Murray et al. (2005) 
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Another problem with pursuing soil carbon offset activities is that reduced tillage offsets 
will likely conflict with goals of the RFS2 where agricultural residues will be a 
marketable feedstock for energy production. Residue removal is often a requisite of no-
till farming, making no-till an attractive management option under an RFS2 regime. 
Thus, under and RFS2 baseline, “additionality” would be a concern as the market for 
soil carbon offsets is likely limited by the existence of the RFS2, which pushes the 
demand for AF residues and dedicated energy crop. For a comprehensive review of other 
issues associated with soil carbon management and tillage offsets, see Murray et al., 
2007.       
3.1.1.2 Land Set-Asides 
 Incentives for fallowing or setting aside land currently in production are another 
option for directly reducing emissions. Land conservation programs akin to the CRP can 
directly reduce emissions from intense agricultural production while boosting soil 
carbon stocks, and allowing direct participation of CRP lands in a GHG offset market is 
a potential policy option for involving conservation lands into current climate mitigation 
efforts.  
 Although the CRP was not designed for carbon storage and sequestration, CRP 
contracts include land cover maintenance and restricted biomass removal, which 
enhances above- and below-ground carbon sequestration (FAPRI 2007). In particular, 
organic carbon levels in CRP lands can be significantly greater than in cropland; studies 
have shown that only five years after restoration of a perennial grass cover, 21% of the 
soil carbon lost during decades of intensive tillage had been replaced (Gebhart et al., 
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1994). A recent comprehensive review of soil carbon with the CRP estimates that soil 
organic carbon increases at the rate of 2.1 metric tCO2 equivalent (e) per hectare per year 
(Piñeiro et al. 2009). These increases in soil carbon storage can be negated by 
recultivation; a global review found there is an average loss of 30% soil carbon from soil 
layers of less than 150cm deep following recultivation of conservation lands (Davidson 
and Ackerman, 1993). For more on the CRP in a low-carbon economy, see (Baker and 
Galik, 2009 ).   
3.1.1.3 Reducing N2O Emissions from Crop Management 
As nitrogen fertilizer is applied to cropping systems to boost yields, direct and 
indirect sources of N2O emissions come as a byproduct. Direct N2O emissions are those 
N2O releases directly tied to the application of the N fertilizer. Indirect sources of N2O 
occur as N leaches off-site then reverts to N2O in a different location, or when nitrates 
volatilize in the form of N2O as part of the nitrification process.  To reduce N2O 
emissions, offset incentives can subsidize farmers to decrease N use on farm. Given the 
potency of N2O as a greenhouse gas (which has a global warming potential more than 
300 times that of CO2), and the other environmental benefits that come with reduced N 
use, this is a particularly popular offset mechanism in the environmental community.  
However, N fertilizers are a very important part of the production process, and even 
small decreases in N use can reduce crop yields.   
3.1.1.4 Emissions Reduction from Livestock Management 
First, consider direct agricultural GHG emissions reduction. Livestock 
production produces a significant source of global N2O and CH4 and CO2 emissions. In 
25 
 
 
the U.S., livestock emissions are a significant source of agricultural emissions 
accounting for 200 TgCO2e, roughly 3% of total emissions (EPA, 2009). Globally, FAO 
(2006) estimates that net emissions from all livestock production and consumption 
activities are approximately 9% of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions, 35-40% of 
global methane emissions, and 65% of N2O global emissions5 (FAO, 2006). Efforts to 
reduce livestock emissions include: 
• Improved enteric fermentation: Reduced emissions through improved enteric 
fermentation are possible through alternative feed blends that improve rumen 
efficiency, and lead to fewer CH4 emissions per-unit of feed;  
• Manure management- Anaerobic lagoon treatment for hog and dairy operations 
is a viable mitigation option; methane can be captured and potentially converted 
to energy for on-farm use, and 
• Altered management strategies: including indirect management of CH4 
emissions by increasing animal growth productivity6, or by eliminating a stocker 
phase (and thereby decreasing the lifespan emissions of the livestock) 
• Reduced pasture emissions: includes alternative management options for pasture 
land management to reduce emissions associated with grazing activities—again, 
an option could include eliminating the stocker phase of production. 
                                                 
5
 Estimates include emissions from the cultivation of livestock feed, transportation and processing of meat 
products, and land use change emissions associated with livestock development.  
6
 An option here is the application of bovine somotatrophin, a growth hormone that has raised other 
important environmental and human health issues (Outlaw et al., 2009). 
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Due to the amount of resources necessary for livestock production, a shift in food 
consumption habits to diets that contain a smaller proportion of meat can reduce 
anthropogenic emissions significantly. Recent analysis shows that a global shift to a 
“Healthy Diet” principally with less animal protein not only reduces the accumulation of 
CO2 in the atmosphere in 2050 by 30 parts per million (ppm)7 (Stehfest et al., 2009). 
However, a reduction in global livestock production is unlikely as changing preferences 
are shifting the demand for meat in rapidly developing economies. In addition, if global 
demand for meat continues to rise, regional efforts to reduce herd size or alter diets 
could lead to leakage in the livestock sector (as production shifts elsewhere to satisfy 
global demand).  
3.1.1.5 Emissions Reduction from Rice Cultivation  
 CH4 emissions from rice cultivation account for a much smaller share of total 
U.S. emissions (~6 TgCO2e, or <0.1% of total U.S. emissions) but comprise a larger 
share of global agricultural emissions (EPA, 2009). Global emissions from rice 
cultivation are estimated to be approximately 708 Tg CO2-e for 2010 (US Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2006), 11% of global GHG emissions from the agricultural sector.   
A direct response to reduce these emissions is to reduce rice cultivation 
altogether, forgoing methane emissions. Altering management strategies and species mix 
to one that reduces methane emissions is also an alternative. This includes use of iron 
silicate fertilizers (Ali et al., 2008a, Ali et al., 2008b)8, which is a much more socially 
                                                 
7
 The mitigation scenario analyzed was to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at 450 ppm.  
8
 Iron silicate fertilizers have been shown to boost yields from paddy rice cultivation in addition to 
reducing CH4 emissions 
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palatable form of rice emissions reduction than a strict reduction in acreage, as 
approximately 370 million tons of rice are consumed for food (FAO, 2009). Mid-season 
drainage of rice paddy fields can significantly reduce methane emissions also but comes 
with the added cost of requiring additional water use.  
3.1.1.6 Forestry Mitigation  
 Literature has shown that the greatest AF-GHG mitigation opportunities come 
from forest-based offset activities and bioenergy (Murray et al., 2005; Baker et al., 
2009). A number of offset activities are available that potentially increase the carbon 
storage potential of forest stands, including:  
3.1.1.6.1 Avoided Deforestation 
 Deforestation is a significant driver of anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions, 
accounting for roughly 12% of global emissions and comparable in size to the emissions 
from the global transportation sector (Olander et al., 2009). Deforestation accounts for 
an overwhelming portion of total emissions in Brazil and Indonesia, the world’s third 
and fourth largest emitters by volume (UNFCC 2009). Reducing deforestation rates and 
improving sustainable forest management is a challenge in a time of continuing 
population growth and agricultural expansion. Nevertheless, financial incentives and 
policy levers can be useful in this important task. 
 Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) is an incentive 
mechanism that pays landowners to preserve forests as part of climate policy today 
(Miles and Kapos, 2008, Olander et al., 2009). Several recent studies have evaluated 
REDD incentives globally by comparing baseline land-use trajectories to other 
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trajectories where carbon payments compensate landowners for keeping forests intact.  
Recent modeling efforts suggest that ~1.8 billion tCO2e of global emissions can be 
eliminated for approximately $10/tCO2e; at $20 and $30/tCO3e, mitigation estimates 
increase to 2.5 and 2.9 billion tCO2e, respectively (Gullison et al., 2007, Kindermann et 
al., 2008, Murray et al., 2009). These greenhouse gas benefits could also be 
accompanied by a 50% reduction in global deforestation rates by 2030 (Kindermann et 
al., 2008). Avoided deforestation is thus likely a feasible, relatively cheap alternative for 
greenhouse gas mitigation that would produce many ecological co-benefits, including 
biodiversity conservation (Fearnside 2008) and additional net cooling from water 
recycling.  The challenges with implementing REDD protocols include the method for 
distributing payments, the means of establishing a proper deforestation baseline, and 
leakage.  
3.1.1.6.2 Forest Management 
 Forest management offsets are activities designed to increase the carbon 
sequestration potential of lands currently in timber production. A variety of options are 
available, including rotation extensions, altered species mix, partial thinning, and 
reforestation. Faster growing species can be planted in order to stimulate biomass growth 
and carbon accumulation, though this brings additional risks typical of introducing non-
native species into vulnerable ecosystems (Jackson and Baker, 2010). Carbon 
sequestration rates vary significantly by region, topography, and other factors, but 
typically range 2.1-3.1t CO2e acre-1year-1 (Row, 1996).  
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 GHG mitigation protocols exist or are being developed within that explicitly state 
how land is to be managed, what is eligible, and how carbon payments should be 
discounted for landowners participating in forest management offset programs. Galik et 
al., 2009 shows that the break-even carbon price necessary for forest management 
activities to be economically feasible varies significantly by, region, species, policy 
design, and subsequent transaction costs (protocol) (Galik et al., 2009a, Galik et al., 
2009b).   
3.1.1.6.3  Afforestation 
 Afforestation is defined as the planting of managed forests in areas without trees 
for at least 50 years (or some other arbitrary length of time).  In the U.S., afforestation 
has the potential to sequester ~100 Tg C yr-1, depending on the price of carbon (SOCCR, 
2007, Murray, et al., 2005). Globally, the combination of reforestation and afforestation 
activities could reduce atmospheric CO2 concentrations significantly this century, by 
approximately 30 parts per million (ppm) (House et al., 2002). However, this potential 
mitigation may be limited by many factors.  One is the vulnerability of forests to 
increased disturbances, including pathogens, fire, and storms (Galik and Jackson 2009).  
The mountain pine beetle is projected to convert 374,000 km2 of pine forest from a small 
net carbon sink to a large carbon source in Alberta alone, liberating 270 Tg C to the 
atmosphere (Kurz et al. 2008).   
 A second potential limitation is landowner behavior, including decisions on what 
species to plant, how to manage forests, and direct opposition to planting trees on lands 
that have been in conventional agricultural production for generations. Much of the 
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opposition to climate legislation echoed by the agricultural community stems from the 
supposition that farmers would never participate in an activity that would subsidize “tree 
planting” in lieu of business as usual operations.    
3.1.1.7 Other Issues with Mitigation in Agriculture and Forestry  
 Landowner decisions will ultimately dictate the success of some climate-policy 
efforts. However, setting land aside for carbon sequestration purposes raises a number of 
relevant policy issues, including additionality, permanence, leakage, and transaction 
costs. These factors can confound the overall effectiveness of GHG offset activities, and 
it has been suggested that offset payments be discounted in light of these issues (Heng-
Chi Lee et al., 2007).   
• Additionality- For carbon offsets to be effective in offsetting emissions, the 
activity must be additional to the baseline, i.e., would not have occurred under 
business as usual conditions.  
• Permanence- It is often difficult for AF activities to be considered permanent as 
carbon stored in soils and forest stands will ultimately reach a saturation point at 
which the system is no longer providing carbon benefits. In addition, there is 
increased risk of carbon reversal due to natural disturbances (fires, hurricanes, 
etc.) that make permanence a concern.   
• Leakage- One of the recurring themes of this dissertation, if AF GHG mitigation 
activities lead to agricultural expansion or management intensification in another 
region which subsequently raises emissions, this is referred to as leakage.  
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• Transaction Costs- The true costs of carbon offset activities include the 
transaction costs of aggregating, monitoring, and enforcing carbon offset 
contracts. Transaction costs can vary by region, activity, management protocol, 
and can increase the break-even carbon price needed for the offset incentive to be 
economically viable (Galik et al., 2009a).  
Each option detailed above presents challenges and opportunity costs to consider.  
However, direct and indirect environmental impacts are likely much greater for 
bioenergy production expansion than for carbon offset activities, an issue that is 
addressed in the following section. 
3.1.2 Bioenergy- Social and Environmental Concerns 
Prior to the establishment of the EISA-RFS, there was significant debate in the 
literature regarding the net energy balance of bioenergy, with many studies discounting 
biofuels as an effective source of renewable energy (Pimentel, 2003, Pimentel and 
Patzek, 2005). These concerns were alleviated to an extent by further work that have 
found positive energy balances for biofuels, and hence net GHG reduction potential 
(Dalgaard et al., 2006, Farrell et al., 2006, Hill et al., 2006, Wesseler, 2007).  
 Unfortunately, we currently lack the technology to support large-scale production 
of cellulosic ethanol, which would produce net GHG gains at the lowest environmental 
costs at this time (cellulosic ethanol from perennial grasses, wastes, agricultural residues, 
dedicated energy crops, and algae). During the economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 
there was concern levied that EISA-RFS2 mandates were premature in mandating high 
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proportions of cellulosic ethanol and they were relaxed for 2010. There is a great chance 
that the sector will be unable to meet these targets in the coming years. 
 In addition, bioenergy mandates and GHG mitigation policy raises a number of 
social issues that merit further policy consideration. Corn ethanol expansion has already 
boosted commodity prices and net farm income (Tyner et al. 1979; Biomass Research 
and Development Board, 2008; Fortenberry and Park, 2008; EPA 2009). In addition, 
second generation biofuels offer a source of revenue to producers and new opportunities 
for managing marginal lands by creating a market for agricultural residues or perennial 
energy crops. This can provide an additional revenue stream for producers in low-
income countries as well, and can help productive regions realize greater levels of 
energy independence (Hunt, 2008).  
 How will the agricultural sector will be able to supply human needs for food and 
fiber while supporting an expanding bioenergy industry? This dilemma has been 
characterized as the Food vs. Fuel debate (Daschle et al., 2007, Runge and Senauer, 
2007). Typically, technological advancement and yield productivity growth have out-
paced demand growth for food globally, discounting Malthusian concerns of feeding a 
growing world population. Nevertheless, U.S. and global bioenergy expansion could 
throw off this delicate balance by stimulating demand to the point that short-term supply 
shortages exacerbate hunger concerns in some regions of the world. This effect would be 
particularly acute especially during periods of adverse climatic conditions in the world’s 
most productive regions.  
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 Agricultural commodity prices contribute greatly to hunger and malnutrition 
globally (Senauer, 2008). One reason the Green Revolution was so successful in 
reducing malnourishment and global hunger is that advancements in productivity helped 
to stabilize world commodity markets, leading to declining real commodity prices in 
food markets over time. Recently, the number of malnourished people has risen sharply, 
and currently sits at more than 1 billion worldwide. While not completely driven by 
commodity prices, this trend is particularly troubling following the successes of the 
Green Revolution. Higher food prices can lead to social unrest as well, evidence by 
recent political protests and riots in Egypt, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Mauritania, Mexico, 
Morocco, Senegal, the Philippines and Yemen (Senauer, 2008). Displacing the 
production of valuable food supplies with bioenergy will further contribute to this 
malnourishment trend as markets adjust to new conditions9.   
 Also relevant are the environmental implications of an expanded bioenergy 
industry. Recent literature has outlined the potential environmental pitfalls of increased 
agricultural development. Environmental co-costs of bioenergy include direct or induced 
LUC, higher levels of agricultural input use, and water quality co-effects (discussed in 
sufficient detail in subsequent sections). Zah et al. 2007 compare total GHG emissions 
and the net environmental impacts of 26 different biofuels compared to conventional 
fossil fuels and results indicate that the majority of the biofuels evaluated (21 out of 26) 
                                                 
9
 Commodity price concerns are not central to bioenergy expansion, however. As will be shown in the 
results chapters, GHG mitigation and offsets can pressure commodity markets even further.  
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are GHG reducing relative to fossil fuel equivalents, but often these fuels had a greater 
overall environmental impact10. 
 Cellulosic ethanol from a variety of feedstocks presents an environmentally 
superior alternative to gain and sugar based biofuels as lingo-cellulosic materials often 
come from biomass that does not directly compete with food and fiber crops (e.g., 
residuals of crop or timber production). In addition, per acre energy output is higher for 
cellulosic ethanol as all biomass in the field is used in the fuel production process. 
Boosting per-acre energy output reduces land and resource requirements of the energy 
source, lowers environmental degradation, and provides greater life-cycle GHG benefits. 
Targeting sustainable bioenergy feedstocks or biofuels that negate socioeconomic or 
environmental impacts has been the focus of an emerging literature over the last few 
years. The subject of this literature has fallen into several categories. The first segment 
of this literature has focused on specific feedstocks or the life cycle impacts of particular 
bioenergy monocultures, providing estimates of full “well-to-wheel” energy potential 
and GHG reduction potential. Another portion has considered the social aspects of 
biofuel development as discussed. Then, the final segment has focused on the economic 
dimensions of biofuel policies, both in terms of resource consumption and net economic 
welfare of various policy levers. This dissertation will address aspects of all three areas.   
 The following sections discuss potential market outcomes of recent energy and 
climate policy initiatives, and how such policies enhance the linkages between energy 
                                                 
10
 The net environmental impact in this study is an index value comprised of two main indicators, (1) 
Swiss environmental impact points- a measure of how much environmental impacts exceed legal limits, 
and (2) the European Eco-Indicator- which  
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and AF markets. This in turn influences natural resource management and consumption, 
AF input costs, output prices, and welfare feedbacks in the energy and transportation 
sectors. 
3.2 Commodity Market Implications of Bioenergy and GHG Mitigation  
 As current policy drivers represent a fundamental shift in the US and global AF 
sectors, it is important to consider how energy, transportation, and AF markets are 
currently related and how policies strengthen such interdependencies and implies cross-
sectoral welfare spillovers. 
3.2.1 Increased Linkages between Energy and AF Markets 
 The relationship between energy and AF commodities has been established in the 
literature, but recent economic volatility and continued movement to an economy less 
dependent on fossil fuels will likely strengthen this connection. Data show that energy 
and commodity markets are closely related, exhibiting similar trends over time. Recent 
literature discusses these market interactions, pointing out that higher correlation 
between agricultural and energy markets could signal higher levels of volatility in 
important agricultural commodity prices (Du et al., 2009 , Irwin and Good, 2009). The 
relationship between agricultural and energy markets is important in several ways. First, 
if petroleum market volatility of 2008 is a sign of future market conditions, then the 
ethanol “boom” will continue to rise and fall with petroleum prices given the high 
correlation between agricultural and energy markets (Irwin and Good, 2009). There is a 
direct relationship between corn and petroleum prices for a dry mill corn ethanol plant to 
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break even. For instance, to break even at $5/bushel corn, petroleum price of $80/barrel 
or greater would be needed.  To obtain a 12% return on investment at $5/bushel, a 
petroleum price of $90/barrel or greater would be needed (Tiffany, 2007). As recent 
petroleum market fluctuations have shown, such price combinations are well within 
observed ranges, but volatility in petroleum markets and macroeconomic conditions 
mean that the economic viability of corn ethanol (in the absence of government 
intervention) will be cyclical (Figure 3).  
Second, climate mitigation efforts will raise the price of conventional fossil fuels, 
thus directly affecting agricultural input costs, indirectly affecting output prices, and 
stimulating the demand for bioenergy even further as a low carbon fuel substitute (Baker 
et al., 2010). Currently, there is legitimate concern on the part of agricultural stake-
holders that energy policies that raise the price fossil fuels place an undue burden on 
agricultural producers with low profit margins. 
 In general, data-trends show that producers were able to weather the storm of 
higher input prices in 2007 and 2008 through higher output prices. Also called “cost 
pass-through,” this phenomenon occurs when all producers in an industry or sector of 
the economy simultaneously face higher costs of production. Subsequent supply side 
responses force output prices upward as crop producers face higher energy input costs 
and limited budgets. Similarly, the recent economic downturn and subsequent fall in 
petroleum prices was accompanied by a fall in agricultural commodity prices as well. 
There are a number of studies that have statistically evaluated cost pass through and the 
interactions between energy price shocks and commodity market responses. Fertilizer 
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processors and agricultural producers were able to pass through the highest proportion of 
oil price increases when compared to other economic agents (Baffes, 2007). Recent 
work has also found strong evidence of cost pass-through in the agricultural sector 
during the 2008 petroleum price spike (Kwon and Koo, 2009).  
 Other input costs, such as the price of fertilizer, were adversely impacted by the 
spike in petroleum prices as well. The production of fertilizer and other agricultural 
chemicals is fossil fuel intensive, and thus subject to price volatility in those markets. 
Additionally, the biofuels “boom” of 2007 and 2008 altered U.S. crop mix strategies to a 
more nitrogen intensive mix, more than doubling prices for nitrogen, potash, and 
phosphate fertilizers (Huang et al., 2009 ).  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between agricultural and energy markets  
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 In general, higher energy prices are to be expected under low carbon policies, but 
will be accompanied by higher output prices.  The extent of these output price effects is 
an important policy consideration that is evaluated in later chapters.  
3.2.2 The Role of Biofuels during the Price Spike  
 Some critics of biofuel policies argue that that this food price rise was directly 
related to biofuel expansion in the U.S. and elsewhere, and this has imposed an 
unnecessary burden on the developing world. There is merit to this concern, as RFS 
mandates more closely tie commodity prices to energy prices (particularly corn and 
soybean) by effectively imposing a price floor under the agricultural feedstock 
(Babcock, 2009 ). A net increase in biofuel production in 2008 stimulated by the RFS 
certainly contributed to the commodity price spike.  Studies suggest that a number of 
other factors were also partly responsible for the 2008 price spike, including increased 
production costs, adverse weather conditions, changing food preferences (and a greater 
demand for meat in rapidly developing economies), declining value of the U.S. dollar, 
and import/export policies in a number of important regions (Senauer, 2008, Trostle, 
2008).   
There is a growing correlation between energy and AF markets. Bioenergy 
expansion will likely reinforce this relationship and provide new revenue opportunities 
to AF producers by linking the demand for energy and transportation fuels to the 
demand for primary AF feedstocks.  
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3.2.3 Impacts of GHG Mitigation Policy on U.S. Agriculture  
 Putting it all together, policies that influence energy markets (renewable energy 
expansion or climate mitigation incentives) will influence agricultural commodity 
markets and natural resource use. This raises obvious questions regarding the economic 
welfare implications of such incentives. In terms of climate mitigation, this is especially 
cloudy. The net sectoral welfare effects of GHG policy are tied to a number of factors. 
First, climate legislation (either cap-and-trade or a carbon tax) directly raises the cost of 
fossil fuel intensive inputs (gasoline, natural gas, diesel, and electricity), and other inputs 
tied to fossil fuel prices (such as nitrogen fertilizer, which is highly correlated with 
natural gas and diesel markets). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
recently assessed HR 2454, and found that it could cause petroleum prices to rise 15% 
above baseline levels by 2050 (EPA, 2009). This analysis also shows electricity and 
natural gas prices rising 30 and 35%, respectively, by 2050. Figure 4 displays price 
index values relative to baseline trajectories for selective energy sources under EPA’s 
projections of HR 2454: 
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Figure 4: EPA energy price projections under HR 2454 (source: EPA 2009) 
 
  
Potential cost-side impacts of climate legislation have led to staunch opposition 
to climate legislation by certain stakeholders in the agricultural community. Some 
studies have added to this concern by producing estimates of a substantial total cost 
burden imposed on the agricultural sector under cap-and-trade (Doane Advisory 
Committee, 2008; FAPRI, 2009).  A recent USDA analysis uses EPA’s estimates of 
energy price increases under the ACES, and found more modest operating costs in the 
short-term of less than 2%/acre, and relatively modest increases in the medium and long-
terms of less than 4% and 10%/acre (USDA, 2009). Overall, the USDA analysis showed 
a net income loss to the agricultural sector over time, but did not account for changes in 
production practices over time, nor does it include potential offset and additional 
bioenergy revenue. It also ignored market effects caused by pursuit of GHG offsets that 
move land out of conventional agricultural production.  
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 An updated report put out by the USDA now shows net gains to the sector as a 
whole, piggy-backing on other empirical efforts that have evaluated the entire AF 
system, not just production cost impacts. Outlaw et al. evaluate a limited suite of offset 
activities and evaluate farm level economics of the ACES for 98 representative farms 
across the U.S. representing multiple regions and crop/livestock activities and found that 
71 farms were worse off under the policy (Outlaw et al., 2009 ). Those that gained were 
concentrated mostly in the Midwest and Corn Belt regions. 
 Baker et al., 2010 take the cost/benefit issue of climate policy further by 
considering production and land use responses across a range of CO2 equivalent prices 
and a full suite of mitigation opportunities, including offsets and bioenergy.  Results 
suggest that AF producers could realize windfall gains under climate legislation from the 
sale of offsets, the emergence of bioenergy markets, and indirect revenues as stimulated 
by commodity market shifts, a key result highlighted in subsequent chapters (Baker et 
al., 2010). Similar results were found in de la Torre-Ugarte, et al., 2009, which also used 
sectoral economic modeling to evaluate multiple GHG offset provision options (de la 
Torre Ugarte et al., 2009). 
 In general, it appears that the net sectoral welfare gains to AF producers from 
offsets and bioenergy incentives could be substantial, and will more than offset any 
additional costs of climate and energy legislation. For livestock producers or AF 
producers of conventional commodities without the biophysical potential to participate 
in offset programs, indirect revenue flows through commodity price increases should 
provide adequate compensation. However, such economic gains might come at 
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significant costs on natural resources as external environmental costs of change land 
management decisions are not completely internalized in this framework.  The following 
sections discuss land and water resource concerns that arise under low carbon policies.   
3.3 Land Resources in a Low Carbon Economy 
 One of the key themes of this dissertation is the effect of bioenergy and terrestrial 
GHG mitigation on land use decisions. As discussed, land resources will play a vital role 
in a low carbon economy, as a source of carbon offset potential, and by providing a 
resource necessary for cultivating the requisite feedstock for mandated bioenergy 
expansion. Low carbon policies can have deleterious impacts on land resources, as 
carbon-generating activities in one region can enhance land clearing, land management 
intensity, or raise the opportunity costs of land conservation in other regions.  
3.3.1 Land Use and Bioenergy  
 Ultimately, biofuel policies will continue to influence land use decisions and 
LUC. In order to understand the full impact of the policy, it is important to distinguish 
between direct and indirect LUC. Direct LUC is defined as the conversion of lands from 
a prior use strictly for the purposes of bioenergy cultivation. Research has shown that 
direct land use changes for biofuel production in a number of ecosystems (including 
tropical rainforests or U.S. prairie grasslands) leads to significant payback periods, or the 
amount of time needed for the GHG benefits of non-stop biofuel cultivation to outweigh 
the carbon loss from the original land-clearing activity (Fargione et al., 2008, Gibbs et 
al., 2008, Pineiro et al., 2009).  Table 2 summarizes carbon payback periods for various 
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types of biofuel development, land categories, and regions. Notice there is significant 
variation in estimated carbon payback periods. This is due to differences in carbon 
stocks for different land types, disparity in global crop productivity, and the difference in 
life-cycle GHG emissions reduction potential for different biofuels.  
 There are several important implications of these studies.  First, rapid 
development of viable “second generation” bioenergy feedstocks, such as cellulosic 
ethanol from crop residues, switchgrass, or woody biomass is critical. Dedicated 
cellulosic ethanol production can significantly or fully mitigate against lengthy carbon 
payback periods (Pineiro et al., 2009).  
Also, these studies indicate a need for technological improvement, perhaps 
driven by policy incentives (Gibbs et al., 2008).  Finally, the difference in regional 
carbon payback estimates illustrates the importance of supporting biofuel development 
on existing or abandoned cropland. Abandoned or idle cropland can be effective source 
of expandable land for bioenergy development, but keeping agricultural land set aside 
can be a better short-term climate investment (Hoogwijk et al., 2009, Pineiro et al., 
2009).  
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Table 2: Estimated Carbon Payback Periods from Direct Land Use Change for 
Biofuels 
Study Land-use Type Region Biofuel 
Carbon 
Payback 
Period 
Fargione et al., 
2008 
 
 
 
Tropical or 
Peatland 
Rainforest 
Indonesia/ 
Malaysia 
 
Palm Biodiesel 
 
 
86-423 
 
 
Fargione et al., 
2008 
 
Tropical 
Rainforest 
Brazil 
 
Soybean Biodiesel 
 
319 
 
Fargione et al., 
2008 Grassland Brazil Soybean Biodiesel 17-37 
Fargione et al., 
2008 
Native 
Grassland U.S. Corn Ethanol 93 
Fargione et al., 
2008 
Abandoned 
Cropland U.S. Corn Ethanol 48 
Gibbs et al., 2008 
Varying 
Grassland Global 
Sugar/Grain 
Ethanol 7-60 
Gibbs et al., 2008 
Varying 
Grassland Global Soybean Biodiesel 80-100 
Gibbs et al., 2008 
Varying 
Grassland Global Palm Biodiesel 0 
Gibbs et al., 2008 
Varying 
Forestland Global 
Sugar/Grain 
Ethanol 20-900 
Gibbs et al., 2008 
Varying 
Forestland Global Soybean Biodiesel 300-900 
Gibbs et al., 2008 
Varying 
Forestland Global Palm Biodiesel 5-120 
Pineiro et al., 2009 
CRP, Native 
Grassland U.S. Corn Ethanol 29-48 
Pineiro et al., 2009 
CRP, Native 
Grassland U.S. Cellulosic Ethanol 0 
 
 Indirect LUC (also referred to as induced LUC or leakage) from bioenergy 
cultivation is also of paramount concern. In this situation, the allocation of land for 
biofuel production in one region stimulates commodity markets and induces land use 
change in another region. The theory of induced land use change relies on the notion that 
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a marginal increase in some land-clearing activity can be at least partly attributed to a 
price response brought on by production decisions in another region (McCarl, 2008). 
 Estimation of leakage is quite difficult, as it involves simulating agricultural 
development (or LUC) under a biofuel expansion scenario relative to a baseline 
trajectory. Assuming one has appropriate baseline assumptions of market conditions and 
economic behavior, modeling can be used to establish a baseline consistent with history. 
Then, to estimate induced LUC emissions, one must introduce the relevant policy shock 
into the economic system and see how markets and resource consumption decisions 
might adjust. If such a model adequately represents physical land stocks by region, LUC 
emissions can be calculated by comparing land use trajectories, and then calculating the 
emissions from land clearing activities that were not present in the baseline simulation. 
This requires spatially explicit biophysical data on land use and associated carbon stocks 
to fully capture net emissions. Typically, full structural economic modeling within 
systems that capture trade flows, spatial distributions of land types/use, and 
comprehensive GHG accounting are needed to conduct such analyses.  
 Recent work measured indirect land use responses to expanded ethanol 
production in the U.S., and has really stirred the debate surrounding the environmental 
effectiveness of bioenergy (Timothy Searchinger et al., 2008).  Searchinger et al. find 
that LUC emissions resulting from domestic ethanol production will result in a 93% and 
50% increase in emissions for corn biomass-derived ethanol, respectively, relative to an 
energy equivalent unit of gasoline (meaning every mile driven on corn ethanol emits 
approximately twice as much as a mile driven on gasoline). Put into the context of 
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carbon payback periods, these results suggest that a payback period of 167 years of 
context biofuel production and consumption would be necessary to outweigh ILUC 
emissions.    
 Obviously, the implications of these studies contradict political ambitions of 
reducing GHG emissions by displacing fossil fuels with biofuels. However, some 
question the validity of the Searchinger analysis, and the inclusion of indirect LUC 
emissions in life cycle emissions calculation in general.  Wang, 2008, questions 
assumptions regarding total reliance on corn ethanol (instead of cellulosic feedstock 
conversion), a lack of corn productivity growth, and general uncertainty not accounted 
for in the Searchinger analysis.  Kim and Dale, 2009, point out that indirect LUC 
emissions depend on assumptions regarding social and environmental responsibilities 
taken by governments, and varying crop management practices, while also pointing out 
that fossil fuel consumption can also produce indirect emissions that are not accounted 
for (Kim and Dale, 2009).   
Other recent studies show that indirect LUC trajectories depend on a number of 
factors; in particular, LUC is sensitive to assumptions regarding yield response to 
demand shocks (Keeney and Hertel, 2009). However, augmenting two simple 
assumptions (U.S. forest conversion, and constant yield) reduces this debt significantly. 
Holding U.S. forest use constant (whereas Searchinger assumes that 36% of new U.S. 
cropland entering production would come from forests) reduces the payback period to 
141 years. Yield response plays an even larger role. A 1% increase in yield globally for 
the five major crop commodities (barley, corn, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat) would 
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reduce the payback period to 31 years, reconfirming the yield response results in Keeney 
and Hertel, 2009.  
 An even more recent comprehensive analysis by Hertel et al. (2010) has 
attempted to replicate the Searchinger et al. (2008) results using a static computable 
general equilibrium model. This study found smaller net LUC emissions estimates from 
U.S. ethanol expansion (Hertel et al., 2010), including a net land use change response 
that is approximately 40% of the Searching estimates and a carbon payback period of 
approximately 30 years. The advantage of this study is that the sensitivity of LUC 
emissions to several key variables, including 1) resource constraints, 2) substitutability 
of crop co-products, 3) demand response for food, 4) yield responses to higher prices, 
and 5) lower productivity of cropland coming into production.11 The paper illustrates 
that estimated ILUC emissions vary considerable for different base values of these key 
parameters.   
It should be noted that the previous studies cited here relied on static economic 
models that inherently ignore the dynamics of land use decisions or commodity 
markets.12  Additionally, biodiesel mandates, cellulosic ethanol, and other “advanced” 
biofuels produced in the U.S. are not modeled, and these studies have not measured 
ILUC on the economic margin, as the modeling approach exogenously “shocked” 
baseline conditions with a high level of corn ethanol. Also, cropland expansion in the 
                                                 
11
 An ad hoc productivity factor of 0.66 is used to simulate reduced yields of new cropland. In general 
there is a real dearth of data that ties land productivity and production characteristics of lands considered 
“marginal” to regional average yields. Hertel et al. beseech the scientific community to fill this void. This 
sentiment is echoed in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.  
12
 The authors are very clear that results of this comparative static approach should continue to be 
compared with those obtained from dynamic optimization approaches.  
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U.S. onto forested or grazing lands is highly is constrained in these studies using ad hoc 
assumptions or extremely inelastic elasticities of substitution for U.S. land uses. Greater 
flexibility in U.S. cropland expansion possibilities would presumably decrease these 
estimated losses further.    
3.3.2 Land Use and GHG Mitigation  
 Induced LUC emissions are important in a climate mitigation context as well. 
Recent studies argue that not accounting for indirect LUC in life cycle analyses of 
bioenergy is a critical carbon accounting flaw in international climate policy legislation 
(Searchinger et al., 2009). Such models measure market responses to bioenergy 
expansion and subsequent land use decisions driven by the commodity market impact. 
Additionally, offsets that incentivize land set-asides on marginal or productive 
agricultural lands, while beneficial from carbon and wildlife habitat standpoints, can lead 
to alternative forms of development, including cropland deforestation and grassland 
conversion. This point is highlighted by unanticipated effects of the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) that have been explored in a number of previous studies (Baker 
and Galik, 2009 ,Baker et al., 2008, Wu, 2000, 2005). While the program produces local 
environmental benefits, setting agricultural lands aside for conservation purposes can 
induce leakage other regions. Also, maintaining conservation lands in a period of high 
opportunity costs of conservation (i.e., arbitrarily high commodity prices or land rents) 
can lead to alternative forms of agricultural development in more sensitive ecosystems 
(Baker, et al., 2008).    
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 Leakage is often thought of in a biofuels context, but pure climate mitigation 
activities can also lead to indirect land use changes. Several studies have evaluated 
leakage from forest conservation, forest management, and afforestation efforts (Gan and 
McCarl, 2007, Murray et al., 2004, Sun and Sohngen, 2009), and conclude that upward 
pressure on commodity markets induced by forest carbon sequestration incentives that 
lengthen rotations and alter forest management can shift timber production elsewhere, 
leading to diminished GHG gains to the mitigation effort. This effect can vary 
tremendously; Murray et al., show that leakage effects on net mitigation potential can 
range from less than 10% to more than 90%, depending on the region and mitigation 
activity undertaken.  
 In summary, managing land resources effectively under low-carbon policies such 
that the mitigation and renewable energy priorities are not undermined will prove to be a 
lofty goal.  Shifting land resources away from conventional food and fiber production 
can boost agricultural development to the extensive margin. In the U.S., this could signal 
an increased propensity to deforest, cultivate natural grass or rangeland, or re-cultivate 
lands currently enrolled in conservation programs. Internationally, deforestation is of 
primary concern. External pressures on land resources illustrate the importance of 
international offsets, or programs designed to reduce deforestation rates internationally.  
If policies and production responses in the U.S. are primarily responsible for commodity 
price fluctuations, then U.S. support of policies that can alleviate land use change 
internationally is critical for comprehensive climate mitigation goals—a key result 
discussed in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.   
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 However, land use change is not the only concern of environmental concern 
posed by bioenergy and climate mitigation policies, as water resources are also at risk.  
The next section discusses agricultural water resources in a low-carbon economy.   
3.4 Water Resources in a Low Carbon Economy 
 To date, most studies within the climate/water paradigm have focused on the 
biophysical impacts of climate change on water resource systems, and implications for 
future water availability (Christensen et al., 2004, Jackson et al., 2001).  The economics 
literature has examined water management institutions in a changing climate, or how 
agricultural production systems might respond to climate change (Chen et al., 2001, 
Döll, 2002, Fischer et al., 2007, Hatch et al., 1999, Mendelsohn and Dinar, 2003, 
Mendelsohn et al., 1994). These studies take an adaptation perspective, choosing to 
explain the economic consequences of changing temperatures and precipitation patterns 
with most highlighting the potential benefits of increased agricultural yields brought on 
by warmer temperatures, higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations, and increased regional 
water availability.13   
 However, few studies have considered the impact of climate mitigation 
opportunities or renewable energy mandates on regional water resource systems. This is 
a growing area of concern, as highlighted by the most recent Assessment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Bates et al., 2008). Recent research 
                                                 
13
 However, recent evidence by Roberts and Schlenker suggests that crop yields decline substantially 
beyond certain heat tolerance thresholds, suggesting that agriculture could experience substantial welfare 
losses under recent climate change projections (Roberts and Schlenker, PNAS, 2009).  
51 
 
 
indicates that world categorized by serious GHG reduction efforts would ease irrigation 
water requirements and improve water availability (Fischer et al., 2007). 
  The interactions of water, energy, and climate policy are critical, especially when 
climate mitigation efforts explicitly interact with AF by affecting both energy input costs 
and incentivizing alternative land uses. As climate mitigation schemes raise the cost of 
energy inputs, water managers in groundwater dependent regions will be forced into 
difficult decisions. In regions where scarcity is not a concern, increasing the marginal 
costs of water provision indirectly through GHG mitigation efforts raises equity 
concerns. Where scarcity and over-exploitation are prevalent, raising the marginal cost 
of water extraction could indirectly help sustain the lifetime of the aquifer.  In addition, 
higher energy costs could lead farmers to switch to more energy and water efficient 
irrigation systems, such as the Low Energy Precision Application system.14 Regardless 
of region, or relative water availability, climate mitigation incentives will be pervasive in 
water management decisions.  
Policy makers should be careful in promoting carbon benefits at the expense of 
water resources; water quantity/quality trade-offs of renewable energy development 
should be carefully weighed.      
3.4.1 Interactions with AF Mitigation Alternatives  
 In no way is the carbon/water trade-off more appropriate than with GHG 
mitigation incentives for agriculture and forestry. While previous research has suggested 
                                                 
14
 Recent studies refute the claim that such systems actually promote water conservation (Peterson and 
Ding, 2005). 
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that climate mitigation in agriculture can directly benefit water resources (Greenhalgh 
and Sauer, 2003, Pattanayak et al., 2005), this dissertation will show that terrestrial 
mitigation can have largely ambiguous net effects on water consumption and quality 
 Much like land resources, one classify the policy induced impacts of bioenergy 
expansion and AF mitigation activities as having either direct or indirect effects on water 
resources. Direct, or local effects, are the accompanying responses in consumption, 
quality, and altered hydrologic flows associated with a mitigation activity (or cultivation 
of bioenergy feedstocks).  Indirect responses occur when changing production practices 
or land uses in one region stimulate management intensity in another, thereby boosting 
irrigation rates or application of agricultural inputs that reduce water quality15. 
Biofuels present the most ostensible dilemma. There is valid concern that a 
global biofuel industry will increase use of irrigation water and degrade water quality 
through agricultural chemical application (National Research Council (U.S.), 2008, 
Rajagopal and Zilberman, 2007). However, some argue that the net impacts of biofuel 
development will be negligible at a global scale, but could have acute impacts locally, 
especially where water is scarce to begin with (Berndes, 2002, de Fraiture et al., 2008). 
In terms of quality, increased nitrogen runoff and leaching are likely; for surface water 
supplies this can lead to hypoxia in the Gulf Coast as well as other residual 
environmental impacts (Donner and Kucharik, 2008). If allocation of land to energy 
production in one region extends production in another, indirect impacts on water 
resources could negate any benefits in the conservation region. As an example, consider 
                                                 
15
 I refer to this as “water leakage” from herein.  
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the case of an offset market that incentives land set-asides for carbon sequestration. If a 
unit of irrigated agricultural production leaves production in one region, then the indirect 
market outcome could shift water use in a region with existing scarcity concerns that 
lacks the biophysical capability to participate in an offsets market at a large scale (this 
case is explored conceptually in the following chapter).  
 The cultivation of dedicated energy crops or use of agricultural residues for 
bioelectricity could have less pronounced effects on water.  Perennial biomass crops 
such as switchgrass, hybrid poplar, and willow can reduce agricultural input use and 
irrigation requirements relative to alternative biofuel crops such as corn and soybean 
(Scharlemann and Laurance, 2008, Zah et al., 2007). However, water leakage is still a 
concern if dedicated energy crops replace food production in areas with predominately 
non-irrigated production.   
 Agricultural mitigation activities will also affect water resources directly and 
indirectly. Consider land set-asides and soil sequestration through reduced tillage.  The 
former will obviously reduce irrigation withdrawals and improve water quality locally as 
land is taken out of production. For instance, research indicates that CRP lands reduce 
water erosion, sedimentation and nutrient leaching (Davie and Lant, 1994; Randall et al., 
1997). Conservation tillage is another option to increase the sequestration potential of 
agricultural lands (Lal, 2004).  The advantage of conservation tillage is that it helps 
nutrient and water retention in agricultural soils, leading to decreased input use and long-
term production sustainability. Conservation tillage also reduces soil erosion, which 
decreases sedimentation runoff (Lal, 2004, Pimentel et al., 1995). Regional studies have 
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combined economic and biophysical modeling systems to simulate potential 
environmental co-benefits of conservation tillage, finding net water quality 
improvements (Feng et al., 2007, Kurkalova et al., 2004).   However, reduced tillage is 
often accompanied by additional herbicide application, which can degrade water quality 
(Schneider and Kumar, 2008).  
 In many parts of the world nitrogen runoff from agriculture is the predominant 
source of water pollution and the problem is worsening (Aneja et al., 2008, Greenhalgh 
and Sauer, 2003). In the United States, Gulf of Mexico hypoxia, caused primarily by 
upstream agricultural runoff, threatens aquatic ecosystems and critical food supplies 
(Robertson and Vitousek, 2009). Globally, this problem is acute in a number of regions; 
more than 400 hypoxic zones have been identified, and hypoxic activity has increased 
exponentially since the 1960s (Diaz and Rosenberg, 2008). Nitrate contamination in 
surface and groundwater systems poses a serious and diverse set of health risks, and is 
another environmental cost of agricultural N use (Townsend et al., 2003). Thus, any 
effort to reduce on-farm nitrogen use--be it through nutrient trading or N use offsets, will 
aid in reducing the environmental costs of intense agriculture. Production function 
relationships between N and water inputs and yield effects will determine whether the 
extent to which N offsets affect water resources.   
 Forest offsets can also alter hydrologic flows, and indirectly impact water 
management outside of the system. Afforestation incentives can have indirect 
consequences on water via leakage, similar to the aforementioned options.  Additionally, 
new forest stands could directly impact hydrologic systems by reducing stream flow and 
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disrupting natural hydrologic processes (Jackson et al., 2005, Jackson et al., 2005, le 
Maitre and Versfeld, 1997). The extent of reduced runoff and water system disruption 
depends on the geographic location of afforested lands, and the species of vegetation 
planted (Farley et al., 2005). Depending on the geographic location of afforested land, 
impacts on the hydrologic cycle can be quite serious (Zomer et al., 2006).  Avoided 
deforestation, can benefit ecosystems and water supplies by reducing run-off, preventing 
erosion and flooding, protecting fisheries, and lowering siltation of river systems 
(Chomitz and Kumari, 1996, Parrotta, 2002).  
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CHAPTER IV  
A MODEL OF LAND ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT UNDER 
BIOENERGY AND GHG MITIGATION POLICIES 
  
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a conceptual model that is consistent with 
the goals of renewable energy (implying cropland expansion) and GHG mitigation 
(which could refer to offset market participation, or some other price-mechanism 
incentivizes reductions in emissions or enhanced sequestration) on land management 
options on the intensive and extensive margins. This model shows how such policies can 
all lead to higher output prices.  
4.1 Background  
Several previous studies have addressed the welfare and commodity market 
implications of renewable energy mandates or GHG mitigation in the agricultural sector 
(Murray et al. 2007, Baker et al., 2010, Feng and Babcock, 2010). Feng and Babcock use 
comparative statics of a system in market equilibrium to show that biofuel mandates will 
lead to cropland expansion and management intensification in input use as farmers 
respond directly and indirectly to the new market conditions. Keeney and Hertel, 2009 
use a global computable general equilibrium to simulate land use responses on the 
intensive and extensive margins. This study takes this methodology a step further by 
illustrating the effects of combined bioenergy mandates and mitigation efforts on land 
management decisions. 
57 
 
 
This chapter presents a simple model of the linkages between the production of 
food, bioenergy, and the provision of carbon from multiple land supplies. This model 
provides insight into the effect of renewable energy mandates, GHG intensity thresholds 
for bioenergy, and carbon offset incentives on land management decisions along the 
intensive and extensive margins. An extensive shift in agriculture requires that new land 
be brought into production (such as previously productive land that had been idled, or 
natural forests or grasslands that are cultivated for the first time). An intensive shift 
requires a change in management intensity (i.e. increased application of agricultural 
inputs). This chapter attempts to conceptually model the linkages between reduced 
carbon policy efforts, and how land management shifts can affect commodity prices as 
well as the potential and costs of GHG mitigation in the AF sectors. Innovations of this 
model compared to previous studies of biofuel mandates and land use include the 
addition of emissions intensity of production, mandates combined with GHG intensity 
thresholds (instead of a pure volume-based mandate), and a carbon offset market.      
4.2 The Model  
First, consider a system in which producers will make resource allocation and 
production decisions in a static fashion. Consider a supply of land (L) that can be used 
for three alternative purposes: production of conventional food (f), bioenergy (b), or 
carbon (c). The supply of  c can more generally be thought of as the net emissions or 
mitigation emanating from the terrestrial systems. While there are many food and 
bioenergy cropping alternatives, this model assumes a very general commodity 
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representation for simplicity. Conventional commodities are represented by the 
composite f, bioenergy is represented by the composite b, and GHG emissions, c. An 
aggregate production function (Y) captures the production possibilities of these goods as 
a function of land use, and an index of production intensity (a variable which includes 
soil management intensity, and the degree of agricultural input use), denoted by µ j. The 
level of chosen management intensity is directly related to productivity and GHG 
emissions. While previous studies have explored the role of intensification in alleviating 
indirect LUC concerns of biofuel policies, no study has explored this variable in detail, 
or how resulting emissions can be altered by intensity of production in addition to land 
use changes. The form of µ j can vary by region; depending on geographic and 
production characteristics of the land.  
Before returning to management intensity, consider the total land supply function 
for this system.  
(Equation 1)    L = Lc + L f + Lb  
Lc represents the land that is idle in a given time period and Lf is the land used for 
the production of food, and Lb is allocated to energy production. One can assume that 
land is idled for a combination of factors, including the non-market value of lands held 
in situ, or due to geographic factors limiting the production potential of lands (that is, not 
all idle land can be used for food or energy production). Alternatively, this could 
represent land that is actively managed for timber production. The interactions between 
production agriculture and forestry are handled in detail in subsequent chapters.  
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4.2.1 Food and Energy Supply Functions  
For now, assume that food and energy are the only productive options on this 
land, and while this may come from the same feedstock, one can represent Yf and Yb with 
separate production specifications.16 Production of food follows a relatively simplistic 
form that depends on the amount of land and intensity applied to the system, and the 
amount of land in production at any given time (which allows for declining productivity 
as additional land is brought into production.  Let θ represent the total proportion of 
land in production, or ( )f bL L L+ . The aggregate supply function for food becomes: 
(Equation 2)   
*
*
0
( , )
fL
f
f f fY y dLµ θ= ∫
 
Land-based bioenergy production takes a similar form: 
( Equation 3)   
*
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 Following most agronomic relationships, assume that production of food and 
bioenergy is increasing and concave in input use, such that 0j
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Notice that the proportion of land dedicated to production activities also enters the 
production function yj(). The implication here is that, ceteris paribus, marginal 
productivity will decline in this system as additional land is brought into production, 
                                                 
16
 Note that this formulation makes assumes no overlapping between energy and conventional cropping 
systems (thus, no harvesting of residues on food systems for advanced biofuels production. While the 
Renewable Fuels Standard was designed to allow for biofuels produced from cropping residues and other 
agricultural by-products, I choose to model a generic form of this management decision.   
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thus 0j
y
θ
∂
<
∂
  for j=f,b. This is the expansion effect on productivity. Assuming that 
landowners will use their most productive lands actively, any effort to expand total 
acreage will boost total productivity, but at a declining rate (holding intensity constant).  
While this model can be applied to two distinct production functions for food and 
energy, this chapter makes the simplifying assumption that the composite food 
commodity and energy feedstock come from the same crop. Thus, one can substitute the 
production of food into that of energy using the same feedstock. Land shares and chosen 
production intensity for food and energy, respectively, will remain independent of the 
other. This is an important distinction. Since the production of each producers a different 
source of emissions on the margin, it is important to separate the two.  For instance, 
lower production intensity for energy crops can produce additional GHG benefits on the 
margin as this is coupled with the carbon value of fossil-fuel replacement.     
4.2.2 Carbon Supply Functions 
The contribution of this model is the joint product supply function of c, either in 
the form of emissions or mitigation potential, from energy and food cropping systems. 
Previous analytical models of biofuels, climate, and land use have not captured the 
emissions and terrestrial carbon sequestration profiles of the land use system. The 
production of c is defined as the sum of all sources of GHG emissions and terrestrial 
carbon sequestration in the system. Again, the term “c” refers to all sources of GHG 
emissions within the system that contribute to the atmospheric concentration of GHGs. 
These include: 
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• CO2 emissions from land shifts from idle to productive use (a loss in terrestrial 
carbon), 
• CO2 emissions tied to fossil fuel use captured by the intensity proxy (µ j), 
• CO2 emissions offset in the general economy through bioenergy replacement of 
fossil fuels (τ ),  
• N2O and other non-CO2 emissions captured by the intensity proxy (µ j),  
• Emissions from energy consumed in transporting and processing the bioenergy 
feedstock per unit output (constant) is represented by
 
bφ  (and the parameter ω  is 
GHG emissions per-unit energy consumed)17,  
•  C stored in productive soils managed under low-intensity regimes, and 
• C sequestered in land moved over into conservation.  
The net carbon supply function for this system is defined by Equation 4, which 
sums over all sources of emissions and sequestration from productive and non-
productive activities.   
(Equation 4)  YC = cs ⋅ LC − L f c f (µ f ) − Lbcb (µb ) − ωφb −τ( )Y b  
 Production activities can produce a source of GHG emissions through energy 
and agricultural input use. Total emissions from food cultivation will depend on the 
amount of land in production, and the per-unit emissions from cultivation, which is a 
function of the chosen level of management intensity. Thus, the net contribution of c 
                                                 
17
 This is a simplifying assumption.  In reality, energy consumed in transporting biomass for bioenergy 
processing would depend on productivity per unit land and  
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from food production to Yc is represented by L f c f (µ f ). However, bioenergy 
consumption replaces emissions from fossil fuel combustion, so the net contribution of c 
from bioenergy systems will include emissions from the cultivation process Lbcb (µb ) , 
and emissions from transporting, processing, and combustion of the final biofuel, 
represented by ωφb −τ( )Y b .  Thus, net emissions depend on production decisions on 
the intensive margin (µ j) and the relative share of land in each use.  
This model also assumes that non-productive land will sequester a constant 
amount of carbon, represented by the parameter cs.  In this simple static representation, 
the carbon uptake from idle land is a function of the amount of land idled, so saturation 
of terrestrial carbon stocks does not happen (if this were a dynamic model, terrestrial 
carbon stocks would ultimately reach a saturation point, and the stock of carbon lost 
from land use changes would grow with the amount of time the land had been in a prior 
use). Any change in this stock will be met by an addition in annual carbon sequestration 
(from shifts out of production), or an instantaneous loss in carbon equal to the 
sequestration rate18. Any movement of land from production to idle use will generate a 
constant rate of carbon sequestration (cs). This relationship is illustrated by Figure 5: 
                                                 
18
 A simplifying assumption as this is a static model. Accurate representation of terrestrial carbon fluxes 
requires comparative dynamics.    
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Figure 5: Carbon sequestration supply from idle land 
 
Additional land moved into production will contribute a positive source of 
emissions, thereby reducing the total supply of c. The net effect of this source depends 
on the chosen management intensity level for food and energy production, and the 
proportion of each in the total productive land base, as discussed in the subsequent 
section. Equation 5 depicts the net emissions resulting from a unit shift of land into food 
and bioenergy respectively. Here, the system suffers a loss in carbon sequestration plus 
any subsequent cultivation emissions from a chosen level of management intensity.  
(Equation 5)  
∂YC
∂L f
= −cs + c f (µ f* )                               if food expansion
∂YC
∂L f
= −cs + cb (µb* ) − (ωφb -τ )yb (µb* )     if bioenergy expansion 
 
C
0
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Emissions also vary with intensity of food and energy production (µ j). To 
visualize GHG emissions at different levels of effort, and the relationship between yield 
productivity and emissions, consider Figure 6. Here, curves are drawn arbitrarily to 
depict concavity in production and increasing emissions per level of effort. Yield per 
unit area is represented by the vertical axis on the left side of the figure.  Emissions per 
unit area are represented by the vertical axis on the right-hand side. The horizontal axis 
represents the chosen level of management intensity, µ j. To reiterate, the intensity 
variable is defined as some functional relationship that captures the yield impacts of 
input use and soil management decisions. Simultaneously, the intensity proxy 
determines the emissions contribution of the production activity. As additional energy 
use increases emissions linearly, and increased N fertilizer can induce non-linear 
(increasing) emissions, emissions from food systems increase over the intensity horizon.  
First, consider a value of µ j = 0. This would imply the absolute minimum 
intensity level required to produce some given level of base output, 0jy . One could 
imagine this to be a labor-intensive system, perhaps with perennial crops, continuous no-
till, and no fertilizer or chemical additives. The main source of capital inputs would be 
the energy and machinery required to initially plant the system and for harvest. Regional 
climate and plant growth conditions might affect productivity more than management 
decisions. Notice that at low levels of intensity (indicated by zone A), the system is 
producing a net GHG sink (hence, negative total emissions) such that that the carbon 
sequestered in productive soils outweighs the additional emissions produced form input 
and fossil fuel use in the system. This would likely imply a case of continuous no-till or 
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conservation tillage practices, with limited fertilizer/chemical application, and limited 
fossil fuel use. Net emissions then increase quickly, such that the productive system 
becomes a net source at low to medium levels of µ j. Thus, the emissions function from 
food production, c f (µ f ) , is increasing and convex in intensity such that: 
∂c f (µ f )
∂µ f
> 0, and 
∂2c f (µ f )
∂µ f
2 > 0. The implication here is that movement to the 
intensive margin from a low-intensity system defined by Zone A into a high-intensity 
system in Zone B will increase productivity, but at the expense of higher emissions.  In a 
business-as-usual regime with no policy incentives to reduce emissions, a producer will 
choose the level of intensity that equilibrates the marginal costs of intensification with 
marginal returns. Incentives for emissions reductions, however, could cause a producer 
to relax management intensity if the GHG mitigation payment outweighed any expected 
loss in productivity from de-intensification.  
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Figure 6: Emissions from productive activities     
 
 
Emissions from bioenergy cropping systems take a slightly different form due to 
the emissions displacement effect of biofuels. Total emissions per unit area from 
bioenergy cropping are depicted by the bottom curve in Figure 6, and mathematically by 
Equation 6. Here, total emissions are a function of intensity as before, so cb (µb ) denotes 
the per-acre emissions of bioenergy cultivation. However, additional terms are needed to 
account for the full life-cycle emissions from bioenergy production from energy 
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consumed for transporting and processing the biomass (defined byωφb ). Again, the term 
φb  represents the energy consumed to transport and process the bioenergy (assumed 
constant in this model for simplicity—in reality this would vary regionally depending on 
processing technologies and hauling distances), while ω  is a simple emissions factor for 
converting energy consumed to CO2 (or similar GHG metric). The final term, τ, 
represents the emissions factor for an energy equivalent unit of fossil energy. Take the 
example of corn ethanol and gasoline.  A gallon of gasoline has CO2 content equal to 
roughly 0.0088 tCO2e, and ethanol is roughly 70% as efficient as gasoline on an energy 
equivalent basis, so τ in this case would be 0.7*0.0088 = 0.00616. Thus, in the case of 
corn ethanol, in addition to cultivation emissions, each unit of bioenergy produced in the 
system provides τ = 0.00616 units of carbon through fossil fuel replacement in the 
transportation fuel market (assuming no leakage).  
(Equation 6)   Emitb = cb (µb ) − ωφb −τ( ) yb (µb ,θ )     
 This specification shows that increasing bioenergy crop yields will boost the 
supply of GHG benefits up to a point where ( )( ) ( , )b b b bb
b b
c yµ µ θωφ τµ µ
∂ ∂ 
= −  ∂ ∂ 
. 
Beyond this point, the emissions from increased intensity will outweigh the marginal 
GHG gains of higher energy yields. This is important for policies that impose GHG 
reduction thresholds on the full life-cycle GHG benefits of biofuels. While the 
production relationships of energy and food are considered identical, choosing 
alternative levels of intensity in both can affect net GHG emissions from the entire 
system (thus intensity in food and energy production are accounted for separately).  
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 Consider a fixed proportion of land allocation between food and energy. Holding 
this proportion constant, the net GHG effect of a shift to the intensive and extensive 
margins is given by (Equation 7. The importance of this specification is that GHG 
emissions (or the supply of c) depend not only on the land clearing activity, but also on 
management responses on the intensive margins. To date, most analyses have focused on 
the former, but have ignored the latter.  
(Equation 7)    
2 ()fC
f
f f
cY
L µ µ
∂∂
=
∂ ∂ ∂
  
(Equation 8)   ∂
2YC
∂Lb∂µb
=
∂cb (µb )
∂µb
+ ωφb − τ( ) ∂yb (µb )∂µb  
 
4.2.3 Profit Maximization in the Absence of Policy 
Incorporating the supply of c directly into a land use optimization framework can 
illustrate analytically how policy-induced shifts to the intensive and extensive margins 
can impact net emissions from the system.  A system with existing bioenergy mandates 
(or equivalent incentive) that wishes to pursue GHG mitigation might face higher 
abatement costs than under BAU conditions.  
First, consider a simple profit maximization case in the absence of policy drivers. 
Here, land allocation and management intensity will depend on the relative land rents 
from energy feedstock, food production, and idle use. Assume that there is some implicit 
value on land not in Lf or Lb, which is depicted by Vc(Lc).  Let w j (µ j )  represent the 
costs of input use for a given level of management intensity per unit land area, and let Pe 
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be the price of fossil energy used in transporting and processing bioenergy (processing 
biomass to energy requires additional cost components—previous studies have 
employed this component to describe the price difference between corn and ethanol). 
Now we can express the net returns function from land use activities in the following 
terms:  
(Equation 9) 
 
pi = max
L f ,Le ,µ f ,µe
P jY
j
−w j (µ j )L j − Peφ jY j +V j (L j )( )
j =1
J
∑     for j = f ,b
s .t .          L j = L
j =1
J
∑
Where:   P j ,Y
j
,w j (µ j ) = 0    for  j = c
              φ j (µ j , L j ) = 0          for j  =  f ,c     
              V j (L j ) = 0                for j = f ,b  
 
 The Langrangian for this system becomes:  
(Equation 10) L(...) = P jY j −w j (µ j )L j −φ j (µ j , L j )Y j +V j (L j )( )
j =1
J
∑ − λ L − L j
j =1
J
∑






 
 
First order conditions of this system are shown in the following equations, where 
a “*” is used to denote choice variables at optimality. Equations 11-13 ensure that the 
marginal value of land among alternative uses is equilibrated at the same shadow price   
( λ ). 
Land will be allocated such that these conditions hold on the margin; any change 
in the relative value one land holding will influence allocation among the other uses. For 
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instance, a policy that increases the equilibrium commodity price of f or b, or mandates a 
greater supply of either commodity will bring more land into production (assuming no 
change in Vc(Lc)).  (Equation 14 and (Equation 15 equate the marginal costs of an 
aggregate shift in management intensity with the marginal value of productivity gained 
by boosting intensity. Thus, an aforementioned policy driver could also manifest itself in 
higher average production intensity to enhance productivity per-unit area. Equation 16 
ensures that the constraint on land allocation holds in equilibrium (that is, land cannot be 
created).  
(Equation 11)    * *( , )f f fP y µ θ λ=
 
(Equation 12)   * * * *( , ) ( , )b b b b b bP y yµ θ φ µ θ λ− =
 
(Equation 13)     ∂Vc (L
C *)
∂LC
= λ  
(Equation 14)   
*
* * *
*
0
* *
( , ) ( )
fL
f
f f
f ff
f
f f
y dL
w
P L
d
µ θ µ
µ µ
∂ ∂
=
∂
∫
 
(Equation 15)  
* *
* * * * * *
*
0 0
* * *
( , ) ( , )( )
b bL L
b b
b b b b
b b b
b e b
b b b
y dL y dL
wP L P
d
µ θ µ θ
µ φ
µ µ µ
∂ ∂
∂
= +
∂ ∂
∫ ∫
 
(Equation 16)     
1
J
j
j
L L
=
=∑  
 
 Assuming all second order conditions hold for this system, one can use 
optimality conditions to express the optimal land use totals and the intensity proxy as a 
function of own price, cross price, and supply of the other good.  The implication is that 
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policies that influence commodity prices, mandate the production of bioenergy, or 
incentivize GHG emissions reductions could alter land management trends on the 
extensive or intensive margins. The next sections show conceptually how biofuel and 
climate mitigation policies might affect market equilibrium, and additionally how such 
policies might alter the land use optimization problem. In addition, policy induced shifts 
in the demand for or price of f or b will influence land management decisions of the 
other. Indeed, this result has been shown in the literature for land management decisions 
with a bioenergy mandate (Feng and Babcock, 2010). 
 Note that while the joint product supply of c is not included in this pre-policy 
land allocation problem (as it does not affect optimization criteria in the absence of 
policy), total emissions, or the supply of c, can be calculated using optimal land 
allocation and intensity variables.  
4.2.3.1 Adding a Bioenergy Mandate  
First, consider the effect of a mandate on a system in market equilibrium. For 
simplicity, allow food and bioenergy to be derived from the same form of biomass 
(consistent with corn and ethanol, or soybeans and biodiesel). It has been shown that 
there is a distinct relationship between these prices, denoted by (Equation 17:  
(Equation 17)    Pb =
P f
β − P e φb
 
Where:  
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(Equation 18)    
1 2(1 )
αγβ δ δ= −  
 
The parameter β  is formed of several components has been proposed in 
methodologies presented in Moschini et al., 2009, de Gorter and Just, 2009, and Cui et 
al. 2010 to show the direct price differential in food and bioenergy prices in market 
equilibrium. In essence, β  is an adjustment factor that relates that price that can be 
received for a unit of food to the value of energy and food by-products that can be 
derived from converting a unit of food to bioenergy. Important parameters in this 
specification include the energy equivalence conversion factor of bioenergy relative to 
fossil fuel equivalents (γ), the net feedstock required to produce a unit of bioenergy 
output (α), the proportion of the feedstock that can re-enter the food supply chain as a 
byproduct ( 1δ -- an example would be Distillers Dry Grain from corn ethanol 
production), and the price difference of the by-product as a close substitute to the raw 
commodity ( 2δ ). Also, to get the price of bioenergy, one must also deduct the energy use 
and costs of transporting and processing the biomass into fuel, or P
e
φb .  Thus there is a 
distinct relationship not only between food and bioenergy, but also between fossil energy 
prices, Pf and Pb.  
To illustrate how a biofuel policies affect equilibrium prices for commodities, let 
aggregate supply functions from the system described above depict the total supply 
curve, and let the demand for bioenergy be reflected in the aggregate demand curve for 
food (as this is the primary feedstock driving energy processing). Furthermore, since f 
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and b are derived from the same biomass source, one can combine these supply curves to 
depict equilibrium conditions in commodity markets (which are influenced exogenously 
by energy markets). 
(Equation 19)    Q fS + QbS = Y f +Y b = Q fD  
 
Consider Figure 7, which depicts the equilibrium supply and demand of food and 
bioenergy following a format similar to recent welfare analyses of ethanol mandates 
(Moschini et al., 2009, de Gorter and Just, 2009, and Cui et al. 2010, Feng and Babcock, 
2010). The vertical axis on this figure represents the Here, the equilibrium price for food 
is not met as distortionary policies in the energy sector, such as ethanol blending 
requirements and production tax credits for biofuels drive the price of food to 0fP . The 
initial supply of food and energy are Q fS 0  and QbS 0  respectively.   
What happens if a stringent mandate requires additional bioenergy from the 
system?  Letting B denote the volume of the mandate (hence, Qb1 = B ), this forces a 
wedge between equilibrium supply and demand, effectively requiring more feedstock 
production from the system than would have realized under pre-policy conditions. This 
would boost the equilibrium prices of food to 1fP , while reducing the supply of food to 
Q f1 . With higher food prices, the price of bioenergy climbs as well to a new level of 
Pb
1
=
P f
1
β − P e φb
.  
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Figure 7: Food and bioenergy market equilibrium with a mandate 
 
Returning to the optimization framework from Equation 9, there are two ways in 
which the effects of a bioenergy mandate can be incorporated into the model, with 
similar implications for land management. For a simple producer optimization problem 
of a single landowner that is a price-taker, one can simply compare optimal land 
management under baseline and policy-induced price regimes. Alternatively, one could 
model the land allocation problem as a Social Planner problem in which regional land 
resources are allocated to produce f and b. In such a case, one could model the 
exogenous shift in prices, and a mandatory production threshold for b that would not be 
there under pre-policy conditions.  Holding the value function for idle land constant in 
0S
fQ
fP
0S
bQ
1S
bQ B=1SfQ
S S
f bQ Q+
bP
0
fP
1
fP
D
fQ
75 
 
 
this new policy regime, the mandatory level of b would imply a re-distribution of land 
resources. Feng and Babcock discuss the influence of an ethanol mandate on land 
allocation, deriving total expansion and intensification effects across different cropping 
systems. The Feng and Babcock results are straightforward and applicable to the model 
presented here—higher prices bring additional land into production, but as this land is of 
a lower quality, overall intensification occurs to maintain average productivity across the 
system. That is, if an acre of existing food production is replaced by an acre of energy, a 
market response would be to demand more food production. If expansion occurs to 
replace that lost acre, this would be of a lower quality, thus intense management would 
be required to fully replace the lost acre of production. Thus, by imposing mandatory 
production levels of b, one can induce expansion of Lf and increase µ j  to make up for 
the lost productivity.  
4.2.3.2 Adding GHG Intensity Thresholds  
In addition to the binding mandates, the RFS2 and California’s LCFS include 
GHG reduction thresholds for bioenergy. These stipulate that the full life-cycle 
emissions displacement of renewable fuel must offset fossil fuel emissions by X%. 
Typically, these metrics involve some correction for indirect LUC emissions 
internationally, but mostly they are concerned with the well-to-wheel life-cycle 
emissions from the bioenergy.  Assuming that the energy equivalent GHG displacement 
of bioenergy stays constant (τ ), this means that a threshold is imposed on GHG 
intensity of biofuels in order to maximize the emissions displacement potential from the 
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production system. One idea behind this sort of policy mechanism is to promote 
sustainable biomass production with limited environmental degradation to reduce 
emissions from fossil fuel use and promotes alternative forms of energy without 
sacrificing the productivity of conventional crops. However, such emissions intensity 
thresholds could reduce overall production and can lead to additional leakage that would 
not have occurred with just the binding mandate.    
Emissions intensity of bioenergy cropping systems can by reduced by lowering 
cultivation emissions (cb (µb )), or by lowering transport and processing emissions (ωφb
). For simplicity, assume that only cultivation emissions can be altered. Thus, emissions 
intensity for bioenergy must fall below some policy-mandated threshold, ξ . Equation X 
displays the emissions intensity threshold, where emissions intensity is defined as total 
emissions per unit area divided by yield:  
 
 
(Equation 20)   cb (µb ) − (ωφb − τ ) yb (µb )( )
yb (µb )
≤ ξ  
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Following Figure 7 this implies that production and emissions intensity would 
have to lie somewhere in the range highlighted in blue below (as indicated by Figure 8) 
such that the per-unit emissions displacement of bioenergy reaches the mandated 
thresholdξ . Intensity to the right of this area would imply excessively high cultivation 
emissions, though falling to the left of the shaded area would imply low yields. 
Assuming that production intensity of bioenergy lies somewhere outside of this range 
without a GHG reduction threshold, a reduction would be required, thus prohibiting 
excessive production intensity. For example, if production intensity from the system was 
initially at 0bµ  but this violated the emissions threshold, then a decrease in intensity to at 
least 1bµ  would be necessary for the system to comply with the intensity threshold. Note 
that while this de-intensification implies a net reduction in emissions from cultivation, 
such a shift would lower per-acre productivity as well.   
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Figure 8: Illustrating the effects of LCFS on production intensity 
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If a mandate still binds, an overall reduction in bioenergy production intensity 
would imply a greater allocation of land into bioenergy.  As the mandate binds, any 
reduction in productivity per unit land would require additional land to hit the quota, 
leading to a re-allocation of land that reduces food production. First, reduced emissions 
intensity from a bioenergy cropping system could imply decreased transportation 
emissions from cultivation to processing location, meaning a smaller radius of bioenergy 
production surrounding the energy facility. This reduced radius implies a greater 
proportion of energy production within that area, or a trade-off from convention or idle 
use to bioenergy.  The second reason is more intuitive—land is less productive on the 
margin, and hence requires greater intensity to achieve average productivity levels. Since 
the point of a GHG threshold is to reduce emissions intensity of production, bioenergy 
expansion onto marginal cropland would likely not occur.  Instead, a producer would 
substitute productive land currently used for food wherever reductions in management 
intensity and emissions are possible without sacrificing much in the way of yield. Over 
the long-term, such a replacement would lead to expansion in conventional commodity 
production, perhaps onto marginal lands that require intensive cultivation. 
If reduced management intensity in b requires greater levels of Lb, this would 
reduce the supply of the conventional commodity, subsequently raising the price, as 
depicted by Figure 9. This figure builds upon the previous depiction of the effect of the 
mandate B on the supply of f and b. Now, there is a reduction in total supply due to 
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restrictions on intensity. Supply decreases from Q fS 1 + QbS 1( ) to Q fS 2 + QbS 2( ) , and 
equilibrium prices are increase from P f
1
 to P f
2
.  
 
 
Figure 9: Food and energy market equilibrium with a mandate and GHG intensity 
thresholds 
 
The following mathematical expression augments the original optimization 
problem by adding the mandate constraint and the emissions intensity inequality: 
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(Equation 21) 
 
pi = max
L f ,Le ,µ f ,µe
P j
2Y j −w j (µ j )L j − Peφ jY j +V j (L j )( )
j =1
J
∑     for j = f ,b
s .t .          L j = L
j =1
J
∑
              Y b = B                     
             
Lbcb (µb ) − ωφb −τ( )Y b( )
Y b
≤ ξ
Where:   P j
2
,Y j ,w j (µ j ) = 0    for  j = c
              φ j (µ j , L j ) = 0          for j  =  c, f     
              V j (L j ) = 0                for j = f ,b  
              B  = Mandate
              ξ =  Emissions Intensity Threshold
 
 Optimality conditions from the system would reflect the mandate and GHG 
intensity threshold for bioenergy. That, in addition to the higher equilibrium prices, Pj
2
, 
could induce additional land expansion and intensification in f. Thus, while GHG 
thresholds can reduce emissions from bioenergy production, such policies can 
potentially lead to land use shifts and intensification for food production system at a 
greater rate than a mandate with no GHG reduction thresholds. Once again, the supply 
function for c does not enter the objective function explicitly, but implied land 
management patterns in optimality can be used to estimate net emissions.  
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4.2.3.3 Adding GHG Mitigation Incentives   
Now, in addition to policies that function similarly to the RFS2, we can explore 
what happens to the system when GHG mitigation incentives are included into the 
optimization framework. First, it is important to note that any price-based GHG 
mitigation incentive mechanism would ideally target emissions reductions that are 
additional to emissions under baseline practices. For such a policy to be successful, one 
must first establish baseline emissions for the land us system. Let 0
cY  represent net 
emissions under business-as-usual conditions. Using optimal land use shares and 
intensity proxies, baseline emissions would be given by the following equation:  
(Equation 22)  YC0 = cs ⋅ LC 0* − L f 0*c f (µ f0*) − Lb 0*cb (µb0*) − ωφb −τ( )Y b 0*  
 
Now assume that a mitigation policy is enacted that creates a price incentive for 
emissions reduction within the land use system. The most obvious example would be a 
carbon offset market that pays farmers for emissions reduction or enhanced 
sequestration, but other similar programmatic approaches could exist (such as a 
voluntary program akin to the CRP that pays landowners to adopt mitigation practices 
and pays them some established mitigation price). For this model, let Pc denote the value 
of the mitigation price incentive. Also, let 1
cY  be total emissions from the system after 
the establishment of the GHG mitigation policy. Thus, the total supply of creditable 
mitigation from the terrestrial system is given by:19  
                                                 
19
 This specification does not account for leakage of emissions that accompany productivity reductions.  
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(Equation 23)    
Offset _ Supply = Y c 0 −Y c1
Where Y c 0 = baseline emissions
 
Any reduction in total emissions can come from reductions in µb  or µ f , or 
through a land use shift out of production for carbon sequestration (that is, higher levels 
of Lc). If a bioenergy mandate binds, then no additional b can be produced for 
mitigation.  However, if B is not binding (that is, we replace the previous constraint with 
an inequality), then additional b production could contribute to mitigation goals.  Note 
that not all variables need to move uniformly towards mitigation. That is, net emissions 
reduction might be achievable through greater levels of Lc, accompanied by 
intensification (increased µ j ). Changes in any of the land use or management variables 
will imply different levels of production emanating from the system as well.  
The new welfare function reflects this new GHG mitigation supply function 
(relative to baseline emissions). No new constraints are added to the system (depicted by 
(Equation 24). However, a new term in the objective function that internalizes the value 
of GHG mitigation through shifting land management patterns, thus incentivizing 
reductions in intensity or a reallocation of land for increased carbon sequestration:   
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(Equation 24)  
maxpi
L f ,Le ,µ f ,µe
= Pf Y
f
−w f (µ f )L f
                PbY
b
−wb (µb )Lb − PeφbY b
              +V
c
(L
c
) + P
c
(Y c −Y c )
s .t .          L j = L
j =1
J
∑
              Y b = B  
 
           Lbcb (µb ) − ωφb − τ( )Y b( )
Y b
≤ ξ
                   
 Where:   B  = Mandate (optional)
              
 
 
Optimality conditions for the system could fundamentally change in this scenario 
as the value of idle land is adjusted to account for carbon sequestration potential, or as 
different levels of intensity are chosen for emissions reduction. Before, bioenergy 
policies affected the value of productive lands, but now land is reallocated as rents from 
production compete with the value of carbon sequestration. On the margin, a new unit of 
land moved to Lc would now include the value of carbon sequestration. This relationship 
is displayed in the following equation:  
(Equation 25)    ∂Vc (L
c*)
∂Lc
+ P
c
cs = λ  
 
For a sufficiently high Pc this additional value on idle land assures, at the very 
least, that production expansion will occur at a slower rate than in the absence of the 
mitigation policy, implying reduced land use change under a carbon pricing regime.  
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Now, as the cost of emissions from management intensity is internalized, the marginal 
value of an additional acre of productive land must be balanced with the costs of that 
land and the GHG costs of management intensity level µ j*. Thus, the offset value of 
changing management intensity must equate with the marginal returns to such a shift.   
If commodity prices adjust to supply contraction, the existence of a carbon offset 
market might not imply a net reduction in intensity.  If the commodity price effect of the 
mandate or shifting land out of production is large enough, or if reductions in intensity 
only produce small GHG benefits, this could induce an intensification effect that boosts 
emissions c f
0 (µ f0 ) < c f1 (µ f1* )( ) . However, with more moderate shifts in commodity prices 
and a carbon price that is sufficiently large, one would expect a reduction in 
management intensity relative to the baseline due to the opportunity costs of forgoing 
carbon offset credits. The returns to a marginal unit of idle land should be equal to the 
marginal costs of land conversion, and the opportunity costs of taking land out of 
production (or ∂Vc (L
c*)
∂Lc
+ P
c
cs ). Note that the opportunity costs of taking land out of 
production will increase as more land is idled (and as the productivity of land increases 
with Lc, thus the landowner is surrendering higher quality land with each additional unit 
of Lc).  
4.2.3.4 Combining a Bioenergy Mandate with GHG Mitigation Incentives 
To reiterate, the supply of GHG abatement from this representative land use 
system could come from reductions in management intensification, further production of 
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bioenergy beyond baseline levels, and through land set-asides for carbon sequestration. 
However, as the previous section argues, bioenergy mandates could increase land use 
and management intensity. Thus, there are two important interactions of biofuel 
mandates and GHG mitigation that warrant further attention.  
First, a viable market or policy incentive for emissions reduction could reduce 
the initial land use change and production intensity concerns brought on by the 
bioenergy expansion policy for any value of Pc.  The full extent of this effect he full 
extent of this effect would depend on the magnitude of Pc, and the magnitude of the 
bioenergy policy-induced commodity price shifts in Pb1 and Pf1. Thus, there is a 
balancing effect at play, where movement to the intensive and extensive margins is 
driven in one direction by the bioenergy policy, and in another by the mitigation policy.  
A high enough value of Pc could introduce a contraction effect, where the total supply 
under the carbon price regime is lower than under baseline conditions.  As the mandate 
still binds, such a contraction would imply significantly higher prices for food and 
energy output.  
The second important interaction deals with the overall costs of mitigation.  If a 
binding mandate boosts prices and returns productive land, this makes it more expensive 
to move land into Lc or reduce intensity for mitigation purposes by raising the marginal 
value of production. This implicitly increases the marginal compensation required to 
reduce GHG emissions or alter land use for carbon sequestration. Thus, the mere 
existence of a biofuel mandate shifts the supply of GHG mitigation inward by increasing 
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the marginal costs of GHG abatement. This is depicted by the inward shift in the supply 
of mitigation from 0
CY  to 1
CY  in Figure 10.  
An emissions intensity threshold for bioenergy has a slightly different effect.  If 
the emissions threshold imposes a bound on emissions intensity (and hence, µb ) that is 
below baseline production intensity, this arbitrarily lowers potential GHG reductions 
options for bioenergy cropping systems.  Additionally, it decreases flexibility in the 
system for allocating productive land to carbon sequestration and boosting intensity to 
make up for lost productivity (as µb  is potentially constrained).  This again will restrict 
the supply of additional offsets from the system, as illustrated by the second supply shift 
in Figure 10, or the movement from  Y1
C
 
to 2
CY ).  
Thus, resource requirements and price effects of a mandate and the decreased 
management flexibility of a bioenergy emissions intensity threshold could make GHG 
mitigation from land-based activities more costly. The net market and environmental 
effects of combined bioenergy and GHG mitigation policies are more fully assessed in 
subsequent chapters.   
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Figure 10: Effects of bioenergy policies on equilibrium GHG mitigation price and 
supply 
   
4.2.3.5 Expanding the Problem to Multiple Regions  
To finish this chapter, consider the problem of managing land resources across 
multiple regions, each with different biophysical characteristics that affect yield 
productivity and carbon sequestration potential. For simplicity, consider a two-region 
case.  Aggregate supply of food energy and carbon from this system is found by 
summing over total production in each region.  Region 1 can be described as very 
productive; both in terms crop yield and carbon sequestration potential. This is shown in 
Figure 11, which plots yield productivity per-unit area as a function of management 
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intensity on the left-hand side, and the linear relationship between annual carbon 
sequestration and idle land (Lc) on the right-hand side. Notice that Region 1 is not only 
more productive in f and b per-unit area, but that idle land in Region 1 sequesters carbon 
at a much higher rate. 
 
 
Figure 11: Land characteristics of the two-region model 
 
The following system incorporates production functions and carbon 
sequestration parameters for both regions directly into the model:  
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(Equation 26)  
( )
, , , 1 1
0 1
1
1
max ( )     for ,
                      ( ) ( )
. .                   
                                  
           
f e
f e
R J
jr jr
j jr jr jr e jr
L L
r j
R
cr cr
ir ir c
r
J
jr r
j
b
PY w L P Y j f b
V L P Y Y
s t L L r
Y B
µ µ
pi µ φ
= =
=
=
= − − =
+ + −
= ∀
=
∑∑
∑
∑
( )( )( )
  
Where:   ( , ) = 0          for   ,     
               = Mandate
               Emissions Intensity Threshold
b b
b b b
b
j
j j
L c Y
Y
L j i f
B
µ ωφ τ ξ
φ µ
ξ
− −
≤
=
=
 
In this new specification, the model will allocate land resources in each region 
given a policy landscape and market conditions. Each region has its own endowment of 
land, but aggregate production of food, bioenergy, and carbon is the sum of total supply 
in each region. The purpose of illustrating this model is to show that in more complex 
systems composed of multiple regions with different geographic and biophysical 
characteristics, land use shifts to the extensive and intensive margins will vary.  For 
example, a sufficiently high carbon price could induce cropland contraction and reduced 
intensity in the more productive region while expanding production in the other, as the 
productive region has an absolute advantage in both production and carbon 
sequestration.  Incidence of such shifts is tested in the empirical chapters of this 
dissertation.   
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4.2.4 Relevance of Intensity to Environmental Quality  
Non-GHG environmental impacts of agricultural offsets are perhaps of more 
concern than pure GHG leakage. An important factor that has been relatively ignored to 
this point is the importance of the intensity proxy, jrµ , and how spatial production 
patterns and GHG abatement portfolios might shift resource consumption and 
agricultural pollution to regions with little advantage in GHG mitigation. Such an impact 
occurs as an indirect response to higher commodity prices as indicated by the multi-
region model above. 
A simple conceptual model can illustrate the expansion and intensity effects of 
various policy drivers, but ultimately a fully integrated model with detailed information 
on production practices, land quality, spatial crop mix patterns, and biophysical 
parameters capturing pollution and GHG effects of management activities is needed to 
understand the net effect of  shifting land use patterns. The following chapters seek to 
more fully understand the unintended consequences of national biofuel expansion and 
GHG mitigation incentives on non-GHG variables such as water consumption and 
quality, nutrient use, and energy use by region.   
4.2.5 The Importance of Dynamics 
Additionally, land management decisions (particularly in forestry) are typically 
made intertemporally, especially in the forestry sector.  This chapter has ignored the land 
use and terrestrial dynamics.  By not modeling the land allocation problem under low-
carbon incentives using comparative dynamics, it is likely that I have underestimated 
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GHG emissions from land clearing, underestimated GHG mitigation potential, and 
overestimated the full land use consequences of a policy shock.  A dynamic model 
allows for market adjustments to occur more smoothly, instead of assuming a one-tie 
adjustment to a policy perturbation.  The empirical modeling to follow uses an 
intertemporal model that can assess land use competition, markets  
4.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented a simple model of land allocation and management to 
illustrate how bioenergy policies and land-based GHG offset incentives interact. The 
model can be used to show that mandates, GHG intensity metrics for bioenergy, and 
GHG mitigation will contract the supply of conventional food production.  In an 
equilibrium framework, this implies higher commodity prices. A bioenergy mandate will 
lead to production expansion and intensification in food and energy cropping systems. 
Pursuing GHG intensity metrics for bioenergy in addition to a mandate can boost prices 
further by restricting bioenergy management options (and hence, food supply). GHG 
mitigation incentives subsidize landowners for GHG reductions from decreased intensity 
and through reallocation of land for carbon sequestration, though this also constricts 
supply and boosts prices. Also, bioenergy policies restrict the supply and raise the price 
of land-based GHG mitigation. The following chapters will expand on this theory and 
address land use shifts using a detailed economic model.   
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 CHAPTER V  
EMPIRICAL MODELING FRAMEWORK 
  
The U.S. Forest and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model with Greenhouses 
(FASOMGHG) to simulate production responses, land use decisions, and market effects 
of bioenergy and climate mitigation policies.  An introduction to the modeling 
framework is provided, including recent advances pertinent to this analysis. Then, I 
discuss the simulation scenarios that form the remainder of this dissertation.   
5.1 Modeling Framework: FASOMGHG 
This analysis uses the Forest and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model with 
Greenhouse Gases (FASOMGHG) for this analysis. FASOMGHG has been used in a 
wide range of studies to evaluate the economic effectiveness of AF-GHG mitigation in 
the U.S., biofuels, bioenergy, and the subsequent environmental co-effects of such 
strategies (McCarl and Schneider, 2001, Murray et al., 2004, Murray et al., 2005, 
Pattanayack et al., 2005, Schneider et al., 2007, Schneider and McCarl, 2005). The 
FASOMGHG scope and structure allows evaluation of GHG mitigation strategies in the 
AF sectors and the impact of renewable energy standards on the agricultural supply 
chain (Murray et al., 2005; Schneider and McCarl, 2003).   
FASOMGHG was recently updated (from the version used in Murray et al., 
2005) to provide a better portrayal of contemporary forestry and agriculture (Baker et al., 
2009). Advances include additional bioenergy activities representing new marketable 
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alternatives for food and timber commodities, as well as residual by-products of harvest 
and production. The model is particularly unique in its ability to evaluate a full suite of 
biofuel feedstocks for processing ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, and biodiesel; 
FASOMGHG now contains more than twenty alternative biofuel feedstocks for 
processing starch- or sugar- based ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, and biodiesel, and a 
variety of AF feedstock sources for bioelectricity (with options for 100% or co-fired 
biomass generation).  
 Updated technological growth assumptions offer the most up-to-date picture of 
when advanced biofuel technologies will be economically feasible, drawing from 
literature and information used by the US-EPA to create RFS2 rules and regulations. 
Commodity demand, energy market, and input cost growth assumptions have been 
updated to accurately represent current and future market conditions. The forestry sector 
has also been updated to 5-year time steps (previously the model was solved in 10 year 
intervals), recent timberland inventory, distribution of ownership, and harvest schedules 
with an extensive processing sector and the addition of many manufactured product 
forms. Additional forest management options were also introduced.  
FASOMGHG methodology allows for explicit land use competition between 
multiple land uses, as a subsequent section will discuss. FASOMGHG is disaggregated 
into 63 minor production units in the lower 48 states, and 11 main agri-forestry regions.  
All major FASOMGHG agri-forestry regions include crop and forestry production 
opportunities except for the Great Plains and Southwest (which includes most of Texas 
and Oklahoma).  
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In addition to land use competition, FASOMGHG portrays a full suite of GHG 
mitigation options, including biological sequestration of carbon in agricultural soils and 
forest stands, alternative crop and livestock production practices to reduce emissions, 
and bioenergy feedstock substitutes for fossil fuels. The gasses represented are carbon 
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide.  
Forest carbon balances are tracked using a methodology consistent with the 
Forest Carbon accounting system, FORCARB (Birdsey et al., 2000). Forest carbon is 
tracked in trees, soils, understory, and end products. Forest management offset 
opportunities are endogenously modeled in FASOMGHG, and include avoided 
deforestation, rotation extensions, altered species mix, partial thinning, and reforestation. 
Carbon sequestration rates for forest management opportunities vary significantly by 
region, topography, and other factors, but typically range 2.1-3.1t CO2e acre-1year-1 
(Murray et al., 2005). Bioelectricity production possibilities from forest biomass are 
possible from a variety of sources. All biofuels and bioelectricity options modeled are 
listed in Appendix A.    
Most of the agricultural mitigation activities discussed in Chapter II are explicitly 
modeled in FASOMGHG, including: 
• sequestering carbon through cropland tillage change,   
• reducing nitrous oxide emissions from fertilizer and manure/livestock,   
• reducing methane emissions from livestock, manure handling, and rice 
cultivation, 
• sequestering carbon by diverting land to forests and grasslands,  
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For a more comprehensive list and discussion of mitigation activities in AF there are 
a variety of sources available (McCarl and Schneider, 2001, Murray et al., 2005). Other 
recent additions to FASOMGHG have improved our ability to model agricultural soil 
carbon balances dynamically, and track soil carbon balances when land use changes 
occur. Changes in overall crop mix strategies or tillage practices (modeled 
endogenously) can boost carbon sequestration.  We model N2O emissions reductions 
from changes in nitrogen (N) fertilizer use through overall changes in crop mix and 
reductions in on-farm N use levels. Emissions factors (and subsequent yield impacts) are 
based on estimates from the CENTURY model (S.M.  Ogle et al., 2009 ), which is used 
for the U.S. annual GHG inventory. We also model livestock emissions mitigation in 
accordance with EPA GHG inventory methods and mitigation cost estimates.  
5.2 Price Endogenous Framework 
 FASOMGHG is price endogenous, and hence solves for price and quantity 
combinations by maximizing the sum of producer and consumer surplus for all primary 
and secondary commodities (Bruce A. McCarl and Thomas H. Spreen, 1980). The price 
endogenous framework is a popular modeling technique for partial equilibrium (PE) as 
market-clearing price and quantity combinations of produced commodities and factor 
input usage can be solved for, while evaluating the distributional impacts of market or 
policy shocks. A general algebraic representation of the price endogenous model with 
product demand for a number of goods and factor supply from a number inputs, with 
multiple production processes is provided below:  
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(Equation 27) 
 
 
 
Here, many different types of firms (β) are being modeled, each with a finite set 
of production processes (k) that combine fixed factors (j) with purchased factors (i) to 
produce commodities (h). The symbols in the formulation are as follows:  
 Pdh(Zh) is the inverse demand function for the hth commodity.  
 Z
 h is the quantity of commodity h that is consumed.  
 Psi (Xi) is the inverse supply curve (marginal) for the ith purchased input.  
 Xi is the quantity of the ith factor supplied.  
 Qβk is the level of production process k undertaken by firm β.  
 Chβk is the productivity (yield) of product h from production process k.  
 bjβk is the quantity of the jth owned fixed factor used in producing Qβk.  
 aiβk is the amount of the ith purchased factor used in producing Qβk.  
 Yjβ is the endowment of the jth owned factor available to firm β. 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions from this system require that the shadow price on the 
first and second rows are, respectively, the demand and supply prices. First order 
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conditions also maintain that production levels are set so the marginal value of the 
commodities produced is less than or equal to the marginal costs of the owned and fixed 
factors for each Qβk. 
The area under the product demand and factor supply functions makes the 
objective function equal consumer plus producer surplus, which is the net social benefit 
generated by the market exchange of these goods. The solution of the model generates 
equilibrium price and quantity for each output, and purchased input, along with the 
imputed values for the owned factors of production. The competitive behavior 
simulating properties of this formulation provides a powerful tool for policy simulation. 
Scenario analysis can be applied to a price endogenous setting to determine the extent to 
which exogenous policy shocks disrupt optimal demand and supply projections and 
output prices.  
 FASOMGHG is fully dynamic in most variables, and thus maximizes inter-
temporal economic welfare. The model uses constant elasticity demand functions that 
are calibrated with elasticity parameters from a variety of public and academic sources. 
As exogenous policy factors drive production or land use away from the baseline levels 
in response to bioenergy expansion or GHG mitigation policies, the price endogenous 
model accounts for these market adjustments over time by depicting changes in 
equilibrium prices and quantities supplied of all primary and secondary commodities. As 
commodity markets within AF are highly interdependent, a systematic shock that 
disrupts the optimal production portfolio of one commodity (e.g., corn) can cycle 
through other primary or secondary commodity markets (such as ethanol and livestock 
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which use corn as a critical factor input, or corn substitutes such as alternative feed 
grains).  
5.2.1 Factor Input Use and Environmental Variables 
 To measure overall responses to exogenous policy shocks on the intensive 
margins, I rely on FASOMGHG crop management options with varying levels of input 
use, and emissions factors for several important environmental variables. The model has 
detailed crop budget parameters for each region/crop/management combination, in 
which a set of factor inputs is used for each sub-regional production activity entering the 
solution set. The amount of input use in each sub-region depends on chosen management 
intensity levels and overall crop mix strategies. Production can be irrigated or dryland, 
with varying levels of tillage intensity (conventional, conservation, and no-till), and 
nitrogen fertilizer application (full, 85%, and 70%). Input use is consistent with regional 
estimates provided by USDA-ARMS data. Each management regime has an 
accompanying crop yield, so changes in management intensity are accompanied by a 
yield response.  
 Management intensity has implications for regional water use (depending on the 
proportion of dryland to irrigated production chosen). Additionally, soil carbon 
dynamics and overall GHG emissions are influenced by the production intensity 
decision. FASOMGHG contains detailed biophysical data on GHG emissions, pollution, 
yield, input use, and carbon sequestration of regional crop production. GHG emissions 
factors provide the requisite information on the net per-acre emissions associated with a 
particular crop management option.  
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Land use changes are accompanied by shifts in carbon balances between land 
uses. FASOMGHG simulates land competition and transformation between forest, 
cropland, pasture, and conservation lands (CRP), yielding estimates of domestic indirect 
land use change emissions. Land competition is critical to this analysis, as land values 
can be driven in diverging directions from bioenergy and climate mitigation objectives. 
FASOMGHG weighs all policy forces and allocates land efficiently over time between 
the different uses to satisfy the demands for conventional commodities, bioenergy, and 
GHG offsets.  
 In addition to land use changes, production responses to exogenous policy 
stimuli are manifested in management intensity changes. Additional environmental 
variables tied to management intensity are also tracked in the model.  Thus, through 
comprehensive GHG accounting and multiple production possibilities, FASOMGHG is 
able to estimate a variety of local environmental damages and global GHG emissions (or 
sequestration), and how these might be altered in alternative policy regimes. These 
include N percolation and runoff, NO3 runoff and subsurface loss, soil and wind erosion, 
use of other harmful inputs (herbicide, phosphorous, etc.).  
5.3 Model Modifications for this Study 
Here I discuss recent FASOMGHG modifications made to accommodate this 
analysis. These modifications include:  
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• Updated energy market assumptions consistent with the Annual Energy Outlook 
(AEO) 2008 and 2009 reports, with options for testing the sensitivity of AF 
production patterns and land use on energy market assumptions,  
• Updated land use categories and methodology for depicting land use competition 
and land use change,  
• Inclusion of a CRP recultivation supply curve, 
• Welfare disaggregation in the AF sectors. 
• Asymmetric incentives for GHG mitigation activities     
5.3.1 Updated Energy Market Assumptions 
FASOMGHG incorporates recent projections of energy prices and consumption 
(AEO 2008, AEO 2009) to depict up-to-date energy market conditions and energy input 
costs. This is an improved approach over past sectoral modeling efforts that keep the 
price of these critical inputs constant over time. This allows us to simulate: 
• The effects of energy price induced operating cost increases on production 
decisions over a dynamic time horizon, 
• How differences in input costs affect long term investment decisions and land 
use change, 
• The market interactions of bioenergy and fossil fuels, and the relative value of 
bioenergy when relative GHG emissions reductions are valued across mitigation 
schemes 
102 
 
 
• The sensitivity of modeling results to energy market assumptions (AEO 2008 and 
2009 projections are quite different)20 
 
Before this dissertation was completed, extensive sensitivity analyses were 
performed on energy market assumptions.  Figure 12 displays energy price projections 
for AEO 2009 (indexed off of 2004 values).  AEO projections end in 2030, so we 
extrapolate beyond that period using an average linear growth rate for projections from 
2015-2030, where prices trend upward at a relatively modest rate.  
 
 
Figure 12: Price trajectories for energy commodities by AEO report date (Source: 
EIA 2008 and 2009) 
 
Notice that AEO 2008 and 2009 estimates vary considerably.  Relying on 
different sets of price trajectories can have resounding impacts on model results. This 
                                                 
20
 This is a critical issue.  As FASOMGHG uses parameters estimated from other sectoral models (in this 
case, the National Energy Modeling System, or NEMS), results are often sensitive to byproducts of 
alternative modeling efforts.  
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dissertation relies on the latest projections (AEO, 2009), but future work will explore 
these sensitivities further.    
 The price of ethanol is equivalent to the ethanol wholesale price, archived in 
AEO reports beginning in 2006. The price of biodiesel is based off of historic prices of 
B20. Since the AEO does not explicitly model the price of biodiesel, price changes over 
time are based off of the price of diesel.  This is a valid assumption as diesel and B20 
prices have followed similar trajectories over time. Also included in the model are AEO 
quantity projections for ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, and biodiesel. Constraints are 
imposed that require baseline levels of biofuel production to meet these projections. 
Biofuel volumes are held constant after 2030 in the baseline due to uncertainty in 
transportation sector infrastructure. Table 3 displays prices for important energy inputs 
following AEO 2009 price trajectories. Notice that all prices are increasing in the 
baseline, reflecting higher expected costs of production in the future under BAU 
conditions. The price change for fertilizer was determined to be half the rate of change in 
the well-head price of natural gas. Carbon pricing will present further deviations from 
this base as the CO2 equivalent content of each fuel is priced internally. 
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Table 3: Baseline Energy Price Changes (Index Values Over Time where 2000 Base 
Price = 100) 
 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Crop Ethanol 1.00 1.28 0.92 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.99 
Biodiesel 1.00 1.07 1.55 2.05 2.09 2.16 2.28 
Biodiesel Waste Oil 1.00 1.07 1.55 2.05 2.09 2.16 2.28 
Total Ethanol 1.00 1.28 0.92 1.21 1.24 1.28 1.35 
TBTUs  1.00 1.34 1.29 1.34 1.32 1.34 1.39 
Fertilizer 1.00 1.07 1.55 1.57 1.62 1.66 1.75 
Electricity 1.00 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.31 1.38 1.46 
Natural Gas Wellhead 
Price 1.00 2.41 1.37 1.40 1.47 1.53 1.67 
Natural Gas Industrial 
Delivered 1.00 2.41 1.37 1.40 1.47 1.53 1.67 
Imported Crude Oil 1.00 1.76 2.89 3.80 3.88 4.01 4.23 
Diesel Fuel 1.00 1.45 1.28 1.69 1.73 1.78 1.88 
Coal Delivered Price 1.00 1.26 1.21 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.31 
 
 
5.3.2 Updated Land Use Categories 
 FASOMGHG accounts for a comprehensive range of land use categories 
consistent with land classifications from multiple resources. Baseline cropland use 
comes from the creation of regional crop mixes established from historic agricultural 
production estimates by crop and region, reported by USDA-NASS. FASOMGHG 
grazing lands include public and private sources grassland or range, grazed forest, and 
cropland pasture, following definitions, classification, and estimates from the ERS Major 
Land Use Database (Lubowski et al., 2002).   
While previous versions of FASOMGHG only accounted timberland, cropland, 
and pasture (McCarl and Schneider, 2001; Murray et al. 2005), the model now has 
explicit spatial representations of rangeland (public and private), CRP acreage, privately 
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owned-grazed timberland, grazed public forest, cropland pasture, and forest-pasture that 
is grazed only (this category is freely transferable with timberland).  Improved land use 
dimensions allow for improved simulation of land use change patterns in response to 
policy. This categorization also allows for improved GHG accounting between different 
land uses. Figure 13 displays the FASOM land use totals used to form a land base for the 
remainder of this dissertation (these represent base year totals for the 2000 time period). 
 
 
Figure 13: FASOM land base for the U.S. by land use type 
  
Definitions of these land use categories rely on a number of sources, but for the 
most part are consistent with the ERS-Major Land Use classification system, as 
follows— 
1. Cropland- This includes only cropland that is harvested, defined by the ERS and 
USDA Ag Census as “land from which crops were harvested and hay was cut, 
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and land used to grow short-rotation woody crops, land in orchards, citrus 
groves, Christmas trees, vineyards, nurseries, and greenhouses.” FASOMGHG 
does not model all of these activities explicitly, including a number of fruit and 
vegetable crops that comprise relatively small share of the total land base.   
2. Cropland Pasture- Primarily used for grazing in the model, cropland pasture are 
acres “used only for pasture or grazing that could have been used for crops 
without additional improvement. Also included were acres of crops hogged or 
grazed but not harvested prior to grazing.” State totals come directly from 
AgCensus data:  
3. CRP- Land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program, with state and county 
level totals available through the USDA-FSA (FSA, 2009)  
4. Public Forest Pasture- There is a significant portion of publicly owned grazing 
lands, particularly in the Western U.S. These lands are typically managed by the 
U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management (BLM), or a variety of state 
agencies which allocate grazing permits to producers for a nominal fee. These 
lands are included in the FASOMGHG base to more accurately map livestock 
production (per head) to total acres grazed. Beginning with ERS estimates of 
total forest pasture stocks, regional estimates of public forest pasture are found 
by using proportions estimated in USFS, 2004.   
5. Private Forest Pasture- Consists of privately owned grazed forests that fall into 
two categories. Forest pasture in agriculture is non-timberland grazed forest, 
defined as “all woodland used for pasture or grazing during the census year. 
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Woodland or forest land pastured under a per-head grazing permit was not 
counted as land in farms and, therefore, was not included in woodland 
pastured.” (Lubowski, et al. 2002). These lands are in addition to the private 
timberland areas included in the model, so no forest products are withdrawn. 
However, endogenous shifts into forestry from this category are possible, 
indicating a shift in management. The other category of privately held forest 
grazing land includes land that is actively managed for timber while 
simultaneously grazed.  A management option for these lands is to cease grazing 
altogether and manage for timber only. Acreage totals for this category were 
obtained by deducting the US Ag Census estimates of woodland pasture from the 
private grazed  forest totals by region.  
6. Rangeland- We rely on the ERS-MLU definition for grassland or range, which 
consists of both public and private sources. “Grassland pasture and range 
consists of all open land used primarily for pasture and grazing. It includes 
shrub and brush land types of pasture and grazing land such as sagebrush and 
scattered mesquite; all tame and native grasses; legumes; and other forage used 
for pasture or grazing. Because of the diversity in vegetative composition, 
grassland pasture and range are not always clearly distinguishable from other 
types of pasture and range. At one extreme, permanent grassland may merge 
with cropland pasture; at the other, grassland may intermingle or form 
transitional areas with forested grazing land. No single agency, other than ERS, 
accounts for all public and private land used for pasture and range. The 
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estimates in this report are composites of data from the Census of Agriculture, 
Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, Natural Resource 
Conservation Service and several other Federal agencies.”   
7. Forests- Regional timberland stocks, as well as timber demand, inventory, and 
additional forestry sector information are drawn from the 2005 RPA Timber 
Assessment (Darius Adams and R.W.  Haynes, 2007).  
 
This land use categorization system gives FASOMGHG a comprehensive list of 
land use types to represent the AF sectors and land use competition. It should be noted 
that there are discernible differences between the FASOMGHG land base (which 
categorizes land in a similar manner to the USDA-ERS Major Land Use Database) and 
non-federal land use totals as classified by the Natural Resource Inventory, (NRI), as 
indicated in Figure 14. The major difference comes from the ERS-MLU classification of 
rangeland and Cropland Pasture (which we do model explicitly using ERS regional 
totals).  The ERS Cropland Pasture category overlaps both the Cropland and Pasture 
estimates in the NRI.  That is, NRI likely accounts for a portion of the land classified as 
“cropland pasture” in both its “cropland” and “pasture estimates”.  ERS-MLU 
Rangeland includes federal and non-federal sources, plus non-cropland grassland 
pasture, or lands that the NRI deems “Pasture”.  While there is significant overlap across 
these sources, the FASOMGHG approach offers a well-documented land categorization 
base with a historic series formed from Agricultural Census (ERS-MLU) data that is not 
wholly inconsistent with the NRI.   
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Figure 14: Comparison of NRI and FASOMGHG land use totals 
 
In all, the updated FASOMGHG land base is an improved methodology from 
past model versions, and one that we continue to improve upon21. FASOMGHG 
methodology allows for explicit land use competition between cropland, pasture, 
conservation lands (CRP), and forests based on potential profitability between the 
alternative uses, which allows us to simulate potential LUC impacts of policy drivers 
that increase the relative value of land holdings in a particular use (Ralph Alig et al., 
1998, Ralph Alig et al., 2010). Land can move between freely between cropland and 
pasture use; transitions into and out of forest are also possible in certain regions. CRP 
lands are eligible for cropland conversion. GHG accounting methodology tracks changes 
in overall soil carbon stocks as land shifts between uses. Table 4 displays land 
                                                 
21
 Later versions will build upon this methodology using a hybrid approach of ERS-MLU and NRI 
definitions and regional estimates, but this is outside the scope of this dissertation. 
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transferability between alternative uses in the model. Land can move between freely 
between cropland and pasture use given certain biophysical constraints the limit total 
transition potential by region. Transitions into and out of forestry are also possible in 
certain regions. CRP lands begin with a base are eligible for cropland conversion. GHG 
accounting methodology tracks changes in overall soil carbon stocks as land shifts 
between uses.   
 
Table 4: FASOMGHG Domestic Land Use Categories 
 
Source: USDA-ERS, 2009; NRI, 2003. 
 
FASOMGHG is disaggregated into 63 minor production units in the lower 48 
states, and 11 main agri-forestry regions.  All major FASOMGHG regions include crop 
and forestry production opportunities except for the Northern Great Plains and 
Southwest Plains (which includes most of Texas and Oklahoma). For more on regional 
production characteristics, see Adams et al., 2009.  For assessing afforestation potential 
on a regional basis, we draw from USDA-NRCS estimates of environmentally sensitive 
Base Category Possible Land Movement 
Cropland 
 
Cropland-Forest 
Cropland-Pasture 
Cropland Idled Not Transferrable 
Cropland Pasture Cropland-Pasture 
 Pasture-Forestry 
Forest Pasture in Agriculture Pasture-Forest 
Forest Pasture in Timber (Private) Forest-Pasture 
Forest Pasture in Timber (Public) Not Transferrable 
Rangeland (Public and Private) Not Transferrable 
CRP  CRP-Cropland 
Land to Development Not Transferrable 
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or lower productivity land. Afforestable cropland is defined as land eroding at levels 
above a tolerance level (T), and in lower productivity Land Capability Classes (LCC V 
to VII), or cropland classified as wet soil. Pasture eligible for afforestation was 
determined using similar criteria except LCC VII and VIII were restricted.  
Additionally, transition of cropland, forests, pasture, and rangeland to developed 
uses are exogenous factors in the model, included to reflect the reality that productive 
land bases are likely to shrink over time as populations grow and suburban development 
continues. Land to development transfers are modeled on a regional basis by land type, 
and are drawn from recent data prepared for the 2010 Resources Planning Act (RPA) 
Assessment, 2010 (Ralph Alig et al., 2009). These parameters help us depict an AF land 
base that is decreasing in the baseline due to development pressures. Accounting for land 
to development pressures in an AF sectoral modeling framework is important, as varying 
levels of development pressures can affect land use competition between agriculture and 
forestry, GHG mitigation potential, and commodity prices (Alig et al., 2010). Figure 15 
displays regional development trends by region and land use type over time, in million 
acres per year.  There is high variability in the amount of land leaving AF uses for 
development by region, but these development trends are projected to taper off to an 
extent over time.   
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Figure 15: Projected regional development transfers by land use (million acres per 
year) 
 
5.3.3 CRP Recultivation Supply  
 FASOMGHG has the option to simulate AF development with and without 
recultivation of CRP lands. The model defines a total stock of available CRP in each 
sub-region, using data publically available through the USDA-FSA (USDA  Farm 
Service Agency, 2009 ). CRP acreage totals are aggregated to each FASOM region. 
These data include contract termination periods upon which landowners can bid to 
renew their contract, or revert to crop production. That is, each sub-region has a stock of 
CRP acreage subject to a termination schedule. The FASOMGHG CRP stock can remain 
constant over time, meaning the CRP acreage continues to receive a constant rental rate 
over time, or it can revert to crop production at an economical rate following an upward-
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sloping supply schedule. Figure 16 illustrates expected national CRP contract 
termination by acreage totals. The bulk of current CRP contracts are set to expire within 
the next few years; re-enrollment or additional sign-up will be contingent on expected 
rental payments and commodity market conditions.  
 
 
Figure 16: Expiring CRP acreage over time 
 
 
Existing CRP acreage by state (or FASOMGHG sub-region) is input to the 
model by current stock, and expected contract termination period. The majority of the 
CRP stock is concentrated in the Midwestern U.S., in major crop producing regions.  
These are also the regions that are likely most susceptible to further cropland 
extensification (or contraction) depending on the policy regime. Table 5 displays 
expiring CRP acreage by major production regions. Notice that the majority of existing 
CRP contracts is set to expire from the 2009-2015 period, with a large portion of retiring 
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acreage set in the U.S. Great Plains, an area dominated by cropland. Contemporary 
drivers of biofuel expansion could significantly affect the amount of land returning to 
agriculture over the next few years.  In fact this trend has already been observed, as CRP 
stocks declined from a 2007 level of 37.2 million acres to a current (2009) level of 33.6. 
FSA policy targets of 32 million acres signal that the CRP will continue to see 
reductions in acreage.  
 
Table 5: Expiring CRP Acreage by Year and Region in 1,000 Acres (Source: 
USDA-FSA; Aggregated to FASOMGHG Super-Region) 
 2009-2012 2013-2015 2016-2020 
Corn Belt 1,717 1,291 1,730 
Lake States 817 647 919 
Western US 5,798 1,948 1,854 
Great Plains 8,273 2,092 2,486 
Southern US 1,569 857 995 
Northeast  107 85 191 
  
Two CRP scenarios are considered in this analysis.  The first locks in CRP 
acreage at 32 million acres, consistent with current Farm Bill acreage aspirations (Farm 
Bill, 2008). Thus, only a small proportion of CRP can revert to crop production (current 
CRP stock is approximately 33.6 million acres). The second case allows this land to re-
cultivate freely. Like all supplies of land in FASOMGHG, CRP is considered a factor 
input into the aggregate production process. CRP acreage receives a base rental payment 
equal to the average CRP rental rate by FASOMGHG sub-region (FSA, 2009). To model 
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a supply function of CRP lands, we rely on parameters estimated my Secchi and 
Babcock, 2007. This study estimated the effect of higher commodity prices on CRP 
reversion rates in the state of Iowa. The study finds that re-cultivation maxes out at 72% 
when corn and soybean prices increase 250% beyond historic levels (a case nearly 
observed in 2007). These parameters serve as a good proxy for a national CRP reversion 
estimates as CRP lands range from very low to moderately high qualities in Iowa, as is 
the case throughout much of the Midwestern U.S. where CRP lands are concentrated22.   
 As commodity markets and land rents increase, CRP land can be purchased 
(recultivated) at a higher proportion consistent with the supply function outlined below. 
The model weighs the cost of reverting CRP lands against the opportunity costs of 
keeping the land idle. Figure 17 maps the cost of CRP reversion (compared to the base 
rental rate) with the proportion of land allowed to revert at that cost. Consistent with 
other input supply functions in FASOMGHG, the supply curve for CRP reversion is 
input into the model following a separable programming format.  This is a technique for 
approximating nonlinear functions of endogenous variables that are separable into 
functions of a single variable (McCarl and Spreen, 1980)23.    
 
                                                 
22
 This methodology can be updated with regionally-specific recultivation parameters as soon as such 
estimates are available. 
23
 Separable programming approximates a separable non-linear function by solving for a convex 
combination of grid points in the function domain.   
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Figure 17: CRP recultivation supply curve 
  
This formulation allows us to measure potential CRP reversion rates under 
multiple policy drivers. In addition, the CRP could play a variety of roles in a low 
carbon economy, including landowner participation in a GHG offsets market.  In effect, 
we simulate this option by attaching a CO2e price to GHG emission/sequestration. 
Carbon stored in CRP lands above baseline levels would be credited, while CRP 
reversion results in a debit equal to carbon value of the associated land use change.  
Essentially, this models the opportunity costs of CRP re-cultivation when contract 
holders could be subsidized for sequestration potential by participating in a federal GHG 
offset program.   
5.3.4 AF Welfare Disaggregation 
 Following concerns echoed by the agricultural community of the impacts of 
climate legislation on net farm income and sectoral economic welfare in general, welfare 
accounting was disaggregated from an overall producer surplus measure, to individual 
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measures for forestry and agricultural producers and consumers, and between livestock 
and crop producers, which allows for income distribution effects of exogenous policies 
to be measured.   
 First and foremost, returns to production for crop and livestock producers are 
separated. This welfare measure is the producer’s surplus, or area defined as the space 
above the marginal cost of production, up to the equilibrium price point. The costs of 
purchased factor inputs (land, water, labor, and fossil fuels) are also allocated to each 
respective producer group using explicit FASOMGHG crop budget data.  
For mitigation scenarios, payments and GHG credits (debits) were allocated 
between to each respective producer group. GHG payments for the following accounts 
are counted as a source of revenue for livestock welfare accounting: 
• Improved enteric fermentation  
• Manure management (N2O and CH4) 
• Reduced N2O emissions from pasture management (including pasture 
conversion) 
• Afforestation on pasture land  
• Bioelectricity revenue from manure biomass relative to coal combustion 
GHG payments allocated to crop producer welfare include: 
• Reduced CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and agricultural input use 
• N2O emissions from decreased fertilizer use 
• Bioenergy emissions reduction relative to fossil fuel combustion 
• Soil carbon sequestration 
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• Afforestation on cropland 
Forestry GHG payments include:  
• Carbon sequestration resulting from altered forest management strategies 
• GHG payments for improved carbon sequestration in finished forest products 
• Revenues from forest biomass sales for bioelectricity  
 
Bioenergy payments were allocated to producer groups based on feedstock type. 
When land is moved from one account to another, land rents associated with that use are 
also transferred. For example if cropland pasture is converted to full-time crop 
production, then returns to production on the new tract of land, and all associate land 
conversion costs are allocated to livestock producers, reflecting the reality that producers 
from the original land use will collect all land rents under the new use. This is important 
for afforestation, as afforestation GHG payments and associated wood product revenues 
will accrue to crop and livestock producers, not foresters.   
This welfare disaggregation allows us to examine distributional effects of energy 
and climate mitigation incentives on multiple producer groups in the AF sectors,   
5.3.5 Asymmetric Incentives for GHG Mitigation Activities  
The typical Pigouvian approach for internalizing the social costs of an externality 
within a market system would be to price that externality equivalently across all sources 
at the marginal rate of social damages.  Past FASOMGHG studies of climate mitigation 
have done this by pricing all sources of emission and sequestration symmetrically 
(Murray et al., 2005). However, there is reason to consider asymmetric pricing as some 
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offset activities are not palatable from a policy perspective, or are very difficult to 
implement in reality. This dissertation employs an asymmetric GHG pricing scheme to 
consider alternative reduced-carbon policy regimes that might limit the scope of a 
domestic offset program.  Specifically, this dissertation introduces a limited offset 
eligibility regime that does not incentive reductions in emissions from agricultural non-
CO2 sources, or increased sequestration from altered forest management practices. In 
another scenario, no offset activities are incentivized, only bioelectricity replacement of 
coal-fired electricity (where the life-cycle GHG reduction of coal-fired electricity 
generation replacement is priced). This provides a unique look and land management 
and production patterns under non-inclusive domestic offset programs.  
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CHAPTER VI  
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR BIOENERGY EXPANSION 
SCENARIOS  
  
This chapter uses simulation analysis to examine the effects of moving from a 
business as usual AF trajectory based on historic trends and recent projections to one in 
which biofuel expansion is included. Specifically, it explores the implications of the 
RFS2 on land use, GHG emissions, management intensification, water, and commodity 
markets. Sensitivity of these results is tested with and without Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) recultivation.   
6.1 Description of Scenarios 
6.1.1 Baseline 
The FASOMGHG baseline calibrates dynamic trends in important exogenous 
variables using other existing data sources. Dynamic variables represented in the model 
include energy price trajectories consistent with the AEO 2009 report, exogenous biofuel 
production consistent with mandates established prior to the EISA-RFS2 (from the 2005 
Energy Bill—some refer to these levels as the RFS1). Agricultural demand and yield 
productivity growth are consistent with historic and projected trends using USDA-NASS 
data, U.S. import and export market demand, land use changes (RPA Assessment 2003; 
NRI, 2003; USDA-ERS, 2009), and technical progress in bioenergy processing. AEO 
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projections of bioenergy production are summarized in Table 6. Note that this includes 
significant growth in grain-based ethanol over the next few years, even with the absence 
of the RFS2. The implication is that in the absence of renewable energy mandates, the 
demand for corn ethanol will continue to rise under baseline conditions, affecting the 
allocation of lands to food and fiber.  
 
Table 6: Baseline [AEO 2009 (RFS1)] Biofuel Quantity Projections (Billion Gallons 
per year) 
  2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Crop Ethanol 10.81 11.30 12.29 13.11 13.56 
Cellulosic Ethanol 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Total Biodiesel  0.33 0.36 0.37 0.40 0.43 
 
The baseline scenario is estimated over an 80-year horizon (2000-2080) to fully 
capture changes in forestry investment decisions and the dynamic interactions of forest 
and agricultural land use. The following chapters present results on deviations from this 
baseline as stimulated by renewable fuels mandates and climate mitigation opportunities 
in AF. 
6.1.2 Scenarios Employed to Analyze EISA-RFS2 
To simulate the effects of adding the 2007 energy bill RFS mandates to the 
baseline, the latest version of the EISA-RFS rules (referred to as RFS2) are incorporated 
into the model by setting minimum biofuel production requirements for ethanol, 
cellulosic ethanol, and biodiesel at mandated levels, and by feedstock. Requirements are 
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phased in over time until reaching a total of 30 billion gallons of biofuels annually in 
202224.  
The first scenario is henceforth referred to as “RFS2”. CRP is held at 32 million 
acres. The second “RFS2 with CRP Recultivation,” is a relevant sensitivity case in 
which CRP lands are allowed to reenter production upon contract completion. This case 
reveals important information about the potential pressures facing conservation lands 
under a higher commodity price regime brought on by expanded bioenergy efforts. This 
study imposes upper bounds on corn ethanol and soybean biodiesel as in RFS2 but 
allows cellulosic feedstocks to comprise a larger share of the total ethanol portfolio if 
economically feasible. Table 7 displays upper and lower bounds for important biofuel 
types.   
 
Table 7: Biofuel Minimum and Maximum Bounds for FASOMGHG Simulations in 
Billion Gallons 
Biofuel Type Bound 2000 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Total Ethanol Lower 2.131 5.593 13.26 19.71 28.7 28.7 
Total Ethanol Upper 2.131 5.593 12.83 19.377 26.094 30.16 
Cellulosic Ethanol  Lower 0 0 0.43 4.71 13.7 13.7 
Crop Ethanol  Lower 2.131 5.593 12.83 15 15 15 
Forest Ethanol Lower 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Forest Ethanol Upper 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Wet Mill Ethanol  Lower 0.309 0.811 0 0 0 0 
Wet Mill Ethanol  upper 0.309 0.811 1.31 1.39 1.39 1.39 
Total Biodiesel  lower 0.01 0.918 0.86 1.323 1.466 1.466 
Total Biodiesel  upper 0.01 0.918 2.168 3.418 4.668 5.918 
                                                 
24
 To reach a 36 BGY threshold, there are allowances for imported ethanol, and other “advanced” biofuels 
from non-AF biomass.   
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For this scenario ethanol production is locked in at RFS mandated levels beyond 
2022 to be consistent with energy demand projections and current transportation sector 
infrastructure (Figure 18).  FASOMGHG solves under EISA-RFS baseline conditions 
for market clearing levels of production, consumption, feedstock use, and net GHG 
emissions associated with all commodities modeled within the U.S. agricultural and 
forestry sectors.  Meeting the RFS requires that a significant portion of land resources be 
allocated to the production of bioenergy, as simulation results will show. Emphasis on 
cellulosic ethanol creates a new market for agricultural residues (e.g., corn stover, wheat 
straw), and dedicated energy feedstocks such as switchgrass and hybrid poplar, giving 
producers more marketable alternatives for managing their land.  
 
 
Figure 18: Biofuel production over time and by scenario  
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6.2 Results  
The following results tables and discussion are organized such that RFS2 induced 
energy output is presented first, followed by a discussion of commodity price 
projections, exports, producer welfare across scenarios, policy implications for natural 
resource use, and implications for GHG emissions and other environmental variables.    
6.2.1 Net Bioenergy Production by Region  
 National biofuel production rises under RFS2 mandated levels (Table 8). Energy 
output is summarized in billion gallons for ethanol and biodiesel, and Tbtu for 
bioelectricity. The mandated production of ethanol under the RFS2 is more than twice 
AEO 2009 projections. Net ethanol production in 2025 is sustained at the imposed lower 
bound. Biodiesel energy output increases substantially (more than ten-fold), but this is a 
relatively small share relative to ethanol. Bioelectricity increases as well under the RFS2 
relative to the baseline, due to an increased availability of agricultural residues and 
dedicated energy crops that compete with cellulosic ethanol feedstock requirements.  
6.2.2 Commodity Market Implications 
 Dramatic shifts in U.S. demand for AF feedstocks and overall land use will 
impact commodity markets by increasing prices and net returns to crop producers and 
lowering U.S. exports.  First, consider baseline commodity prices as shown in Table 9. 
Generally these decline over time, consistent with historic trends. Corn prices drop to an 
average of $3.03 by 2050, a level consistent with corn prices for most of this decade. 
Other prices display noticeable downward trends as well, especially grain commodities. 
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This reflects changes in yield productivity and production efficiency over time. The 
price of cotton actually increases over time, reflecting reduced acreage in the baseline 
and lower yield growth potential than other crops.  
 
Table 8:  Regional Energy Output from RFS2 Expansion (2025)25 
  
Ethanol  
 (Billion Gallons) 
Biodiesel  
(Billion Gallons) 
Bioelectricity  
(TBTU) 
  Baseline RFS2 Baseline RFS2 Baseline RFS2 
Corn Belt 6.41 7.79 0 0.04 21.99 11.13 
Great Plains 3.34 7.55 0 0.15 4.16 4.16 
Lake States 3.34 7.55 0 0.48 0 8.75 
Northeast 0 0 0 0 19.48 19.48 
Pac. Northwest 0.23 0.11 0 0 25.03 15.19 
Pac. Southwest 0 0 0 0 17.91 15.62 
Rocky Mts. 0 0.04 0 0 10.44 10.44 
South Central 0 3.47 0.12 0.66 350.38 436.58 
Southeast 0 1.36 0 0 406.23 232.88 
Southwest 0.03 2.32 0 0 12.88 212.76 
U.S. Total 13.37 27.87 0.12 1.34 868.52 967.01 
 
Table 9: Baseline Projected Prices for Important Agricultural Commodities 
  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Wheat ($/Bushel) 6.42 6.31 6.09 5.88 5.61 
Corn ($/Bushel) 3.55 3.46 3.37 3.17 3.03 
Cotton  ($/lb) 256.76 264.80 264.42 266.31 275.80 
Soybeans ($/Bushel) 9.27 9.14 9.00 8.93 9.13 
Sorghum ($/Bushel)  5.73 5.61 5.53 5.45 5.42 
Rice  10.08 9.99 9.84 9.79 9.77 
Fed Beef ($/100 lb) 105.13 105.27 103.50 100.93 100.66 
Non-fed Beef ($/100 lb) 66.08 68.44 68.10 66.54 67.41 
Hogs ($/100 lb) 55.92 55.33 54.69 54.01 54.34 
Chicken ($/100 lb) 57.11 56.99 56.43 55.83 55.53 
                                                 
25
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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How do these projections compare to observed trends in commodity prices?  
Figure 19 displays historic and projected prices for several important agricultural 
commodities. Historic price data are plotted in real terms from 1964-2009. FASOMGHG 
baseline commodity price projections are plotted for 2010 and beyond. Notice that there 
is an ostensible downward trend in all projected commodity prices, though this effect is 
more pronounced for corn and wheat than for livestock commodities. Other prices 
exhibit similar trends in these projections, showing that under baseline conditions (i.e., 
in the absence of biofuel expansion efforts, and following contemporary estimates of 
demand and productivity growth) the agricultural sector could experience a continuation 
of historic trends in commodity markets. Declining real commodity prices signal 
reduced demand for factor inputs over time, including productive land and water 
resources. 
 
Figure 19: Historic and future commodity price projections from USDA-NASS and 
FASOMGHG output 
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6.2.2.1 Commodity Price Projections across Scenarios  
In general, price impacts are modest for most commodities (Table 10). Values 
are expressed in per-unit prices and percentage changes from baseline. The major grain 
commodities (corn, soybeans, and wheat) experience relatively small price increases 
over time. Corn prices deviate less than 7% from baseline levels, though this effect is 
even smaller in later years.  Wheat prices also show little movement (~3% or less).  
Soybean prices move significantly, rising more than 10% from baseline levels 
throughout the projection period as a high proportion of soybean production is needed to 
meet the RFS2 mandates.  Livestock prices also rise, with non-fed beef prices rising 
more sharply than fed beef (as some grazing lands move to other uses).  
 To put these prices into policy context, consider the Searchinger et al., 2008 
study that assessed the international leakage implications of U.S. ethanol expansion. 
That study considered a case in which ethanol production increases 14.5 billion gallons 
above baseline levels by 2016 (primarily from corn ethanol). Results indicated that such 
a shift would result in average price increases of 40%, 20%, and 17% for corn, soybeans, 
and wheat, respectively. These estimates are much lower, as this study models the RFS2 
explicitly, and simulates a much higher proportion of cellulosic ethanol than Searchinger 
et al. 2008; cellulosic feedstocks rarely compete directly with food and fiber. Also, a 
greater number of cropping alternatives in FASOMGHG allows for more flexibility in 
cropland allocation (for instance, corn production can be extended to lands currently 
used for producing rice, cotton, etc.). Alternative modeling assumptions and the 
difference in dynamic and static equilibrium modeling also contribute to this difference 
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(further discussion below). Finally, as results project substantial cropland expansion 
under the RFS2 regime, which alleviates prices impact concerns to an extent.  
Thus, results of this study indicate that past analyses might have overstated the 
price impacts of bioenergy by not fully representing the dynamics of land use and 
agricultural investment decisions, cropland expansion possibilities, advanced biofuels, or 
flexible crop mix strategies. 
 
Table 10: Commodity Price Projections and Percentage Change from Baseline 
under the RFS226  
  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Wheat ($/Bushel) 6.52 6.55 6.29 5.95 5.76 
 
1.48% 3.81% 3.36% 1.08% 2.57% 
Corn ($/Bushel) 3.66 3.69 3.46 3.23 3.08 
 
3.07% 6.74% 2.70% 1.86% 1.72% 
Cotton  ($/lb) 258.73 271.10 276.96 278.53 278.53 
 
0.77% 2.38% 4.74% 4.59% 0.99% 
Soybeans ($/Bushel) 9.58 9.73 9.69 9.53 9.35 
 
3.34% 6.45% 7.70% 6.74% 2.35% 
Sorghum ($/Bushel)  6.16 6.57 6.42 6.27 6.24 
 
7.54% 17.07% 16.15% 15.04% 15.03% 
Rice  10.09 10.02 10.03 9.89 9.85 
 
0.11% 0.28% 1.94% 1.01% 0.76% 
Fed Beef ($/100 lb) 106.26 108.31 106.26 103.54 101.87 
 
1.07% 2.88% 2.67% 2.59% 1.21% 
Non-fed Beef ($/100 lb) 66.36 70.41 69.48 68.66 68.42 
 
0.43% 2.89% 2.02% 3.18% 1.50% 
Hogs ($/100 lb) 56.67 57.01 55.96 55.02 55.06 
 
1.33% 3.04% 2.32% 1.87% 1.33% 
Chicken ($/100 lb) 57.63 57.64 57.10 56.30 55.77 
 
-0.10% -1.18% -1.88% -2.04% -3.40% 
 
                                                 
26
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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Table 11 displays indexed deviations from baseline commodity prices.  Here, 
prices of agricultural commodities are bundled into crop and livestock categories using 
an index number (AEO 2009 = 100). I focus on non-poultry livestock prices, which are 
most sensitive to changes in land use (particularly pasture), and the price of feed grains. 
Crop commodity prices are impacted more heavily by the implementation of the RFS2 
than livestock as land is re-allocated to the production of biofuel feedstocks. Price 
differentials are greatest in later years of the simulation period, due primarily to the 
significant decline in prices prevalent in the baseline. Livestock prices remain higher 
than baseline projections due to reductions in cropland pasture acreage, and higher costs 
of feed and an accompanying reduction in production. When CRP lands are allowed to 
re-enter production, crop and livestock price effects are smaller, dropping an average of 
1.67% and 0.70%, respectively, below the constrained CRP case.  
 
Table 11: Commodity Price Indices across Biofuel Expansion Scenarios (Baseline 
Price = 100)27 
  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
RFS2 Base  All Crops  102.70 105.25 102.91 111.44 119.71 
 
RFS2 with CRP All Crops 102.41 103.58 100.82 108.99 117.88 
RFS2 Base  Grain Crops 102.91 105.42 103.19 111.21 118.55 
 
RFS2 with CRP Grain Crops 102.56 103.60 100.85 108.71 116.66 
RFS2 Base  
Livestock no 
Poultry  101.06 102.29 101.19 102.20 105.51 
 
RFS2 with CRP 
Livestock no 
Poultry  100.80 101.16 100.61 101.93 104.26 
RFS2 Base  
Processed 
Commodities 101.78 104.63 100.41 110.68 120.54 
 
RFS2 with CRP 
Processed 
Commodities 101.63 103.68 99.33 109.78 120.21 
                                                 
27
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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6.2.2.2 Net Producer Welfare Implications of the RFS2 
Higher prices and production levels induced by the RFS2 lead to economic 
welfare gains for crop producers. Figure 20 displays regional producer surplus shifts 
across the RFS2 scenarios.  Crop producer welfare gains are positive across all major 
agri-forestry regions, though vary significantly. The Corn Belt, Great Plains, and Lake 
States see the highest net gains under the RFS2, with the Corn Belt realizing gains 
ranging $4.6-$5.3 billion annually. Other regions see only marginal changes in producer 
welfare.   
Notice that for all regions, crop producer welfare declines when CRP reversion is 
included. While this might seem counter-intuitive as more acres are in production and a 
constraint on land is being relaxed, higher rents bring additional land into production, 
which relaxes equilibrium commodity prices and lowers the rents. FAOSMGHG 
maximizes the sum of all welfare accounts, including domestic and foreign producer and 
consumer welfare. Additional cropland under the CRP reversion case reduces output 
prices and producer welfare, but consumer gains (reduced consumer losses relative to the 
no reversion case) lead to a net increase in total welfare.  
Figure 21 displays deviations from baseline livestock producer welfare. Notice 
that for most regions, livestock producers experience a net loss in welfare, though the 
scale of these losses is much less than the gains received by crop producers. Welfare 
losses are due to higher feed costs and losses in pasture acreage (discussed in the next 
section). The implication is that livestock producers may not be able to pass through the 
higher costs of production onto consumers, and could experience sustained losses in net 
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income relative to business as usual conditions. CRP reversion lowers commodity prices 
and welfare losses to livestock producers.  
 
Figure 20: Crop producers' surplus changes from base across the RFS2 scenarios 
 
 
Figure 21: Livestock producers' surplus changes from base across the RFS2 
scenarios28 
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 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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 As the previous section has shown, a projection of agricultural production 
characteristics under the RFS2 and recent market conditions can sustain higher 
commodity prices (undoubtedly affecting export markets in the long run), and raise U.S. 
cropland rents over time. The following sections relate these market factors to natural 
resource use, GHG emissions, and implications for environmental quality.   
6.2.2.3 Total Welfare Implications of the RFS2 
Total U.S. producer welfare is measured as the sum of crop producer gains, 
livestock producer losses, and welfare gains to processors of secondary agricultural 
products (Figure 22). While not previously displayed, processors see substantial gains 
under the RFS2 (approximately $10.5 billion) from the sale of liquid biofuels29. Total 
producer welfare gains are found to be in excess of $20 billion per year. However, 
welfare gains to producers are accompanied by losses to consumers due to higher 
commodity prices (ranging $3.3-5 billion). Total U.S. welfare gains of approximately 
$18 billion. While substantial, more than 50% of these welfare gains are directly 
attributed to biofuels revenue, the rest is due to higher commodity prices received by 
producers.  
 
                                                 
29
 Note that while processors consume primary agricultural commodities, FASOMGHG models processor 
welfare on the producer surplus side of the objective function.  
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Figure 22: Total U.S. agricultural welfare changes from base (annuity)30 
 
6.2.2.4 Implications for Exports 
The RFS2 will reach beyond U.S. markets, affecting international agricultural 
trade and production in the rest of the world. Consider U.S. agricultural exports, and 
estimated percentage change from base for several important agricultural commodities 
(Table 12). Most exports displayed here decrease, some substantially. For instance, 
soybean exports decrease 28-30% from base levels, as U.S. soybeans are needed to 
satisfy RFS2 biodiesel mandates. Corn and wheat do not increase significantly, due in 
part to U.S. cropland expansion. Other crops not used for bioenergy processing 
experience significant indirect export changes as crop mixes adjust to the RFS2 
(including cotton, sorghum, and rice). 
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 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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Table 12: U.S. Export Changes across RFS2 Scenarios (Percent Difference from 
Baseline Annuity)31 
  RFS2 RFS2 with CRP 
Corn  -3.75% -2.00% 
Soybeans -30.10% -28.23% 
Wheat -1.15% 0.69% 
Cotton  -9.39% -8.81% 
Sorghum  -28.38% -24.82% 
Rice -9.46% -9.58% 
Non Fed Beef -1.27% -0.32% 
Pork  -0.62% 0.01% 
Chicken -0.14% -0.05% 
 
 Higher commodity prices and lower U.S. export levels stimulate export activities 
in other regions internationally, which can induce land use change. Figure 23 displays 
export index values from the base period (2000), presented in annuity terms. These 
values express expected changes in export levels, by country of origin, from a historic 
base. Notice that in the baseline, most regions are expected to increase their exports over 
time, implying higher production levels and potentially cropland use (China and India 
are the two exceptions). However, forecasted exports increase across the RFS2 scenarios 
in regions presented here relative to the baseline. While some of these deviations are 
small, other regions see significantly increased exports, including large shifts in 
Argentina and Brazil (6-11%), where indirect land use change in response to U.S. 
policies is a concern.      
 
                                                 
31
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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Figure 23: Export increase by international region and scenario (2000 level = 100) 
 
6.2.3 Land Use Implications 
 The RFS2 driven biofuel expansion requires a shift in crop production patterns 
and mixes as well as the entry of additional land into production as detailed here.  
6.2.3.1 Baseline Land Use Trajectories 
 In the baseline, with no RFS2 mandates, and no CRP reversion, results show a 
net decrease in total cropland and forested acres over time.  Simply put, yield 
productivity growth outpaces demand growth in this scenario, causing reduced demand 
for cropland.. In addition, exogenous urban development takes cropland, grazing lands, 
and timberland out of production.  As Figure 24 displays, both cropland and forested 
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33 million acres from the base (2000) period, or roughly 10-12% of the current cropland 
base. More than 19 million acres is transferred to development (cumulative), with the 
rest being set aside or transferred to pasture or forest. Private timberland decreases 
approximately 30.5 million acres mostly due to development losses (34 million acres), 
though some land transfers into forest from other uses.  
 
 
Figure 24: Crop and forest land use trajectories under AEO 2009 baseline 
conditions32 
   
6.2.3.2 Land Use across the RFS2 Scenarios 
 Figure 25 expresses cropland and forest stocks on an annuity basis for the AEO 
2009 Baseline, RFS2 and RFS2 with CRP reversion scenarios, respectively33. Compared 
to baseline levels, forest use increases only marginally between the AEO 2009 baseline 
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 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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and RFS2 scenarios (approximately 2 million acres), attributed to cellulosic ethanol and 
bioelectricity feedstock demand. There is no discernible change in forest use between the 
CRP 32 million acres and reversion allowed scenarios (though land use change 
trajectories are affected). However, total cropland use increases considerably under the 
elevated bioenergy mandates (approximately 14.5 million acres). The RFS2 stimulates 
commodity demand and pushes agricultural land to the extensive margin, while also 
retaining cropland that would otherwise be idled or transferred out of crop production. 
Allowing CRP reversion adds an additional 3.9 million acres to the cropland stock on an 
annuity basis.  
 
 
Figure 25: Cropland and forest stocks across bioenergy scenarios (million acre 
annuity)34  
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Land use trends change temporally as well. The difference in cropland and forest 
stocks over time is plotted in Figure 26.  Total cropland use is substantially higher under 
the RFS2 scenarios than in the baseline. Beyond 2050, we see a difference of 
approximately 40 million acres in cropland above baseline levels.  Forest use stays 
relatively the same across all three scenarios, but the transition of lands into and out of 
forestry is altered by the influence of the RFS2 mandates (discussed below). Total 
cropland use grows at an increasing rate when CRP reversion is allowed, and stays 
consistently higher for the length of the simulation.  
 
 
Figure 26: Crop and forest land use trajectories across biofuel expansion 
scenarios35 
 
6.2.3.3 Land Use Change across Scenarios 
In general, land-use allocation between alternative uses (cropland, forest, pasture, 
and conservation) is significantly affected by the RFS2 mandates (Table 13). Several 
observations arise from these data:   
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• Deforestation to cropland (which exist in the baseline) increases with the RFS2, 
reflecting greater potential returns to crop production than in timber in some 
regions, consistent with LUC concerns echoed in the literature. By 2020, 
Cumulative simulated cropland deforestation increases 4.77 million acres under 
the influence of the RFS2.  
• There is little difference in deforestation for cropland rates by 2020 between the 
“with” and “without” CRP reversion cases. This is contrary to the hypothesis that 
greater use of marginal or idled cropland will reduce cropland expansion, and is 
indeed contrary to past simulations using the FASOMGHG model (Baker et al., 
2008).  The main difference between these simulations and those in past settings 
is the influence of cropland pasture transitions on CRP reversion rates (as 
moving land from cropland pasture to cropland is a lower cost land use shift in 
some FASOMGHG regions than CRP to cropland), a feature of the model that 
has been enhanced since the earlier simulations.  
• The major differences in cropland deforestation occur in early periods of the 
simulation, which is consistent with the time frame in which the RFS2 drives the 
demand for agricultural feedstocks (2010-2020).  
• Transition of lands from crop to forests (afforestation), which also exists in the 
baseline, decreases across the RFS2 scenarios.  
• The largest shifts into dedicated crop production come from pastureland 
conversion and CRP re-cultivation. Pasture conversion is quite large in early 
years under the RFS2 scenario, exceeding baseline levels by 6.7 and 9.1 million 
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acres for 2020 and 2050, respectively. When CRP is included, this conversion 
decreases only slightly (0.7 and 0.9 million acres).  
• There is a negligible amount of CRP reversion in the baseline where we allow 
CRP reversion up to the point of the Farm Bill 2008 target of 32 million acres 
constant in the RFS2 scenario, though the baseline begins with 37.2 million acres 
of CRP (leaving more than 5 million for recultivation purposes). This supply is 
exhausted in the RFS2 case (based on 2004 levels of CRP acreage). This 
movement is very consistent with the rates of change we’ve observed in CRP 
enrollment over the last three years, as enrollment has declined substantially 
(FSA, 2009).  
• When we allow optimal CRP reversion under the RFS2, we see approximately 
11.5 million acres reverting, or 34.2% of the current CRP stock, a significant 
shift away from conservation priorities.  Loss in soil carbon and other 
environmental benefits (biodiversity and wildlife habitat protection, soil erosion 
protection, etc.) are likely accompanied by such a shift. This result shows that 
holding CRP rental payments at historic levels will not maintain conservation 
lands under higher commodity price regimes stimulated by the RFS2 (data show 
that rental payments for general CRP sign-up have remained steady since 2001, 
while comparable cropland rents have increased steadily.  
• The largest land-use shift in the baseline runs is pasture afforestation, or 1) pure 
afforestation from cropland pasture, and 2) a management shift out of grazed 
forest pasture into permanent timber management. As timberland decreases 
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under the RFS2, a large portion of pasture shifts over to fill this void. This effect 
is enhanced by the RFS2 in later years of the simulation, as pasture moves to 
forest to replace timberland lost to crop production in earlier periods. 
 
Table 13: Land Use Change by Category (Million Acres)36 
  AEO 2009 Baseline RFS2  RFS2 with CRP 
  2020 2050 2020 2050 2020 2050 
Forest to 
Cropland 15.42 22.46 16.29 25.42 15.88 24.69 
      5.61% 13.16% 2.99% 9.93% 
Cropland to 
Forest 1.90 2.99 1.84 1.84 1.82 2.04 
      -2.77% -38.29% -3.92% -31.60% 
Forest to 
Pasture  0.80 2.97 0.78 3.26 0.78 3.26 
      -3.07% 9.68% -3.07% 9.65% 
Pasture to 
Forest 24.54 29.14 29.79 35.84 29.45 35.63 
      21.38% 22.98% 20.02% 22.26% 
Pasture to 
Cropland  9.76 9.76 9.76 10.95 9.76 10.57 
      0.00% 12.16% 0.00% 8.33% 
CRP to 
Cropland  3.65 3.65 5.32 5.32 11.62 11.62 
      45.84% 45.84% 218.63% 218.63% 
 
6.2.3.3.1 Comparison with Other Studies 
In general, most studies of LUC and bioenergy have been performed using global 
economic models to simulate LUC in international regions (Dumortier et al., 2009; 
Hertel et al., 2009; Searchinger et al., 2008).  The idea is that cropland expansion is 
                                                 
36
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
142 
 
 
expected to occur at higher rates in developing nations where land is essentially more 
“mobile”. The bulk of this expansion is expected in tropical regions such as those found 
in Brazil, or in productive grasslands such as the Argentine Pampas. FASOMGHG 
results indicate that there is significant cropland expansion potential within the U.S. 
Different modeling approaches and baseline assumptions and input data all factor into 
final estimates of LU/LUC over time.  
 As a relevant comparison study, consider Keeney and Hertel, 2009, which 
measures land use responses globally to increased biofuel production in the U.S. 
(specifically ethanol) using a computable general equilibrium model of global trade. For 
every billion gallon increase in ethanol production, they find a 0.1 percent increase in the 
demand for U.S. cropland. This is accompanied by reductions in forests and pasture at 
0.35% and 0.53%, respectively. Their approach uses a static computable general 
equilibrium model that relies on Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution between factor 
inputs (i.e., land use types) to simulate land use competition and LUC responses to 
increased U.S. biofuel production. This is different from the dynamic FASOMGHG 
approach that weighs the expected returns to alternative land uses over time, contingent 
on biophysical parameters that constrain total land use transferability by region.  
 Comparing land use totals and total ethanol output from FASOMGHG results 
similar land use responses are found for pasture, very little response in total forest use, 
but a much greater affect in the demand for cropland. Total cropland differences in 2025 
are 9.3 and 15.1 million acres, respectively for the RFS2 and RFS2 with CRP cases 
(Table 14). For every one billion gallon increase in ethanol demand in 2025, results 
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show a 0.20% and 0.32% increase in total cropland (three times the expansion rate of 
Keeney and Hertel, 2009). Contrary to Keeney and Hertel et al., forest use increases, but 
only marginally so (0.08% per billion gallons ethanol). I find a much stronger reduction 
in the demand for pasture resulting from a one billion gallon increase in ethanol.  Thus, 
FASOMGHG shows stronger cropland expansion and pasture contraction effects in the 
U.S. than Hertel et al. 2009, though one might argue that a lack of significant land use 
movement in the U.S. in a global modeling effort is specifically due to the global land 
use coverage. This has implications for commodity markets and international leakage, as 
subsequent sections will discuss.  
 
Table 14: Land Use Responses to U.S. Ethanol Expansion (FASOMGHG 
Estimates) 
  
Ethanol 
(bgy) 
Cropland 
(million 
acres) 
Forest 
(million 
acres) 
Pasture 
(million 
acres) 
Absolute Difference by 2025 
(RFS2 Base) 15.59 9.27 4.35 -11.95 
Absolute Difference by 2025 
(RFS2 with CRP) 15.59 15.10 4.40 -55.41 
Percent  change per 1 billion 
gallon (RFS2 Base)  n/a 0.20% 0.08% -1.15% 
Percent  change per 1 billion 
gallon (RFS2 with CRP) n/a 0.32% 0.08% -1.10% 
 
6.2.3.3.2 Commodity Production Implications of Land Use Responses 
Land use affects total cropland stocks by major U.S. crop (Table 15), and 
livestock production practices. Results here are presented in annuities, by million acres 
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(for simplicity, land use totals are converted to annuity to collapse the time element and 
allow for a simple comparable measure of land use stocks).  
• The RFS2 scenarios cause U.S. corn acreage to increase by more than 3 million 
acres.  
• Wheat acreage actually declines by 0.5-1.5 million acres as crop mix strategies 
adjust to the biofuel expansion policy. In addition there is crop residue harvesting 
for cellulosic ethanol production.  
• Across the RFS2 scenarios, approximately 13-14 million acres of corn and 15-16 
million acres of wheat include residue harvesting for energy production. One 
should note that residue harvesting could undermine other environmental 
objectives such as boosting soil carbon sequestration through changing tillage 
practices. Removing residues from a field reduces the rate at which soil carbon 
accumulates over time. Research has shown that intense residue harvesting can 
also degrade water quality by enhancing erosion and nutrient leaching (Mann et 
al., 2002).  As the next chapter will discuss, the existence of the RFS2, can 
augment AF GHG mitigation potential by limiting certain practices that conflict 
with RFS2 demands.  
• The greatest net change in cropped acres is seen in soybeans, which increases 
7.5-8.6 million acres from baseline to RFS2 conditions due to the large land 
requirements needed to produce soybean biodiesel. Again, while soybean 
biodiesel is a relatively minor portion of the RFS2 total, the   
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• Cotton acreage decreases slightly, and rice acreage decreases appreciably. While 
this reduction in rice acreage is small in absolute terms, global rice markets have 
shown to be very sensitive to acreage totals and short-term reductions in supply 
(Trostle, 2008).  
• Switchgrass, a dedicated energy crop, is grown on approximately 5 million acres 
of cropland under the RFS2, a ten-fold increase above baseline levels. All 
dedicated energy crop acreage occurs in the Southern U.S.  
 
Table 15: U.S. Land Use by Crop and Scenario (Million Acres Annuity)37 
 
AEO 2009 
Baseline RFS2 RFS2 with CRP 
Corn  69.39 72.46 72.92 
 
 4.42% 5.08% 
Soybeans 66.34 73.83 74.95 
 
 11.30% 12.97% 
Wheat 64.32 62.94 63.80 
 
 -2.15% -0.81% 
Cotton  11.58 11.22 11.21 
 
 -3.10% -3.18% 
Sorghum 9.93 11.33 11.54 
 
 14.04% 16.14% 
Rice 3.13 2.88 2.88 
 
 -7.98% -8.06% 
Switchgrass 0.59 5.13 5.21 
  773.45% 786.72% 
 
Shifts in land use and crop production driven by the RFS2 affect the U.S. 
livestock industry as well. As conventional feed grains are used for biofuel processing, 
the price of feed rises accordingly, inducing distinct management shifts in livestock, and 
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lowering herd size. Table 16 displays changes in livestock production. Results indicate 
that poultry, eggs, and dairy production will decrease only marginally due to higher feed 
costs. However, cattle production is significantly affected. Total herd size (denoted by 
the Cow/Calf row entry) drops approximately 10% below baseline levels, with stocker 
cattle decreasing the most, indicating a shift away from pasture grazing.   
 
 
Table 16: Livestock Changes from Base in Absolute (Thousand Head) and 
Percentage Terms38 
  RFS2  
RFS2  
(% Diff) 
RFS2 with 
CRP 
RFS2 with 
CRP (% Diff) 
Sheep  104 2.16% 127 2.63% 
Total Cow/Calf  -1,108 -2.77% -821 -2.05% 
Feedlot Yearlings -2,690 -18.49% -3,322 -22.84% 
Feedlot Calves  1,879 7.25% 2,621 10.11% 
Dairy  -56 -0.88% -31 -0.48% 
Farrow Hog 3,127 24.94% 3,097 24.71% 
Feeder Pig -217 -3.60% -156 -2.58% 
Pig Finishing -4,490 -3.86% -3,284 -2.82% 
Horses and Mules -62 -1.02% -35 -0.58% 
Steer Calf (Stocker) -1,286 -10.12% -1,803 -14.19% 
Heifer Calf (Stocker)  -1,565 -56.72% -1,560 -56.55% 
Steer Yearling 
(Stocker)  -1,329 -9.70% -1,866 -13.62% 
Heifer Yearling 
(Stocker) -1,630 -55.79% -1,625 -55.63% 
Turkey  2,936 1.44% 2,855 1.40% 
Broiler  -21,961 -0.29% -10,438 -0.14% 
Egg  -1,561 -0.48% -418 -0.13% 
 
Optimal feed portfolios also change under the RFS2 (Figure 27) as corn is 
allocated for ethanol production. In total, corn fed to beef cattle, dairy cattle, and hogs 
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decreases by approximately 350 million bushels, helping to explain the dramatic 
reduction in total herd size and livestock producer welfare across the RFS2 scenarios.  
However, some of this loss is supplemented by increased barley, silage, and hay feeds. 
Additionally, DDG from corn fractionation and use of gluten meal are stimulated by the 
RFS2.    
 
 
Figure 27: Change in feed use from base by commodity39 
 
6.2.3.3.3 Regional Land Use: Indirect Policy Consequences    
 Cropland expansion responses to the RFS2 scenarios vary widely by region.  
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Table 17 expresses regional cropland use projections across scenarios on an annuity 
basis. Most regions see an increase in cropland use. The greatest acreage increase occurs 
in the Lake States and Southwest regions, where annual cropland use is projected to 
increase 4-5 million acres, representing approximately 17.5% and 11.5% shifts in 
cropland, respectively. This includes an increase in switchgrass acreage in the Southwest 
(~3.5 million acres), and use of additional cropland for grain production to satisfy the 
void left in conventional commodity markets as food products are used for fuel 
processing in the Corn Belt and Great Plains regions. Also, I find reductions in crop 
acreage in the baseline (especially in the Southwest region), as this is less productive 
land than  the Corn Belt and Lake States; while higher energy prices and low crop prices 
drive some of this out of production in the baseline, but the RFS2 brings it back in.  
Other large deviations from the baseline in the RFS2 case occur in the Corn Belt, 
Lake States, Southeast, and South Central. When CRP reversion is allowed, an 
additional 2-3 million acres re-enter production in the Great Plains. Additionally, as 
more productive CRP lands revert in the Corn Belt, Great Plains, and Lake States, there 
is a smaller amount of cropland used in less productive regions like the Southwest.    
All regions experience shifts in overall cropland use and net gains in biofuel 
output. Given that the RFS2 is a national based policy, one cannot call regional cropland 
expansion effects leakage. However, as the majority of energy production is 
concentrated in a few regions, and cropland expansion effect is prevalent in most, there 
are indirect market responses (i.e., land use changes) occurring in regions with little 
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energy production potential. This can cause increased GHG net emissions from 
agricultural practices in those regions.  
 
Table 17: Regional Cropland Use and Percent Difference from Base across Biofuel 
Scenarios (Million Acres, 2025)40 
  
AEO 2009 
Baseline RFS2 RFS2 with CRP 
Corn Belt 79.37 81.26 81.72 
  
 2.38% 2.96% 
Great Plains 76.02 75.29 78.84 
  
 -0.96% 3.72% 
Lake States  29.41 34.45 34.60 
  
 17.15% 17.67% 
Northeast  4.85 6.40 5.76 
  
 31.92% 18.72% 
Rocky Mts.  25.26 24.88 25.32 
  
 -1.49% 0.24% 
Pac. Southwest 3.79 3.79 3.79 
  
 0.00% 0.00% 
Pac. Northwest 5.85 5.85 5.84 
  
 0.02% -0.04% 
South Central 35.80 36.94 37.20 
  
 3.17% 3.89% 
Southeast 12.84 14.30 14.34 
  
 11.35% 11.65% 
Southwest  22.99 27.65 27.21 
  
 20.28% 18.36% 
  
6.2.3.4 Baseline Emissions across AF Sectors   
 Baseline emissions across all AF activities, expressed in decadal averages out to 
2050 are in Figure 28. Here, positive values indicate a net source of emissions and 
negative values a net sink. The results show:  
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• Forest management decisions account for a large source of emissions throughout the 
time horizon (206 million tCO2e per year), but are significantly higher in early 
periods of the simulation as land moves out of forest into crop production. This 
includes carbon uptake from existing/reforested stands, emissions from 
deforestation, forest fuel use, harvesting timber, and transporting/processing final 
products.  
• Carbon stored in final wood products over the long term completely offsets the 
emissions from land management activities (-259 million tCO2e in the baseline).   
• Carbon stored in afforested stands converting from cropland or pasture is also 
counted, and provides a significant sink in the baseline (-72 million tCO2e). Taken 
together, forest product and afforestation sequestration, plus emissions from forest 
management produce a net annual sink of 125 million tCO2e.  
• Agricultural methane (CH4) accounts for an average of 194.3 million tCO2e per year. 
This includes emissions from rice cultivation, livestock manure management, and 
enteric fermentation. Crop soil C sequestration is variable, reflecting soil carbon 
dynamics, differences in tillage practices, land use changes into and out of crop 
production, and changes in overall crop mix strategies over time.  
• Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions amount to ~150 million tCO2e per year across the 
projected period, which is less than EPA GHG Inventory estimates of ~200 million 
tCO2e per year (EPA, 2009).  
• N2O emissions include those from fertilizer use (122 million tCO2e), indirect 
N2O emissions from soil volatilization or N leaching, N2O emissions from 
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pasture use (~29 million tCO2e), and N2O fluxes from bioenergy and manure 
management activities.   
• CO2 emissions from agricultural energy input use, which account for an average of 
68.4 million tCO2e41.  
• Carbon is sequestered in cropped soils at a rate of 47.2 million tCO2e 
• In all the model projects a total annualized source of emissions from AF activities of 
~176 million tCO2e (in annuity terms).   
 
 
Figure 28: Baseline emissions flux (decadal averages)42 
 
                                                 
41
 It is worth noting that in other accounting systems, fossil fuel use emissions in AF would be accounted 
for in “upstream” capped entities such as energy and industry. I include these here for purposes of 
illustration, and later to show how policy induced shifts in input use can alter net AF emissions.  
42
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6.2.3.5 GHG Implications of Biofuel Expansion 
 To examine the impact of the RFS2 on net GHG emissions, Figure 29 includes a 
side-by-side comparison of the total annualized emissions flux. The bottom portion of 
the figure takes an annualized difference from baseline for each of the major GHG 
accounts. The annualized emissions flux is quite similar across these scenarios, with the 
major difference coming in the liquid biofuel offset category43. The RFS2, which 
produces a high volume of low-carbon cellulosic ethanol, produces a much larger offset 
of fossil fuel equivalent GHGs than the baseline (we find a 75.5 million tCO2e 
difference in this account alone). Net emissions from U.S. AF decrease across the RFS2 
scenarios at a rate consistent with biofuel emissions reduction from fossil fuel 
replacement (80.9 million tCO2e per year without CRP, and 81.2 million tCO2e with 
CRP).  
This is an important result, indicating that increased emissions from land use 
change, increased fossil fuel use and N application use resulting from the RFS2 do not 
produce a source of emissions large enough to discount the GHG benefits of biofuel 
production (ignoring emissions from land use changes and production in international 
regions).  
Specifically, we find increases in: 
• N2O emissions from N application (6.8-7.8 million tCO2e per year),  
                                                 
43
 The liquid biofuels account includes emissions offsets from biofuel replacement of fossil fuels after life-
cycle emissions of biofuels from cultivation, harvest, transportation, processing, and combustion are 
accounted for.    
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• CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use (2.7-3.4 million tCO2e per year), and 
• A reduction in soil carbon sequestration, due to land use changes that reduce soil 
organic carbon stocks (16.7-18.1 million tCO2e per year). 
However, these emissions are completely offset by biofuels (~75 million tCO2e 
per year), and other sources emissions reduction, including: 
• Increased carbon sequestration through afforestation and forest management 
activities (21-25.6 million tCO2e per year). 
• Reduction in methane emissions caused by a shift in livestock management 
practices and reduced herd size (~9.5 million tCO2e)  
If only agricultural GHG accounts are considered, increased emissions from 
agricultural activities discount the GHG benefits of biofuels by 20-25% (with higher 
leakage when CRP reversion is allowed). However, when forestry accounts are included, 
there is no net GHG leakage. This contradicts recent evidence that net N2O emissions 
from increased nitrogen application under an RFS2 regime alone would outweigh the net 
gains from biofuel expansion (Crutzen et al., 2009). Obviously, these estimates do not 
include emissions from international LUC, or other environmental impacts of significant 
cropland expansion and agricultural input use.  
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Figure 29: Annualized GHG emissions and difference from base across RFS2 
scenarios44 
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6.2.4 Management Intensity and Water Resource Implications  
RFS2 implications for water use and management intensity are also important. 
Here I show national and regional deviations from baseline in the use of important 
energy intensive inputs, both on an annualized aggregate basis, and per-acre.  
6.2.4.1 National Water Use 
As previous chapters have discussed, use of freshwater for irrigated agricultural 
is expected to increase significantly under expanded biofuel production. Results of this 
analysis show the following response in water use:  
• Total water use, displayed by Figure 30, increases marginally across the RFS2 
scenarios by approximately 0.6 million acre-feet on an annuity basis- roughly a 
1% increase45.   
• While total cropland increases ~14 million acres annually, projected irrigated 
acreage only expands 0.31-0.34 million acres, a 0.7% increase in irrigated 
production.  
• However, this is not an insignificant amount of water in terms of alternative uses. 
This amounts to an additional 0.54 billion gallons per day withdrawn for 
irrigation purposes. The American Water Works Association reports that average 
                                                 
45
 Keep in mind that FASOMGHG water use totals do not completely depict water withdrawals from U.S. 
agriculture. USGS reports much higher water use totals out of the sector.  This difference is prevalent for 
two main reasons. First, FASOMGHG does not model a number of crops that rely heavily on irrigation, 
including peanuts, some vegetables and fruits, orchards, and vineyard crops that comprise a small share of 
the land base but a very large share of water use in the West Coast, Southwest, and Southeastern U.S. 
Also, our per-acre water use factors are based on Agricultural Resource Management Survey data, in 
which farmers possibly under-report water application rates. Further development is under way to 
reconcile these differences.  
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water use per household per year amounts to approximately 127,400 gallons. 
Thus, putting the RFS2-driven increased irrigation burden of 0.54 billion gallons 
per day into the context of municipal use, this amounts to enough water to satisfy 
the municipal demands of 1.5 million households annually (roughly 6 million 
people). A secondary implication of this result is that the RFS2 will increase 
competition for scarce water supplies, raise the opportunity costs of agriculture-
to-urban water transfers, and could alter long-term water planning strategies. 
Thus, while the extent of this flux is small relative to the entire share of irrigation 
water consumed by the agricultural sector, volumetrically, this represents a very 
high share of water consumed for other purposes. 
• When CRP reversion is allowed, there is no discernible change in total water use.     
 
 
 
Figure 30: Projected agricultural water use (million acre-feet, 2025)46 
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6.2.4.2 Regional Water Use: More Indirect Consequences 
 The spatial distribution of additional water use also merits attention. Table 18 
displays regional deviations in water use in annualized million acre-feet.  Net water use 
increases in all regions, though the extent varies widely by region.  
• The largest percentage changes in water use occur in the Southwest, Northeast, 
and Corn Belt, though the latter two represents a very small change in absolute 
terms. The Great Plains and Southwest regions, which is notable because land 
there is either water scarce or predominately irrigated by groundwater.  This adds 
to concerns of over-exploitation of the aquifer moving forward. This is consistent 
with recent concerns that the sustainable management of the Ogallala could be 
undermined long-term by biofuel expansions incentives (Environmental Defense, 
2008).  
• Some regions experience a net decrease in total water use under the RFS2, 
including the South Central, which consumes approximately 1 million acre-feet 
of water less under the RFS2 due to shifting crop mixes.  
o If this reduction were not counted, the total water response would be 
more significant (~1.6 million additional acre-feet consumed), 
o Additionally, cropland shifts in the South Central indirectly stimulate 
irrigation intensity in other regions. Some irrigated cotton and rice in the 
South Central is replaced with dryland grain and dedicated bioenergy 
feedstock production, indirectly stimulating production of rice and cotton 
in the Southwest.  
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• Deviations in water use are smaller in some regions when CRP reversion is 
allowed since land and water can be substitutable in increasing production, 
reflecting a tradeoff on the intensive and extensive margins. As additional 
cropland comes into production, this relaxes management intensity and the 
demand for irrigation water.  That is, additional cropland production can adjust 
the demand for irrigated production, and reduce water use in some regions.   
 
Table 18: Difference in Regional Water Use (Million Acre-feet Annuity and Percent 
Difference from Base)47 
 RFS2 RFS2 with CRP 
 Absolute Diff. % Diff Absolute Diff. % Diff 
Corn Belt 0.03 9.14% 0.03 9.25% 
Great Plains 0.66 5.39% 0.72 5.88% 
Lake States  0.00 -0.76% 0.01 1.90% 
Northeast 0.02 33.58% 0.01 20.94% 
Pac. Northwest 0.03 1.71% -0.01 -0.74% 
Pac. Southwest 0.07 0.99% 0.08 1.13% 
Rocky Mts.  0.11 0.49% 0.12 0.56% 
South Central  -0.97 -14.02% -0.98 -14.12% 
Southeast 0.03 2.74% 0.04 2.96% 
Southwest 0.62 9.54% 0.59 9.15% 
 
  
There are important social trade-offs to consider when renewable energy 
mandates significantly boost overall water consumption for irrigation purposes. The full 
magnitude of this effect may not be alarming at a national level, but the regional 
distribution of increased irrigation relative to the baseline is perhaps more troubling, 
consistent with those in Berndes, 2002. Social gains in increased renewable energy 
                                                 
47
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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supplies should be carefully weighed with local water resource management goals to 
ensure long-term viability of valuable freshwater supplies.  
6.2.4.3 Other Management Intensification Responses 
Table 19 displays percentage changes in important input use by major production 
region for the RFS2 and RFS2 with CRP recultivation cases, respectively. This value 
serves as a rough estimate of the aggregate intensification effect of production by major 
AF region. In general, results show that management intensification effects vary by input 
and are not consistent across regions. Changes in crop mix compositions driven by 
biofuel expansion can significantly alter nutrient use and agricultural energy use 
portfolios. Important observations include:  
• Total input use increases for every input considered (except natural gas—a 
common input used to fuel irrigation systems) at a national level, driven by 
aggregate cropland expansion. 
• Nutrient use expands significantly (especially for Nitrogen fertilizer applied). 
Phosphorous and potassium application also increase substantially under the 
altered crop mix portfolio (potassium use expands more than 14% from base).  
• The largest volumetric gains in N use occur in the Southwest regions, which is 
also the highest percentage increase at more than 50%.  
• Nutrient use in the Corn Belt and Great Plains can affect water quality 
downstream or groundwater systems through runoff and nitrate leaching. Here, I 
find that N use increases by approximately 4% under the RFS2.  
• Fossil fuel use does not increase consistently across regions. 
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Table 19: Percent Change from Baseline in Total Input Use by Region and RFS2 Scenario48 
Percent change in total input use across the RFS2             
  Nitrogen Phosphorous Potassium Diesel Electric Gasoline Nat. Gas Water 
Corn Belt 2.65% 7.68% 14.99% 2.70% -4.37% 2.86% 12.14% 9.14% 
Great Plains 0.68% -0.09% 1.67% -0.81% 4.65% -2.14% 1.02% 5.39% 
Lake States 4.25% 14.86% 30.05% 19.85% -13.72% -5.35% 14.65% -0.76% 
Northeast 33.71% 33.26% 35.89% 34.72% 34.16% 29.11% 0.00% 33.58% 
Pac. Northwest  0.14% -0.45% -0.79% -0.07% 1.84% 0.17% 0.00% 1.71% 
Pac. Southwest 0.17% 0.40% -4.05% 1.10% -0.57% 0.68% 0.00% 0.99% 
Rocky Mts.  -2.23% -1.99% -0.14% -0.57% 0.00% -3.88% -13.94% 0.49% 
South Central -4.42% 4.91% 0.34% -0.70% -14.04% -11.03% -13.55% -14.02% 
Southeast  10.91% 14.07% 9.42% 9.54% 3.23% 8.52% 0.00% 2.74% 
Southwest 22.45% 32.64% 123.36% 16.39% 9.87% -10.54% 0.00% 9.54% 
 U.S. Total  3.47% 7.73% 14.71% 4.61% 2.27% 0.05% -9.71% 1.00% 
 
Percent change in total input use across the RFS2 with CRP 
  Nitrogen Phosphorous Potassium Diesel Electric Gasoline Nat. Gas Water 
Corn Belt 3.11% 7.91% 14.89% 3.29% -3.93% 3.47% 12.17% 9.25% 
Great Plains 5.07% 4.34% 5.27% 4.01% 4.63% 2.57% 5.71% 5.88% 
Lake States 3.80% 14.38% 30.13% 20.27% -10.74% -4.19% 16.99% 1.90% 
Northeast 20.61% 19.99% 22.55% 20.47% 20.96% 17.46% 0.00% 20.94% 
Pac. Northwest  -0.15% -0.51% -0.46% -0.16% -0.83% -0.12% 0.00% -0.74% 
Pac. Southwest 0.19% 0.61% -5.68% 1.75% -1.87% 0.89% 0.00% 1.13% 
Rocky Mts.  -0.91% -1.03% 0.54% 0.94% 0.05% -2.58% -13.64% 0.56% 
South Central -4.41% 5.57% 0.84% -0.25% -14.21% -11.76% -13.56% -14.12% 
Southeast  11.73% 15.19% 9.99% 9.63% 2.77% 6.86% 0.00% 2.96% 
Southwest 20.08% 30.51% 116.82% 14.55% 9.61% -14.09% 0.00% 9.15% 
U.S. Total 4.33% 8.73% 14.40% 5.97% 2.15% 0.87% -9.34% 1.04% 
                                                 
48
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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An appropriate proxy for regional management intensification responses is the 
deviation in per-acre use of agricultural inputs, which eliminates the effect of cropland 
expansion on total input use (Table 20).  This is a more valuable metric for 
understanding the influence of policies on farm-level production behavior and input use.  
• For the U.S., aggregate management intensity decreases for all energy inputs and 
N fertilizer, but increases for water use and phosphorous/potassium application. 
This result indicates that although cropland use increases, total input use and per-
acre intensity decline, indicating a trade-off along the extensive and intensive 
margins. The cropland expansion effect of the RFS2 appears to dominate the 
management intensity effect.  
• However, management intensity increases for fertilizer and chemical application 
rates in all regions but the Lake States, Rocky Mountains, Pac. Northwest, and 
South Central. Thus, the RFS2 can lead to cropland expansion and a shift along 
the intensive margin, which is consistent with initial expectations and theoretical 
framework. Furthermore, national reductions in management intensity are driven 
by large reductions in the Lake States and South Central.  
• In the Rocky Mountains and South Central, per-acre use of most inputs declines. 
These regions bring additional cropland into production under the RFS2 and shift 
crop mix strategies, but manage to reduce on-farm input use in the process 
(reflecting the intensity/expansion effect observed at the national level).   
• In general, CRP reversion relaxes management intensification increases as 
additional land comes into production. 
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Table 20: Percentage Change from Baseline in Per-acre Input Use by Region and RFS2 Scenario49 
Percent change in per-acre input use across the RFS2       
  Nitrogen  Phosphorous Potassium  Diesel  Electric Gasoline Nat. Gas  Water  
Corn Belt 0.27% 5.18% 12.32% 0.31% -6.59% 0.46% 11.59% -0.17% 
G.  Plains 1.65% 0.88% 2.65% 0.15% 5.66% -1.20% 17.49% 0.45% 
Lake 
States -11.01% -1.96% 11.01% 2.30% -26.35% -19.21% 11.59% 2.84% 
Northeast 1.36% 1.02% 3.02% 2.13% 1.71% -2.12% 0.00% -0.16% 
Pac. 
Northwest  0.13% -0.47% -0.80% -0.08% 1.83% 0.15% 0.00% -0.28% 
Pac. 
Southwest 0.17% 0.40% -4.05% 1.10% -0.57% 0.68% 0.00% 0.04% 
Rocky 
Mts.  -0.75% -0.52% 1.37% 0.93% 1.51% -2.43% -13.11% 0.30% 
South 
Central -7.35% 1.69% -2.74% -3.75% -16.68% -13.76% -26.21% 0.06% 
Southeast  -0.39% 2.45% -1.73% -1.62% -7.29% -2.54% 0.00% 0.30% 
Southwest 1.80% 10.28% 85.71% -3.23% -8.65% -25.63% 0.00% 0.13% 
Total  -1.40% 2.66% 9.31% -0.31% -2.55% -4.66% -13.96% 0.26% 
Percent change in per-acre input use across the RFS2 with CRP      
  Nitrogen  Phosphorous Potassium  Diesel  Electric Gasoline Nat. Gas  Water  
Corn Belt 0.15% 4.81% 11.59% 0.32% -6.69% 0.50% 11.55% -0.17% 
G. Plains 1.30% 0.60% 1.50% 0.28% 0.88% -1.11% 23.09% 0.74% 
Lake 
States -11.78% -2.79% 10.60% 2.21% -24.14% -18.57% 13.62% 2.78% 
Northeast 1.60% 1.07% 3.23% 1.48% 1.89% -1.06% 0.00% -0.07% 
Pac. 
Northwest  -0.11% -0.47% -0.42% -0.12% -0.80% -0.08% 0.00% 0.04% 
Pac. 
Southwest 0.17% 0.60% -5.69% 1.74% -1.88% 0.88% 0.00% 0.17% 
Rocky 
Mts.  -1.14% -1.27% 0.30% 0.70% -0.18% -2.81% -16.73% 0.43% 
South 
Central -7.99% 1.62% -2.94% -3.99% -17.42% -15.06% -26.54% 0.08% 
Southeast  0.07% 3.17% -1.49% -1.81% -7.95% -4.29% 0.00% 0.22% 
Southwest 1.45% 10.27% 83.19% -3.21% -7.39% -27.41% 0.00% 0.11% 
U.S. Total  -1.79% 2.36% 7.69% -0.25% -3.84% -5.05% -14.65% 0.38% 
                                                 
49
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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6.2.4.3.1 Other Environmental Effects  
Management responses along the intensive and extensive margins imply non-
GHG environmental co-effects of the RFS2. FASOMGHG contains technical 
coefficients that relate per-acre use of agricultural practices to environmental impact 
measures. Figure 31 summarizes various nitrogen and phosphorous pollution measures 
in percentage differences from the baseline. These are emissions factors associated with 
regional production practices and per-acre use of agricultural inputs. In general, sources 
of N percolation, subsurface loss, and NO3 runoff increase 3-6% across the RFS2, while 
P runoff and sediment loss increase 4-10%.  
 In general these results indicate that the non-GHG environmental consequences 
of the RFS2 are non-trivial, and merely measuring responses in input use relative to a 
baseline forecast might not reveal appropriate estimates of N and P pollution, nutrient 
loading, runoff, or sedimentation given geographic and biophysical factors that influence 
pollution.  
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Figure 31: Absolute and percent differences in aggregate environmental 
indicators50 
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6.3 Conclusions 
 This chapter has developed simulation-based evidence that RFS2 driven biofuel 
expansion can: 
• Alter land use through higher resource demands 
• This is includes significant cropland expansion, and pasture contraction, 
increased forest to cropland transitions (though this is offset by pasture to forest 
transitions), and lead to significant CRP recultivation  
• Shift production patterns 
• In particular, lower total livestock production is a possible consequence of higher 
feed costs and reduced pastureland. In addition, the RFS2 can alter crop mix and 
management strategies as land is used for dedicated energy feedstock production 
or agricultural residue harvesting, 
• Boost management intensity 
• Results indicate that the RFS2 can stimulate the use of water resources, with 
significant regional variations in water use responses. In addition, the RFS2 
could stimulate substantial increases in fertilizers and other agricultural input 
usage, eliciting regional water quality concerns through higher simulated levels 
of N and P pollution.  
• Significantly boost net energy output directly related to the policy mandates. 
• Marginally reduce GHG emissions from the U.S. AF sectors (however, this does not 
account for potential leakage affects of the RFS2 in international production 
regions). 
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• Alter commodity markets and trade flows 
• While results show significant commodity price response to the RFS2 mandates, 
note that these effects are smaller than previous studies have shown.  This is a 
potential silver lining of extensive U.S. cropland expansion, be it on pasture or 
conservation lands; greater use of land resources domestically can reduce 
concerns of land use change in more sensitive ecosystems elsewhere (such as 
Brazilian rainforest or Argentine Pampas). This is a result that warrants further 
attention; even though FASOMGHG does not represent international production 
possibilities and land use, international trade results indicate that the RFS2 can 
alter export projections in the U.S. and internationally. 
• Increase net lead to net welfare gains for U.S. crop producers, losses for livestock 
producers, but a net gain in U.S. agricultural welfare overall 
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CHAPTER VII  
RESULTS FROM MITIGATION SCENARIOS 
  
Here, results from the previous chapter are expanded to consider the combined 
effects of the RFS2 mandates and climate mitigation incentives. Whereas biofuel 
mandates can result in significant cropland expansion, GHG mitigation can have the 
opposite directional effect, transferring land out of conventional food and fiber 
production for dedicated bioenergy production and terrestrial sequestration.  
7.1 Scenarios Employed 
Several GHG mitigation scenarios are considered using alternative carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2e) pricing schemes (using the 100 year global warming potential for 
methane and nitrous oxide).  There are two main parts to these scenarios that are 
discussed separately:  
• Assumed carbon price 
• Payment eligibility assumptions 
Each will be discussed separately. Biofuel production constrained to levels 
modeled in the previous chapter. Thus, a carbon price signal does not manifest itself in 
the volume of biofuels produced, only on the composition of the biofuel portfolio. The 
spatial distribution and feedstock portfolio will switch to one that provides the greatest 
life-cycle GHG gains given the magnitude of the CO2e price. Combining biofuel 
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mandates with GHG mitigation serves two purposes. First, as EISA-RFS has already 
been established and comprehensive climate policy could become a reality, this scenario 
can serve as an enhanced baseline that factor in all current policy drivers to discuss the 
resulting implications of a GHG mitigation policy for sectoral economic performance, 
land use decisions, and management intensity.  Then, this case can be compared to the 
RFS scenario with no carbon price signals to determine the extent to which GHG offset 
incentives can alleviate environmental damages brought on by the RFS (including 
deforestation or pasture conversion rates, water use/quality, and net GHG emissions). In 
addition the mitigation scenarios below will also be run with and without CRP re-
cultivation.  Potential roles of the CRP in a low carbon economy include use of CRP 
soils for dedicated bioenergy production, direct government payments for CRP carbon 
sequestration benefits, and landowner participation in an offsets market.   
7.1.1 Carbon Price Alternatives 
FASOMGHG methodology assigns price on all eligible GHG flows within the 
sector (spanning carbon sequestration, bioenergy offsets, or changes in GHG emissions 
from altered management practices and land use but controlled by eligibility scenarios 
below).  This does not explicitly evaluate a specific U.S. GHG cap-and-trade proposal.  
Instead, this chapter considers low to high GHG incentives for changing AF practices 
that might arise under different proposals. Real constant prices of $15, $30, and 
$50/tCO2e are evaluated.  In all, these prices give this analysis a wide range of CO2e 
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prices in line spanning those projected by the EPA under the two most comprehensive 
climate bills (like HR 2454 Waxman Markey in 2009).  
7.1.2 Alternative Offset Eligibility Scenarios 
 To reflect the reality that alternative forms of climate legislation will contain 
differences in offset provisions (including which activities will be eligible to receive 
payments), three alternative offset cases are considered: (1) Full offset eligibility, (2) 
Limited Offset Eligibility, and (3) No Offsets.  
7.1.2.1 Full Offset Eligibility   
In the full offset eligibility case all sources of emissions and sequestration in AF 
are priced, accounting for a full suite of offset AF offset activities and mitigation 
strategies. All activities are included once the policy is enacted, and no activities are 
discounted for potential transaction costs resulting from carbon market participation. 
Only emissions changes relative to a baseline are credited (and any increased flux is 
taxed), thus all simulated mitigation is additional by definition, and FASOMGHG 
implicitly discounts for permanence and leakage.  
7.1.2.2 Limited Offset Eligibility 
 The second offset scenario considered models only a limited set of mitigation 
“offset” activities by introducing payment restrictions that vary by activity. Here, certain 
offsets that are considered difficult to implement in practice or which conflict with food 
security goals are not incentivized. Only those activities that are expected to be included 
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in offset protocols initially are credited51. The greatest change here is limiting forest 
management offset eligibility with payment incentives excluded for carbon sequestration 
from existing forest management practices (including avoided deforestation). Also 
excluded are forest product carbon storage, pasture carbon sequestration, reduced 
emissions from rice cultivation, and improved enteric fermentation.  In effect, this limits 
the offset portfolio to changing N application rates, tillage practices, afforestation, and 
lagoon treatment of hog and dairy operations. By not incentivizing these practices, net 
mitigation potential in AF is lowered, and the mitigation portfolio shifts to other 
activities (including bioenergy).  
7.1.2.3 No Offsets—Bioenergy Only  
In the no offsets case, CO2 payments only accrue to energy use, and bioenergy 
emissions reductions.  This simulates a case in which a carbon pricing policy is in effect 
directed toward fossil fuels only, with no offset provision. Here, AF sectors can respond 
to a carbon price signal through changing production practices and crop mixes as a result 
of higher energy costs, or by producing biomass and harvesting residuals that can be 
used for co-fired electricity generation. Here, additional bioenergy production would 
represent a direct mitigation response, though indirect mitigation (or emissions) is 
possible through shifting land use and production patterns.  
                                                 
51
 This is consistent with S 2191 legislation, which included provisions of certain offsets, but makes no 
mention of other potential activities.   
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7.2 Results 
Here I analyze the implications that carbon pricing has on land use, land use 
change, GHG mitigation potential, provision of renewable energy, management 
intensification, commodity markets, economic welfare, and other important items.  
7.2.1 GHG Mitigation  
Net GHG emission mitigation was calculated by taking the annuity of emissions 
flux throughout the simulation horizon (by source) across all mitigation scenarios, then 
calculating the difference from baseline-annualized emissions (discussed in the previous 
chapters).  
7.2.1.1 Mitigation Potential under Full Offset Eligibility 
 Figure 32 shows net mitigation potential under the all offsets are eligible 
scenarios under 3 different carbon prices. Notice that a relatively small carbon price 
incentive ($15/tCO2e) can influence AF practices such that the sectors become a net 
GHG sink. The following observations can be drawn from these results: 
• Mitigation potential ranges 678-1144 million tCO2e per year. Put into context, 
this ranges approximately 11-20% of total U.S. emissions per year from all 
sources (EPA 2009 GHG Inventory), The greatest mitigation potential comes 
from altered forest management practices, afforestation, and bioenergy, with 
agricultural activities providing a modest share of the portfolio. 
o In fact, some emissions sources increase across the mitigation scenarios, 
pasture soil carbon (reduced sequestration), and N2O emissions from 
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crop management (a by-product of increased management intensity 
stimulated by the RFS2, as outlined in the previous chapter). 
• Mitigation from altered forest management practices ranges 155-292 million 
tCO2e per year, driven primarily by lengthened rotations and avoided 
deforestation.  
• Afforestation of dedicated cropland or pasture is an economically competitive 
abatement strategy even at $15/tCO2e, and provides a significant offset source at 
higher price (ranging 158-354 million tCO2e). 
• Emissions offsets from biofuels do not change significantly across scenarios.  
• Agricultural methane and emissions decrease significantly (33-55 million tCO2e 
per year) across the mitigation scenarios due to shifting livestock production 
patterns, improved enteric fermentation, and manure management practices that 
offset methane emissions.  
• Other mitigation strategies that play a less predominant role in the overall AF 
mitigation portfolio include reduced N2O emissions (which increase at $15 and 
$30/CO2e, but decrease marginally at $50/tCO2e).  
• Agricultural soil carbon sequestration changes from baseline actually represent a 
net source of emissions when compared to the baseline, but this is strictly a by-
product of land shifting out of pasture use. The aggregate soil carbon account 
includes crop and pasture soil carbon stocks. As pastureland is afforested or 
converts to crop production, pasture carbon is reduced relative to the baseline. 
Thus, carbon is essentially shifted from one account to another. Since 
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afforestation increases soil carbon sequestration relative to grazing lands, this 
represents a net gain in total terrestrial carbon, but a small decrease in 
agricultural soil C (as the loss in pasture C outweighs the soil C gained form 
adoption of conservation or no-till practices).    
 
 
Figure 32: Net GHG mitigation (annualized emissions flux from base) for the full 
offset eligibility scenarios52 
 
  
Allowing land use shifts from conservation (CRP) priorities to cropland can 
increase net AF mitigation potential, but only marginally so (Table 21). Some studies 
have maintained that the CRP can contribute to GHG mitigation goals if kept intact 
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(Baker and Galik, 2009 and Pineiro et al. 2009). Results here show that continued 
participation in the CRP could be significantly reduced under a low carbon policy 
regime, even when further subsidized by the value of maintaining in situ carbon stocks. 
Here, allowing a portion of CRP to re-enter production can contribute to GHG 
mitigation goals at rates that outweigh the soil carbon losses from re-cultivation. Results 
suggest allowing CRP re-cultivation increases net mitigation potential by 9-23 million 
tCO2e per year. A larger productive land use base allows for additional mitigation 
options through bioenergy feedstock cultivation, and it enhances conventional 
commodity production in some regions, freeing up productive land for carbon 
sequestration elsewhere. Total CRP reversion above baseline levels ranges 10.1-16.3 
million acres (cumulative), so the per-acre carbon benefits to CRP recultivation under a 
full offset scenario range 0.9-1.8 tCO2e per acre per year (above the soil carbon loss as 
recultivated). The U.S. average C sequestration for lands set aside for the CRP is 
approximately 0.85 tCO2e per acre per year53, suggesting that alternative uses of this 
land might contribute more greatly to the AF system’s mitigation potential.   
 
Table 21: Difference in Mitigation Potential with CRP Reversion Relative to 
Mitigation without CRP Reversion 
 
$15/tCO2e with 
CRP 
$30/tCO2e with 
CRP 
$50/tCO2e with 
CRP 
Total Mitigation 
Difference (million 
tCO2e) 9 23 21  
% Difference in 
Mitigation Potential 1.3% 2.5% 1.8% 
                                                 
53
 For a summary of C sequestration potential from the CRP, see Piñeiro et al., 2009.  
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7.2.1.1.1 Mitigation Potential for the Limited Offset Eligibility Case 
Now, consider mitigation for the limited offset scenarios. When we eliminate 
offset payments for forest management, enteric fermentation, and N2O emissions, this 
incentivizes alternative abatement strategies and land use patterns in the AF sector. 
Mitigation potential changes in the following manner: 
• Total mitigation potential now ranges 506-920 million tCO2e per year, which is 
20%-26% less abatement than under the full offset scenarios (Figure 33), with 
afforestation and bioenergy as the dominant abatement options 
• Afforestation offset potential ranges 178-414 million tCO2e per year, which is 
13-17% higher than afforestation mitigation under the full offset case.  
• Mitigation from bioenergy ranges 313-401 million tCO2e per year, and increases 
only marginally (1-2%) from the full offset case 
• Notice that GHG accounts associated with forest management practices now 
create a net source at lower GHG prices ($15-$30) as there are not avoided 
deforestation incentives to keep forestland from converting to agriculture, 
• Methane emissions reductions do not register in this new mitigation portfolio 
• Agricultural soil carbon and N2O produce a net source of emissions relative to 
baseline levels, driven by land use shifts and the RFS2 mandates.  
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Figure 33: Net emissions and mitigation (annualized emissions flux from base) for 
the limited offset eligibility scenarios54 
 
7.2.1.1.2 Mitigation Potential for the No Offset Case 
For the no offset scenarios, some sources of abatement respond directly to the 
carbon price incentive that affects input costs and stimulates bioenergy production 
(Figure 34). Other sources of abatement occur indirectly as management practices 
respond to the new set of economic stimuli (including higher costs of production)  
• Full abatement potential ranges 424-730 million tCO2e per year, a 37-43% 
reduction from full offset abatement levels, 
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• Abatement potential from bioelectricity ranges 346-560 million tCO2e per year, 
which is substantially more than under a GHG policy where bioenergy must 
compete with AF offset practices such as afforestation. 
• Notice that afforestation and forest management contribute to the estimated 
mitigation potential under this scenario for the $30 and $50 scenarios. While not 
subsidized directly through a carbon payment mechanism, the demand for 
bioenergy from AF feedstocks boosts land transitions from agriculture to 
forestry, and indirectly contributes to the overall mitigation portfolio  
 
 
Figure 34: Net emissions and mitigation (annualized emissions flux from base) for 
the no offset eligibility scenarios55 
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7.2.1.1.3 Importance of Offset Eligibility Restrictions 
To reiterate, restricting offset payments for a number of AF activities can 
significantly reduce the AF’s role as a low-cost abatement source (Figure 35). A 
comprehensive abatement approach that considers a full suite of direct emissions 
reductions, offsets, and bioenergy will produce the greatest mitigation gains. Annualized 
mitigation potential at $30/tCO2e under full offset eligibility is 24.3% higher than for 
limited offsets case, and 43% higher when only bioenergy is incentivized.  However, 
GHG abatement is not the sole variable of interest, and as the rest of this chapter 
illustrates, pursuit of full mitigation potential could bring legitimate concerns regarding 
international leakage, commodity prices, and the regional distribution of agricultural 
input use.  
 
 
Figure 35: Net mitigation potential by scenarios at $30/tCO2e 
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7.2.2 Commodity Price and Welfare Projections 
 Climate mitigation incentives in addition to biofuel mandates alter the demand 
for land resources, placing further upward mobility on commodity prices. Results below 
show that land shifts stimulated by combined RFS2 and mitigation incentives can lead to 
price impacts that that are much larger than those stimulated by the RFS2 alone.  Also, 
commodity price fluctuations stimulated by low-carbon policies depend not only on the 
magnitude of the carbon price considered, but the scope of the mitigation policy enacted.  
7.2.2.1 Commodity Prices across Mitigation Scenarios 
 First, consider how commodity prices might vary with the magnitude of the 
carbon price imposed on the system. Figure 36 displays price indices for important grain 
and livestock commodities to illustrate the impact of GHG mitigation incentives on 
commodity markets over time. Grain and soybean prices rise sharply once the policy is 
implemented (2010), and this continues into later years of the simulation period. Prices 
are consistently higher for greater carbon prices, an artifact of increased incentives to 
alter production and management activities for GHG abatement and higher production 
costs as the GHG content of fossil fuel use and other agricultural inputs are explicitly 
priced.  In all, short term (2010-2015) commodity price movements range 5-25% across 
the CO2 prices, stabilize in the medium term (2020-2030), then start to rise again 
beyond 2030. It is important to note that a portion of these price fluctuations occur as a 
direct result of the RFS2 mandates, and not in response to the mitigation efforts. It is the 
combined effect that of the RFS2 and mitigation that leads to excessively high price 
impacts. CRP recultivation serves as a buffer against significant commodity price 
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movements, especially at higher CO2 prices. So in addition to improving GHG 
mitigation potential, reverting CRP acreage adds to total AF production and relaxes 
commodity price concerns of managing land for carbon.  
 
Figure 36: Commodity price index values across full offset mitigation scenarios56 
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 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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 Tables 22-25 display important commodity price trajectories over time in 
absolute terms and in percentage change from base. The following important 
observations can be made:  
• Full Offset Eligibility 
o All prices displayed see significant increases, especially in the long term.  
o Corn and soybean prices vary the greatest amount, due to decreased crop 
acreage  
o Fed beef prices rise due to reduced herd size and higher costs of feed, 
non-fed beef prices rise as land moves out of pasture 
o Rice and chicken see little movement throughout the horizon 
o Wheat fluctuates greatly initially, but this effect tapers off 
• Restricted Offset Eligibility 
• Under the limited offset case, commodity price trajectories show similar 
movement as in the full offset case.   
• For the no offset case, however, most commodity prices fall relative to 
the Baseline and RFS2 scenario presented in the previous chapters. 
Without incentives for carbon sequestration and livestock herd 
reductions, agricultural acreage expands significantly (contributing to 
reduced prices).  This is consistent with other recent papers and reports 
that find little change in commodity prices (with slight downward 
pressure) when significant emphasis is put on bioelectricity from AF 
residues (de la Torre Ugarte et al. 2010).  
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Table 22: Commodity Prices and Deviations from Base at $30/tCO2e (Full Offset 
Eligibility) 
  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Wheat ($/Bushel) 6.61 6.63 6.08 5.85 5.01 
  
2.97% 9.02% 8.25% 10.00% -0.65% 
Corn ($/Bushel) 3.94 3.85 3.32 3.12 3.01 
  
11.00% 14.26% 9.47% 18.34% 34.99% 
Cotton  ($/lb) 262.15 305.33 308.68 367.49 410.57 
  
2.10% 15.46% 11.92% 30.81% 42.11% 
Soybeans 
($/Bushel) 9.96 11.03 10.73 14.11 15.30 
  
7.36% 22.58% 17.49% 56.25% 65.84% 
Sorghum 
($/Bushel)  6.53 6.88 6.70 6.55 5.94 
  
14.09% 24.43% 23.39% 21.48% 13.61% 
Rice  10.23 10.28 10.17 10.00 9.97 
  
1.51% 4.48% 4.11% 3.71% 3.04% 
Fed Beef ($/100 lb) 106.26 109.16 113.08 110.02 105.13 
  
1.07% 5.48% 12.34% 14.12% 12.60% 
Non-fed Beef 
($/100 lb) 73.56 76.75 82.91 80.72 79.89 
  
11.33% 12.71% 22.99% 23.26% 20.85% 
Hogs ($/100 lb) 60.99 61.08 57.84 57.09 56.73 
  
9.06% 11.69% 6.42% 7.12% 10.29% 
Chicken ($/100 lb) 58.69 59.29 57.62 56.25 56.25 
  
2.77% 5.07% 3.77% 2.97% 4.36% 
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Table 23: Commodity Prices and Deviations from Base at $30/tCO2e (Full Offset 
Eligibility with CRP) 
  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Wheat 
($/Bushel) 6.60 6.30 5.79 5.64 4.72 
  
2.76% 3.54% 3.12% 6.09% -6.43% 
Corn  
($/Bushel) 3.87 3.75 3.31 3.13 2.99 
  
9.02% 11.32% 9.34% 18.98% 33.96% 
Cotton   
($/bale) 260.84 303.56 305.96 369.17 410.57 
  
1.59% 14.79% 10.94% 31.41% 42.11% 
Soybeans 
($/Bushel) 9.85 10.68 10.64 14.09 15.30 
  
6.25% 18.67% 16.54% 56.05% 65.79% 
Sorghum 
($/Bushel)  6.45 6.83 6.60 6.45 5.88 
  
12.57% 23.49% 21.65% 19.63% 12.48% 
 
Rice  10.23 10.27 10.18 10.00 9.97 
  
1.51% 4.31% 4.22% 3.71% 3.04% 
Fed Beef  
($/100 lb) 106.26 108.44 111.16 108.52 104.15 
  
1.07% 4.79% 10.44% 12.57% 11.55% 
Non-fed Beef 
($/100 lb) 73.92 77.24 82.01 80.40 79.89 
  
11.87% 13.43% 21.65% 22.77% 20.85% 
Hogs  
($/100 lb) 60.55 60.19 57.49 56.88 56.67 
  
8.27% 10.06% 5.78% 6.72% 10.17% 
Chicken  
($/100 lb) 58.58 58.87 57.58 56.25 55.98 
  
2.58% 4.32% 3.69% 2.97% 3.85% 
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Table 24: Commodity Prices and Deviations from Base at $30/tCO2e (Limited 
Offset Eligibility) 
  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Wheat 
($/Bushel) 6.53 6.46 5.96 5.85 5.07 
  
1.67% 6.21% 6.21% 10.11% 0.64% 
Cotton  
($/bale) 257.60 288.89 301.28 369.79 410.52 
  
0.33% 9.25% 9.24% 31.62% 42.14% 
Corn  
($/Bushel) 3.74 3.68 3.24 3.10 3.01 
  
5.50% 9.30% 6.96% 17.50% 34.87% 
Soybeans 
($/Bushel) 9.64 10.38 10.49 14.31 15.39 
  
3.95% 15.26% 14.81% 58.48% 67.02% 
Sorghum 
($/Bushel)  6.27 6.71 6.58 6.53 5.98 
  
9.48% 21.41% 21.22% 21.02% 14.47% 
 
Rice  10.17 10.21 10.15 10.00 9.97 
  
0.91% 3.76% 3.89% 3.71% 3.12% 
Fed Beef  
($/100 lb) 105.27 108.44 104.91 103.69 98.13 
  
0.14% 4.78% 4.23% 7.55% 5.08% 
Non-fed Beef 
($/100 lb) 66.11 71.01 70.61 72.52 72.54 
  
0.05% 4.28% 4.76% 10.74% 9.72% 
Hogs  
($/100 lb) 59.46 59.28 57.18 57.43 57.22 
  
6.32% 8.38% 5.21% 7.73% 11.28% 
Chicken  
($/100 lb) 58.10 58.60 57.33 56.29 56.04 
  
1.73% 3.84% 3.25% 3.03% 4.00% 
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Table 25: Commodity Prices and Deviations from Base at $30/tCO2e (No Offset 
Eligibility) 
  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Wheat ($/Bushel) 6.54 6.14 5.68 5.13 4.33 
  
0.13% -5.00% -4.66% -12.37% -14.57% 
Cotton ($/bale)  261.86 271.98 280.65 365.89 422.07 
  
1.65% -5.85% -6.84% -1.06% 2.81% 
Corn ($/Bushel) 3.72 3.55 3.13 2.79 2.75 
  
-0.69% -3.62% -3.45% -9.88% -8.42% 
Soybeans 
($/Bushel) 9.85 9.81 9.47 13.20 15.28 
  
2.18% -5.41% -9.69% -7.79% -0.75% 
Sorghum 
($/Bushel)  6.35 6.53 6.36 6.35 5.66 
  
1.32% -2.68% -3.30% -2.68% -5.38% 
Rice  10.20 10.13 9.98 9.92 9.92 
  
0.25% -0.78% -1.72% -0.77% -0.54% 
Fed Beef  
($/100 lb) 106.26 105.76 101.20 96.01 92.96 
  
0.94% -2.48% -3.54% -7.41% -5.27% 
Non-fed Beef 
($/100 lb) 66.51 70.14 68.42 67.55 70.41 
  
0.60% -1.22% -3.11% -6.86% -2.93% 
Hogs ($/100 lb) 57.17 56.33 54.91 53.62 53.98 
  
-3.85% -4.97% -3.97% -6.64% -5.66% 
Chicken  
($/100 lb) 57.79 57.31 55.89 53.87 54.01 
  
-0.53% -2.19% -2.52% -4.29% -3.63% 
 
     
 
 
 
7.2.2.2 Producer Welfare Effects of Combined Biofuel and GHG Policies 
The previous chapter showed that higher commodity prices, in addition to 
increased revenue for processed biofuels can boost agricultural producers’ net income 
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(as measured by producer surplus. Here, RFS2 mandates contribute to producer welfare, 
as do GHG offset payments, revenue from bioelectricity feedstock sales, higher input 
costs, and indirect commodity market revenue stimulated by production decisions 
Figures 37-39 display regional changes in crop and livestock producer welfare, 
across the mitigation prices modeled.  This provides a measure of net U.S. economic 
welfare flowing to the agricultural sector across the suite of low-carbon policies 
simulated. Again, welfare measures are reported as annualized deviations from baseline 
levels.  
Under the full offset mitigation scenarios, crop producers’ surplus increases for 
all FASOMGHG agro-forestry regions, at all prices. Livestock producers are hurt by 
higher commodity prices in a few select regions under the $15 case (Corn Belt, Great 
Plains, and Northeast), but benefit under both of the higher price scenarios in all regions. 
The regional distribution of potential welfare gains is an important consideration for 
mitigation policy development, as this indicates where the greatest offset potential 
resides spatially, and how contemporary agricultural land rents in a particular region 
might compare in the long term with high carbon offset incentives. Regions with the 
greatest afforestation potential see significant welfare gains (Corn Belt, Lake States 
South Central, and Southeast), but even regions without forestry options see significant 
producer welfare gains through the production of bioenergy feedstock production or 
indirect commodity market revenue. 
Total welfare gains (the sum of offset payments, bioenergy revenue, processed 
biofuel revenue, and indirect commodity market revenue across all regions), as shown in 
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Figure 40, are substantial across the full offsets scenario (ranging $37-$90 billion per 
year). In general, crop producers receive the majority of these surplus flows (92%-96%). 
Livestock producers balance the benefits of offset payments and higher output prices 
with increased feed and operating costs. The limited offsets scenario produces even 
higher producer gains ($37-$104 billion annualized) when the carbon value of land use 
transitions is not explicitly priced. Under no offsets, producer gains are limited to 
bioenergy processing revenue and indirect commodity market impacts, and range $29-
$56 billion). Additionally, producers are faced with higher input prices, but no incentives 
for emissions reduction.  
Higher commodity prices will ultimately be realized by households, and are an 
important factor in total economic welfare accounting of national climate legislation. 
Annualized consumer welfare losses range $11.6-$28 billion under full offset eligibility, 
$9-$23 billion under limited offset eligibility, and $6-$11 billon under no offsets. 
However, these losses are more than outweighed by producer gains, signaling net 
economic gains to U.S. AF under a variety of low carbon policy futures.  
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Figure 37: Annualized change in producer welfare under the full offset eligibility57 
 
 
                                                 
57
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
-500
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
 f
ro
m
 B
as
e
 (
M
il
lio
n
 2
0
0
4
$
 A
n
n
u
it
y
)
Livestock Producer Welfare 
(Full Offset Elig.)
$15/tCO2e $30/tCO2e $50/tCO2e
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
 f
ro
m
 B
as
e
 (
M
il
lio
n
 2
0
0
4
$
 
A
n
n
u
it
y
)
Crop Producer Welfare (Full Offset Elig.)
$15/tCO2e $30/tCO2e $50/tCO2e
189 
 
 
 
Figure 38: Annualized change in producer welfare under limited offset eligibility58 
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Figure 39: Annualized change in producer welfare under no offset eligibility59 
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Figure 40: Total change in U.S. agricultural welfare across all mitigation 
scenarios60 
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7.2.2.3 Disaggregating Welfare Flows by Source and Policy 
To illustrate the breakdown of welfare flows between direct and indirect sources 
and by policy, consider Figure 41. Here, I have taken information from simulation 
output presented in the bioenergy expansion and climate mitigation chapters, 
respectively. This figure illustrates how welfare changes can be disaggregated by policy, 
and into direct and indirect sources. The direct policy contribution from the RFS2 is 
broken down into biofuel processing revenue (the value of processed biofuels), indirect 
revenue from higher commodity prices, and consumer losses under new market 
conditions.  
Welfare flows are then disaggregated further for climate policy scenarios to 
distinguish between agricultural GHG mitigation payments, bioelectricity revenue, 
indirect revenue from commodity market shifts, and consumer losses from climate 
mitigation. The results show that there is significant revenue potential from the sale of 
offsets and bioenergy feedstocks.  This figure also indicates that pursuit of mitigation 
through offsets that take land out of production can reduce AF consumer welfare more 
acutely than bioenergy expansion policies as prices rise sharply. Biofuel mandates, 
terrestrial GHG mitigation incentives, and use of AF biomass for electricity generation 
can provide a substantial flow of economic benefits to landowners and producers. 
193 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Policy contributions to welfare changes61 
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7.2.3 Land Use/Land Use Change  
Note, however, that while simulation results show substantial mitigation potential 
and welfare gains for the US-AF across climate mitigation scenarios, such results are not 
achievable without significantly altering the way land resources are managed.   
7.2.3.1 Full Offset Scenario 
• Cropland initially expands, and then contracts significantly. Expansion is 
caused by the RFS2 mandates and bioelectricity feedstock production at 
lower CO2e prices. Cropland contraction, prevalent at the $30 and 
$50/tCO2e cases, is caused by reduced cropland deforestation, and 
afforestation shifts for carbon sequestration credits. 
• Forest use expands substantially (24-48 million acres, annualized) as forests 
are managed for carbon and agricultural land is afforested (Figure 42). 
• Allowing CRP recultivation increases the cropland stock by 3.6-7.4 million 
acres relative to the mitigation scenarios with no reversion (annualized).  
• CRP reversion increases total forestland as well (1-3.5 million acres, 
annualized). Here, the model is bringing additional cropland into production 
that was formerly in CRP in regions with no forestry opportunities (Great 
Plains, Southwest), allowing additional afforestation and bioenergy in other 
regions.  
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Figure 42: Annualized cropland and forest stocks across full offset mitigation 
scenarios (million acres)62 
 
7.2.3.2 Limited Offset Scenario 
• For the limited offset scenario, cropland expands even further at the 
$15/tCO2e case. The difference in annualized cropland between the full and 
limited offset cases at $15/tCO2e is approximately 7.5 million acres.  
• Forestland increases substantially as well due to afforestation incentives (20-
46 million acres annualized), but this is lower than under the full offset case, 
as there are no avoided deforestation or forest management incentives to keep 
existing stocks intact or lengthen harvest rotations. 
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7.2.3.3 No Offsets Case 
• As discussed, the primary mitigation option under the no offset scenario is 
bioenergy. Results show that the majority of the requisite biomass comes 
from dedicated energy crops or agricultural residues.  
• Annualized cropland increases 22.4-27.8 million acres (Figure 43). 
• Forestland use increases as well (2.7-7.6 million acres, annualized), 
stimulated by bioenergy feedstock demand although this change is only 
marginal compared to the full and limited offsets scenario 
 
 
Figure 43: Annualized cropland and forest stocks across limited and no offset 
mitigation scenarios (million acres)63 
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Figure 44 and Figure 45 display long-term trends in forest and cropland use, 
respectively, to further illustrate land use disposition over time. Total forest use is lowest 
for the baseline, but declines in the long term across all scenarios after increasing 
initially under the carbon offset incentive regimes. Total cropland use declines 
throughout the projection under the baseline and expands to a level of ~325 million acres 
under the no offsets scenarios. Under full offset eligibility, total cropland decreases 
initially then expands once again beyond 2050. Here, land is afforested initially, then 
deforested for crop production in later time periods. Under limited eligibility, cropland 
expands initially for dedicated energy crop acreage, and afforestation rates are lower 
initially. With no forest management offsets, forestry rents are lower than in the full 
offset case, so the model is hesitant to move additional cropland over in early periods. 
Consistent with the previous chapter, CRP recultivation brings an additional 5-6 million 
acres back into production across the simulation horizon. 
 
 
Figure 44: Forest use over time by offset scenario ($30/tCO2e)64 
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Figure 45: Cropland use over time by offset scenario ($30/tCO2e)65 
 
7.2.3.4 Land Use Change  
Tables 26 and 27 display cumulative transitions between major land use 
categories at different CO2e66. The following important observations are made regarding 
these data:  
Full offset eligibility 
• GHG pricing decreases cropland and pasture deforestation in the near term, but 
can boost long-term deforestation rates as previously afforested land is harvested 
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and sustained increases in commodity prices induce a shift back to crop 
production, 
o CRP reversion reduces near-term deforestation further  
• Cumulative cropland and pasture afforestation increases substantially, ranging 
52-67 million acres by 2020 and 67-97 million acres by 205067,  
• Pasture to cropland shifts increase under the full offset scenario by more than 
25%, 
• CRP recultivation rises with the carbon price. At $50/tCO2e, total recultivation is 
roughly 60% of the current CRP stock 
Restricted offset eligibility 
• The limited offsets case has a negligible effect on cropland deforestation in the 
near-term (though forest to cropland shifts increase marginally at $15/tCO2e) 
• With no mitigation incentives for forestry, cropland rents are higher relative to 
forestry, so there is less incentive to afforest (especially at lower CO2e prices). 
This is also driven by changing livestock production practices, as will be 
discussed, 
• The no offsets case significantly increases cropland deforestation and pasture to 
cropland shifts relative to the base and at greater rate than is observed in the other 
mitigation scenarios 
                                                 
67
 Note, this is a cumulative shift, and not a constant shift; land can move into agriculture over time to 
replace afforested acreage.  
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• Pasture afforestation still persists, but cropland afforestation is reduced to zero 
for the no offset case with higher GHG prices.   
7.2.3.5 Regional Cropland Use  
• Cropland shifts vary widely by FASOMGHG region , GHG price, and offset 
eligibility scenario (Figures 46 and 47). Areas with significant afforestation 
potential see reductions in cropland. In the South Central, this occurs at relatively 
low CO2 prices, and increase with the price of carbon. In regions where cropland 
is more valuable such as the Corn Belt and Lake States, high levels of cropland 
aforestation only occur when the price if carbon is sufficiently high.  
• The highest increase in acreage from base occurs in the Southwest region, and 
this is consistent across all policy combinations, 
• With CRP reversion total cropland use in the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains 
expands significantly, which allows additional afforestation (and cropland 
reductions) to occur in the South Central and Lake States  
• Under limited offset eligibility, cropland use expands even further in the 
Southwest region, but only shifts marginally in other regions, 
• Under no offset eligibility, cropland use expands considerably in most productive 
regions except for the Great Plains, where growth in renewable energy is limited 
by low bioelectricity market penetration potential.  
 
201 
 
 
Table 26: Cumulative LUC across Full Offset Eligibility Mitigation Scenarios, 
Absolute and Percent Change from Base (Thousand Acres68)  
LUC across full offset mitigation scenarios       
  $15/tCO2e $30/tCO2e $50/tCO2e 
  2020 2050 2020 2050 2020 2050 
Cropland 
Deforestation 8,746.04 29,318.15 6,799.09 28,373.20 6,494.06 25,613.91 
  
-28.03% 30.55% -44.05% 26.35% -46.56% 14.06% 
Cropland 
Afforestation 7,872.70 10,953.18 17,653.03 22,902.40 22,359.18 49,336.04 
  
422.67% 267.55% 1071.99% 668.53% 1384.44% 1555.56% 
Pasture 
Deforestation 403.85 1,552.60 723.69 1,867.33 737.82 1,821.15 
  
-29.48% -47.77% 26.36% -37.19% 28.83% -38.74% 
Pasture 
Afforestation 44,121.54 45,830.29 46,168.92 47,583.75 44,810.97 47,294.25 
  
87.54% 94.80% 96.24% 102.25% 90.47% 101.02% 
Pasture to 
Cropland  12,282.40 12,282.40 13,737.50 13,737.50 14,015.68 14,015.68 
  
25.83% 25.83% 40.74% 40.74% 43.59% 43.59% 
CRP to Cropland  5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 
  
45.76% 45.76% 45.76% 45.76% 45.76% 45.76% 
        
LUC across full offset mitigation scenarios with CRP     
  $15/tCO2e   $30/tCO2e   $50/tCO2e   
  2020 2050 2020 2050 2020 2050 
Cropland 
Deforestation 8,219.23 29,438.49 6,559.69 27,775.50 6,492.78 26,323.82 
  
-32.37% 31.09% -46.02% 23.68% -46.57% 17.22% 
Cropland 
Afforestation 9,296.98 12,063.59 20,016.22 28,700.72 26,093.07 59,065.68 
  
517.23% 304.82% 1228.89% 863.10% 1632.33% 1882.05% 
Pasture 
Deforestation 409.69 1,558.43 721.08 1,864.73 737.82 1,810.29 
  
-28.46% -47.58% 25.91% -37.27% 28.83% -39.10% 
Pasture 
Afforestation 43,545.33 45,838.51 46,164.38 47,579.41 41,108.03 47,312.60 
  
85.09% 57.40% 96.22% 63.38% 74.73% 62.46% 
Pasture to 
Cropland  9,761.00 9,761.00 12,307.96 12,307.96 11,752.55 13,906.27 
  
0.00% 0.00% 26.09% 26.09% 20.40% 42.47% 
CRP to Cropland  13,775.33 13,775.33 16,689.65 16,689.65 19,973.66 19,973.66 
  
277.38% 277.38% 357.22% 357.22% 447.19% 447.19% 
                                                 
68
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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Table 27: Cumulative LUC across Restricted Offset Eligibility, Absolute and 
Percent Change from Base (Thousand Acres)  
LUC across limited offset mitigation scenarios with CRP     
  $15/tCO2e   $30/tCO2e   $50/tCO2e   
  2020 2050 2020 2050 2020 2050 
Cropland 
Deforestation 12,341.06 27,222.98 11,910.87 22,406.32 12,081.80 17,506.98 
  
1.53% 21.20% -2.01% -0.24% -0.60% -22.05% 
Cropland 
Afforestation 4,167.82 9,233.87 13,115.35 20,381.41 21,118.95 48,032.17 
  
176.70% 212.92% 770.73% 590.68% 1302.09% 1527.71% 
Pasture 
Deforestation 1,259.16 4,114.36 1,152.06 3,010.59 -23,529.12 -29,145.77 
  
119.87% 38.32% 101.16% 1.22% 
-
4208.47% 
-
1079.87% 
Pasture 
Afforestation 46,897.68 48,312.70 46,428.62 47,843.87 9,761.00 9,761.00 
  
50.95% 34.52% 49.44% 33.21% -68.58% -72.82% 
Pasture to 
Cropland  13,737.50 13,737.50 14,275.50 14,275.50 -3,647.46 -3,647.46 
  
-1.27% -1.27% 2.60% 2.60% -126.21% -126.21% 
CRP to 
Cropland  5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 
  
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
LUC across no offset mitigation scenarios       
  $15/tCO2e  $30/tCO2e  $50/tCO2e   
  2020 2050 2020 2050 2020 2050 
Cropland 
Deforestation 13,909.50 27,786.40 14,289.06 28,348.21 15,443.86 30,313.99 
  
14.43% 23.71% 17.56% 26.21% 27.06% 34.97% 
Cropland 
Afforestation 772.90 1,085.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
-48.69% -63.22% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 
Pasture 
Deforestation 523.98 3,403.22 501.51 1,822.16 717.75 1,917.94 
  
-8.51% 14.42% -12.43% -38.74% 25.33% -35.52% 
Pasture 
Afforestation 35,815.33 39,756.77 37,274.85 43,679.47 45,417.54 46,831.97 
  
15.28% 27.97% 19.98% 40.59% 46.19% 50.74% 
Pasture to 
Cropland  14,346.41 14,346.41 16,014.75 16,014.75 13,737.50 14,016.50 
  
3.11% 3.11% 15.10% 15.10% -1.27% 0.74% 
CRP to 
Cropland  5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 5,320.71 
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Figure 46: Change in regional cropland use (full offset eligibility)69 
 
                                                 
69
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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Figure 47: Change in regional cropland use (restricted offset eligibility)70 
 
7.2.4 Commodity Production Implications 
o Shifting land use patterns affect crop mix and livestock management 
strategies (Tables 28). The following observations can be made.  
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7.2.4.1.1 Crop Production and Land Use 
Table 28 displays regional cropland use by crop and scenario. Specifically, 
results indicate: 
• Corn acreage decreases only marginally for the full and limited offsets scenarios, 
and expands considerably under no offset eligibility relative to the baseline, 
• Soybean acreage changes only slightly from the AEO 2009 baseline, but declines 
noticeably across the offset eligibility cases relative to the RFS2 projection (10-
12%), explaining the high commodity price effect on soybeans, 
• Rice and wheat acreage decrease at a high proportion relative to the AEO and 
RFS2 bases (12%-26% relative to the RFS2 for rice, and 2%-7.5% for wheat), 
• Cotton acreage declines relative to the base for all scenarios 
• Meanwhile, dedicated energy crop production increases considerably, with the 
highest growth seen in switchgrass.  
o Switchgrass acreage increases from approximately 7 million acres from 
the RFS2 scenario, driven by the demand for bioelectricity feedstocks, 
o Hybrid poplar and willow play a role in the portfolio for no offsets case, 
solely for bioelectricity. However, poplar and willow are used to supplant 
pulp and paper mills in the full offset scenarios as forests are managed for 
carbon.  
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Table 28: Crop Acreage by Mitigation Scenario (Million Acre Annuity)71 
Conventional 
Crops 
AEO 
2009 
Base $30/tCO2e 
$30/tCO2e 
with CRP  
$30/tCO2e 
No Offsets 
$30/tCO2e 
Lim 
Offsets 
Corn  69.40 68.91 69.47 72.43 69.1 
Cotton  11.58 11.18 11.10 11.22 11.34 
Sorghum  9.94 10.75 10.82 11.58 11 
Soybeans 66.33 65.30 66.45 72.22 67.03 
Rice  3.13 2.14 2.14 2.52 2.3 
Wheat  64.32 58.38 59.77 62.04 60.2 
        
Energy Crop 
Acres 
AEO 
2009 
Base $30/tCO2e 
$30/tCO2e 
with CRP  
$30/tCO2e 
No Offsets 
$30/tCO2e 
Lim 
Offsets 
Hybrid 
Poplar 0.00 0.91 0.92 1.31 0.71 
Switchgrass 0.59 12.07 12.21 15.50 12.67 
Willow 0.03 0.56 0.55 0.12 0.12 
 
 
7.2.4.1.2 Livestock Production 
Livestock production practices respond to the mitigation policies in a number of 
ways. For the full offsets case, livestock production responds directly to mitigation 
incentives for manure management or improved enteric fermentation, and higher energy 
costs, and indirectly to higher feed costs that depend on changes in crop production. For 
limited offsets, livestock producers face higher costs, and manure management 
incentives, but no payments for improved enteric fermentation. For the no offsets case, 
livestock producers face only higher costs of production.  
                                                 
71
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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Table 29 displays absolute and percent deviations from base for several 
important classification groups (in 1,000 head) for al offset eligibility scenarios and at 
$30/tCO2e. Results show that across these mitigation efforts livestock production 
practices could respond considerably.  For the full offset case, total cattle production 
(cow/calf) falls ~12%. Stocker calves, yearlings, and heifers are reduced nearly to zero at 
$30/tCO2e. The stocker phase of production occurs when cattle are grazed for a certain 
portion of time (typically 9 months to a year) before being sent to a feedlot operation.  
Here, the stocking phase is essentially eliminated, but feedlot calves increase 
considerably. This is a by-product of incentivizing reduced enteric fermentation and shift 
use of grazing lands. One mitigation option is to feed the animals more heavily at a 
younger age, thus reducing lifespan and net GHG emissions per-unit meat. This raises 
serious concerns regarding the treatment of animals and the environmental co-effects of 
large-scale feeding operations, but we do not account for that in this analysis. Hog and 
poultry operations are also reduced, but only marginally so when compared to cattle (this 
is an indirect response to higher costs of production). CRP reversion has a very small 
effect on these results. 
The limited offset scenarios see a much smaller reduction in livestock head 
(5.7%), but a similar response in reduced grazing (due to pasture afforestation and 
cultivation). Other livestock practices see little movement. The no offsets case sees only 
a slight reduction in total production (though practices change significantly) driven by 
higher costs of production. 
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Table 29: Absolute and Percent Change in Livestock Production (Thousand Head)72 
  $30/tCO2e  
$30/tCO2e 
(% Diff) 
$30/tCO2e 
with CRP  
$30/tCO2e 
with CRP 
(% Diff) 
$30/tCO2e 
Lim 
Offsets 
$30/tCO2e 
Lim 
Offsets (% 
Diff) 
$30/tCO2e 
No Offsets 
$30/tCO2e 
No Offsets 
(% Diff) 
Sheep  254.50 5.26% 151.85 3.14% 217.41 4.49% 270.99 5.60% 
Cow/Calf  -4,716.06 -11.77% -4,464.30 -11.14% -2,275.92 -5.68% -1,348.23 -3.37% 
Feedlot Yearlings -14,250.32 -97.98% -14,350.55 -98.67% -1,422.89 -9.78% -3,088.43 -21.24% 
Feedlot Calves  9,510.55 36.68% 9,836.98 37.94% 30.27 0.12% 2,254.04 8.69% 
Dairy  -377.85 -5.94% -338.87 -5.33% -198.04 -3.12% -45.18 -0.71% 
Farrow Hog 526.67 4.20% 869.12 6.93% 512.70 4.09% 438.85 3.50% 
Feeder Pig -266.27 -4.42% -269.49 -4.47% -445.48 -7.39% -113.19 -1.88% 
Pig Finishing -5,346.03 -4.60% -5,414.86 -4.66% -8,697.55 -7.48% -2,069.51 -1.78% 
Horses and Mules -210.20 -3.49% -215.43 -3.58% -94.52 -1.57% -73.16 -1.22% 
Steer Calf 
(Stocker) -11,375.88 -89.56% -11,493.42 -90.49% -280.03 -2.20% -1,687.74 -13.29% 
Heifer Calf 
(Stocker)  -2,758.37 -100.00% -2,758.37 -100.00% -1,614.25 -58.52% -1,554.09 -56.34% 
Steer Yearling 
(Stocker)  -11,997.97 -87.58% -12,127.22 -88.52% -297.21 -2.17% -1,750.56 -12.78% 
Heifer Yearling 
(Stocker) -2,920.25 -100.00% -2,920.25 -100.00% -1,692.83 -57.97% -1,628.26 -55.75% 
Turkey  323.46 0.16% 962.37 0.47% 409.12 0.20% 1,716.34 0.84% 
Broiler  
-
136,995.85 -1.84% 
-
129,936.88 -1.74% 
-
113,834.96 -1.53% -27,013.79 -0.36% 
Egg  -6,806.59 -2.08% -5,673.98 -1.73% -4,291.00 -1.31% -2,129.81 -0.65% 
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 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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7.2.4.2 Import and Export Market Implications 
Long-term shifts in land use and production patterns impact international 
agricultural markets, as U.S. exports would be expected to decline under GHG 
mitigation efforts (Table 30). As suggested in the previous chapter, shifting global trade 
patterns have serious implications for land use change in international regions. Results 
suggest that U.S. exports of major grain and meat commodities would decrease 
substantially under all mitigation scenarios considered. Grain exports decrease at the 
highest rate, with soybeans seeing the greatest movement (coincidentally, soybean 
expansion in the Brazilian Amazon is a key concern in the land use change arena). These 
results reflect export shifts in response to the RFS2, in addition to those stimulated by 
land shifting to carbon sequestration or bioenergy. The concluding chapter provides 
more detail comparing export responses to the RFS2 and mitigation scenarios. 
 
Table 30: Percent Change in Annualized Exports across Mitigation Scenarios 
($30/tCO2e)73 
  
$30/tCO2e 
Full Offsets 
$30/tCO2e 
Full Offsets 
with CRP 
$30/tCO2e 
Lim Offsets  
$30/tCO2e 
No Offsets 
Corn  -14.74% -13.47% -12.68% -7.01% 
Soybeans -43.52% -40.97% -39.71% -33.54% 
Wheat -6.59% -2.88% -4.85% -1.41% 
Cotton  -18.26% -8.81% -8.81% -12.98% 
Sorghum  -44.43% -41.65% -41.57% -36.48% 
Rice -38.99% -38.79% -31.91% -22.54% 
Fed Beef -6.85% -6.25% -3.43% -1.48% 
Pork  -3.27% -3.16% -5.45% -0.91% 
Chicken -2.72% -2.45% -2.11% -0.24% 
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 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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Production and exports from international regions show significant upward 
movement across mitigation scenarios. Figure 48 shows export index values, measured 
as the annualized change in exports relative to the base (observed) period; values below 
100 indicate an expected decline in exports from these regions in the baseline. 
Essentially, these data illustrate the additional supply of important grain commodities to 
the world market originating from the regions listed on the horizontal axis.  International 
exports from the regions modeled increase for all mitigation scenarios evaluated, 
substantially so for some regions (such as Brazil, Argentina and China). Export changes 
are lowest in all regions for the no offset scenario where production expands 
considerably in the U.S.  
 
 
Figure 48: Export change by international region and mitigation scenario (2000 
base export level for all crops = 100)74 
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7.2.5 Management Intensity and Water Resource Implications  
To tell a complete story of shifting land use and production patterns under 
reduced carbon efforts, one must consider management intensity responses to the low 
carbon policies in addition to what happens on the extensive (land use) margin. 
7.2.5.1 National and Regional Water Use Response to GHG Pricing 
Under the influence of bioenergy mandates, irrigation water consumption 
increases nationally and for most regions. Pattanayak et al. (2005) show that GHG 
mitigation can improve water quality locally, but this study was performed before 
national biofuel mandates were under consideration. When GHG mitigation is included 
in addition to the RFS2, water use declines relative to the baseline, but only marginally. 
Under full offset eligibility, net water consumption declines 0.5-1.5 million acre feet, or 
0.9%-2.5% of total water consumed Figure 49. Water use declines due to higher 
pumping costs across the mitigation schemes, reduced cropland acreage, and crop mix 
shifts. However, this is relatively small shift, especially when compared to the total 
amount of cropland projected to leave conventional production in the full offset 
mitigation scenarios.  
212 
 
 
 
Figure 49: Total water use across mitigation scenarios (full offset eligibility)75 
 
CRP reversion brings additional land into production, but also reduces net water 
consumption further. For the CRP mitigation scenarios, net water consumption declines 
at a lower rate at the $15/tCO2e case, but at a much higher rate for the $30 and 
$50/tCO2e scenarios (0.1%-3.9% from base levels). This effect shows that movement to 
the extensive margin can relax management intensification. 
 For the restricted offset eligibility scenarios, water use also contracts (Figure 50). 
Across the limited offset scenarios, annualized reductions in water use range 1.1%-4%. 
Similar to the full offset case, reductions are caused by higher energy prices, shifting 
crop mixes, and reduced cropland stocks. For the no offset case, annualized water use 
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declines 0.7%-3.6%, driven by energy prices and a shift out of irrigated production of 
conventional crops and into non-irrigated perennial crops. 
 
 
Figure 50: Total water use across mitigation scenarios (limited and no offset 
eligibility)76 
 
7.2.5.1.1 Incidence of Water Leakage  
Further examination of water use at the regional level reveals that water use does 
not decrease consistently for all agricultural regions modeled. If climate mitigation or 
renewable energy efforts induce land use shifts in the in the in important agricultural 
regions, indirect production responses in less productive regions and incidence of 
leakage are possible outcomes. 
Table 31 displays percentage deviations in annualized water consumption from 
baseline (million acre feet). Notice that for some regions, this flux is positive, indicating 
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a net increase in water use. For some regions with existing water scarcity problems such 
as the Great Plains and Southwest, water consumption increases at a high rate. Thus, 
when viewed at a national scale, it appears that GHG mitigation efforts can reduce total 
water consumption, but when viewed regionally shifting production patterns push water 
use to the intensive margin for regions with little GHG mitigation potential. This is 
essentially “water leakage,” as reducing water consumption and improving quality 
locally has the residual impact of boosting irrigation elsewhere.  
For the restricted offset eligibility scenarios, limited offsets have a similar effect 
on water consumption, as the Southwest and Great Plains, and Rocky Mountain regions 
see marginal increases in consumption, while water use changes very little in other 
regions (Table 32). However, in the no offsets scenarios, water use in the Great Plains 
declines at higher CO2e prices.  This is further evidence of the water leakage 
phenomenon in reverse order.  Here, cropland expansion occurs for most regions, 
relaxing some commodity prices.  Irrigators are thus faced with higher energy costs 
stimulated by the climate policy, but do not realize the indirect benefits of higher output 
prices as with the previous offset eligibility scenarios. This encourages a distinct 
management shift away from irrigated production in the Great Plains where water-
pumping costs directly related to energy prices. If climate mitigation or renewable 
energy policy efforts induce land use or management shifts in the most productive 
agricultural regions in the U.S., then incidence of leakage or intensification responses in 
other regions are possible outcomes.  
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Table 31: Absolute and Percentage Deviations from Base in Regional Water Use under Full Offset  
Eligibility (Million Acre-feet Annuity)77 
  $15/tCO2e $30/tCO2e $50/tCO2e 
$15/tCO2e 
with CRP 
$30/tCO2e 
with CRP 
$50/tCO2e 
with CRP 
Corn Belt 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
  
3.96% 3.01% -7.50% 2.10% 1.19% -7.36% 
Great Plains 0.39 0.57 0.55 0.71 1.04 0.89 
  
3.17% 4.64% 4.50% 5.79% 8.53% 7.25% 
Lake States -0.04 -0.15 -0.22 -0.05 -0.19 -0.27 
  
-10.70% -36.96% -54.59% -12.55% -49.15% -68.99% 
Northeast 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
  
-2.64% -10.38% -10.57% -6.04% -10.75% -15.47% 
Pac. Northwest 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.16 
  
6.06% 9.75% 9.31% 2.21% 5.70% 10.07% 
Pac. Southwest -0.02 -0.08 -0.23 0.00 -0.07 -0.16 
  
-0.29% -1.19% -3.50% -0.07% -1.06% -2.40% 
Rocky Mts.  0.19 0.28 0.36 0.42 0.46 0.48 
  
0.85% 1.28% 1.66% 1.94% 2.10% 2.19% 
South Central -1.80 -2.69 -3.83 -1.82 -2.69 -3.95 
  
-25.84% -38.66% -55.12% -26.17% -38.66% -56.91% 
Southeast 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.03 
  
2.71% 5.84% 5.22% 3.41% 5.95% 2.79% 
Southwest 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
  9.67% 9.67% 9.67% 9.67% 9.67% 9.67% 
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Table 32: Absolute and Percentage Deviations from Baseline Water Use Levels under Limited and No  
Offset Eligibility (Million Acre-feet Annuity)78 
  
$15/tCO2e 
Lim 
Offsets 
$30/tCO2e 
Lim Offsets 
$50/tCO2e 
Lim Offsets 
$15/tCO2e 
No Offsets 
$30/tCO2e 
No Offsets 
$50/tCO2e 
No Offsets 
Corn Belt 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
  
4.27% 0.53% -7.92% 3.57% 0.11% -5.71% 
Great Plains 0.42 0.43 0.24 0.32 -0.09 -0.18 
  
3.39% 3.51% 1.99% 2.61% -0.77% -1.43% 
Lake States -0.03 -0.14 -0.23 -0.10 -0.20 -0.22 
  
-7.69% -36.05% -57.80% -26.41% -50.62% -56.56% 
Northeast 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.05 
  
11.51% 16.60% 19.25% 76.98% 104.91% 90.38% 
Pac. Northwest 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.11 
  
3.58% 7.11% 6.53% 1.58% 0.86% 6.90% 
Pac. Southwest -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.16 
  
-0.12% -0.86% -1.58% 0.17% -0.22% -2.34% 
Rocky Mts.  -0.05 0.11 0.28 0.04 -0.19 -0.45 
  
-0.23% 0.50% 1.28% 0.17% -0.85% -2.05% 
South Central -1.65 -2.19 -3.25 -1.45 -1.66 -1.91 
  
-23.76% -31.60% -46.74% -20.84% -23.95% -27.52% 
Southeast 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.07 
  
1.57% 5.20% 2.66% 4.54% 7.29% 5.55% 
Southwest 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 
  9.69% 9.68% 9.69% 9.69% 9.69% 9.69% 
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7.2.5.2 National and Regional Energy and Nutrient Use Response to GHG Pricing 
In addition to water, shifting land management patterns can boost intensity of 
production and use of fossil fuels and nutrients that are also valuable inputs in the 
production process. Tables 33-36 display annualized percent changes in input use, 
regionally and nationally, in total and per-acre terms. Given the amount of data 
presented here, I choose to display intensity effects for the $30/tCO2e case only.  
• Fossil fuel use decreases across most region/mitigation scenario combinations in 
response to higher fuel costs imposed by the policy.  
o Electricity use declines significantly in some regions, but is boosted by 
higher irrigation rates in others (Southwest and Great Plains) 
o Total diesel and gasoline use decline significantly nationally and for most 
regions under full and limited offset scenarios (the Southwest is the one 
exception here, as cropland expansion in this region induces additional 
input use). 
o These results are mostly consistent on a per-acre basis, as energy intensity 
per-acre falls at a national level for all fuels but electricity  (increased per-
acre electricity use is driven in part by groundwater pumping in the 
Southwest region) 
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• Total N fertilizer use increases significantly across all offset eligibility scenarios, 
ranging 3-9%. Phosphorous and potassium use increase substantially, ranging 
9.6%-18% and 21.4%-32%, respectively.  
• The Lake States and South Central regions reduce N use overall but use 
higher levels of P and K, primarily driven by a higher proportion of 
soybean production (soybeans typically have lower N application rates 
than other major grain commodities) 
• Unlike the change from baseline to the RFS2 where cropland expansion 
was accompanied by a reduction in per-acre N intensity, mitigation boosts 
per-acre intensity nationally and for most regions. The implication here is 
that cropland contraction is accompanied by absolute and marginal shifts 
in nutrient application, or movement from the extensive margin to the 
intensive margin on the production frontier.
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Table 33: Percent Change in Total Input Use under Full Offset Eligibility79 
Percent change in regional input use at $30/tCO2e with full offset eligibility (annualized)      
  Nitrogen  Phosphorous  Potassium  Diesel Electricity  Gasoline Natural Gas Water  
Corn Belt 4.53% 18.53% 25.46% -6.55% -9.86% -3.89% 5.73% 3.01% 
Great Plains 2.10% 2.20% 69.31% -2.57% 3.39% -0.07% -0.34% 4.64% 
Lake States -4.14% 4.48% 38.82% -12.15% -33.52% -22.47% -41.21% -36.96% 
Northeast 6.36% -5.53% -4.10% -2.81% -11.51% -22.93% 0.00% -10.38% 
Pac. Northwest 2.09% 4.95% 195.41% -4.94% 8.61% -0.10% 0.00% 9.75% 
Pac. Southwest 2.71% 4.63% 105.63% -14.89% -94.64% -0.77% 0.00% -1.19% 
Rocky Mts.  -0.72% 2.61% 34.04% -12.47% -0.89% -2.71% 2.36% 1.28% 
South Central  -20.66% -9.09% -16.04% -38.34% -34.35% -27.40% -44.28% -38.66% 
Southeast 17.84% 23.16% 16.98% -4.88% 7.71% -0.85% 0.00% 5.84% 
Southwest  43.49% 54.43% 216.86% -0.57% 12.15% 22.41% 0.00% 9.67% 
TOTAL 3.25% 9.62% 22.36% -8.88% -1.64% -7.43% -37.37% -2.10% 
           
Percent change in regional input use at $30/tCO2e with full offset eligibility and CRP (annualized)    
  Nitrogen  Phosphorous  Potassium  Diesel Electricity  Gasoline Natural Gas Water  
Corn Belt 3.63% 17.55% 24.03% -7.06% -10.78% -4.61% 3.57% 1.19% 
Great Plains 7.21% 7.90% 73.16% 2.98% 7.57% 8.85% 5.12% 8.53% 
Lake States -5.76% 2.79% 36.54% -13.93% -46.52% -23.97% -52.45% -49.15% 
Northeast 5.54% -6.20% -4.74% -3.68% -11.91% -23.33% 0.00% -10.75% 
Pac. Northwest 5.42% 9.27% 215.54% -1.61% 4.18% 2.86% 0.00% 5.70% 
Pac. Southwest 2.81% 4.68% 95.59% -14.39% -94.68% -0.24% 0.00% -1.06% 
Rocky Mts.  6.14% 8.41% 42.45% -6.48% 1.36% 4.25% 5.15% 2.10% 
South Central  -22.11% -10.23% -17.29% -40.11% -33.27% -29.60% -44.75% -38.66% 
Southeast 17.21% 22.95% 16.77% -4.44% 7.19% -0.94% 0.00% 5.95% 
Southwest  40.09% 52.24% 209.17% -2.51% 10.99% 13.51% 0.00% 9.67% 
TOTAL 4.41% 10.93% 21.45% -7.47% 1.08% -6.39% -38.10% -1.15% 
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Table 34: Percent Change in Total Input Use under Restricted Offset Eligibility80 
Percent change in regional input use at $30/tCO2e with limited offset eligibility (annualized)      
  Nitrogen  Phosphorous  Potassium  Diesel Electricity  Gasoline Natural Gas Water  
Corn Belt 4.81% 18.65% 25.78% -5.91% -10.97% -3.21% 2.77% 0.53% 
Great Plains 2.14% 1.82% 57.36% -2.48% 2.05% -0.54% -1.13% 3.51% 
Lake States -5.97% 9.04% 45.04% -5.97% -32.07% -17.43% -40.99% -36.05% 
Northeast 34.16% 22.09% 25.07% 20.25% 15.77% 8.79% 0.00% 16.60% 
Pac. Northwest 1.64% 3.82% 195.92% -4.85% 6.75% -0.09% 0.00% 7.11% 
Pac. Southwest 2.29% 4.37% 101.16% -11.83% -94.47% -0.62% 0.00% -0.86% 
Rocky Mts.  -1.46% 2.21% 35.36% -12.86% -0.57% -4.47% -5.04% 0.50% 
South Central  -17.40% -4.77% -12.08% -36.23% -24.30% -26.11% -38.32% -31.60% 
Southeast 14.80% 19.19% 13.78% -4.19% 5.80% -4.27% 0.00% 5.20% 
Southwest  46.78% 62.34% 234.74% 1.51% 9.92% 21.25% 0.00% 9.68% 
TOTAL 4.06% 11.48% 24.57% -7.37% -1.61% -6.60% -32.99% -1.81% 
Percent change in regional input use at $30/tCO2e with no offsets (annualized)     
  Nitrogen  Phosphorous  Potassium  Diesel Electricity  Gasoline Natural Gas Water  
Corn Belt 5.02% 18.42% 22.23% -0.84% -10.15% -2.90% 2.32% 0.11% 
Great Plains 1.78% 1.43% 44.48% -1.97% -3.41% -2.21% -1.27% -0.77% 
Lake States 4.66% 20.65% 55.40% 14.63% -48.47% -12.25% -53.48% -50.62% 
Northeast 134.97% 118.45% 125.11% 111.87% 105.45% 102.99% 0.00% 104.91% 
Pac. Northwest 0.64% 0.57% 134.14% -0.26% 1.78% 0.21% 0.00% 0.86% 
Pac. Southwest 1.85% 4.42% 92.42% -3.64% -94.68% -0.15% 0.00% -0.22% 
Rocky Mts.  -2.12% 3.80% 45.01% -13.60% -1.44% -10.31% -21.48% -0.85% 
South Central  -1.60% 15.05% 3.85% -4.25% -19.08% -17.70% -28.51% -23.95% 
Southeast 30.85% 42.61% 32.97% 17.29% 10.94% 19.53% 0.00% 7.29% 
Southwest  41.08% 59.03% 221.28% 14.88% 9.95% 8.65% 0.00% 9.69% 
TOTAL 8.99% 18.00% 31.98% 2.22% -4.55% -2.32% -26.20% -2.38% 
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   Table 35: Percent Change in Per-acre Input Use under Full Offset Eligibility81 
Percent change in per acre regional input use at $30/tCO2e with full offset eligibility (annualized)    
  Nitrogen  Phosphorous  Potassium  Diesel Electricity  Gasoline Natural Gas Water  
Corn Belt 3.31% 14.73% 9.36% -14.55% 5.49% -8.89% 16.05% 1.79% 
Great Plains 3.09% -0.86% 70.78% -42.95% 81.22% -44.86% 80.74% 1.88% 
Lake States -8.20% 13.81% 21.97% -27.98% -7.69% -16.01% -30.00% -3.02% 
Northeast -18.03% 15.25% -16.79% 16.80% -24.24% 1.73% 0.00% -23.13% 
Pac. Northwest 2.39% 2.50% 188.21% -67.02% 229.29% -69.66% 0.00% 1.97% 
Pac. Southwest 2.74% 1.84% 101.91% -57.85% -87.29% 680.55% 0.00% -1.24% 
Rocky Mts.  2.62% -0.01% 34.06% -34.70% 51.79% -35.90% 59.70% 1.13% 
South Central  -9.02% -0.07% -15.98% -26.62% -10.54% -18.84% -31.35% -12.73% 
Southeast 9.47% 12.51% 3.97% -8.52% 17.74% -15.79% 0.00% 1.61% 
Southwest  1.79% 51.73% 108.84% -52.39% 135.56% -48.04% 0.00% -0.19% 
TOTAL 0.56% 9.01% 12.24% -18.82% 21.16% -23.60% -18.02% 0.57% 
Percent change in per-acre regional input use at $30/tCO2e with full offset eligibility and CRP (annualized)  
  Nitrogen  Phosphorous  Potassium  Diesel Electricity  Gasoline Natural Gas Water  
Corn Belt 1.45% 15.87% 7.04% -13.17% 2.75% -7.17% 11.57% -0.62% 
Great Plains 8.25% -0.33% 73.73% -40.72% 81.47% -40.02% 75.25% 0.46% 
Lake States -19.24% 27.29% 7.27% -19.76% -33.35% 14.08% -58.32% -1.43% 
Northeast -54.34% 105.42% -53.63% 107.72% -57.59% 80.79% 0.00% 0.25% 
Pac. Northwest 5.43% 3.65% 204.44% -67.68% 222.37% -68.09% 0.00% 0.45% 
Pac. Southwest 2.81% 1.82% 92.09% -55.43% -88.06% 735.38% 0.00% -0.96% 
Rocky Mts.  8.08% 0.31% 42.02% -34.15% 53.93% -32.27% 55.26% 0.56% 
South Central  -24.77% 19.32% -30.68% -13.61% -22.76% -8.85% -39.39% -2.09% 
Southeast -7.66% 33.15% -12.30% 8.97% -1.64% 0.71% 0.00% 0.92% 
Southwest  1.37% 50.19% 105.86% -52.64% 134.37% -51.57% 0.00% -0.24% 
TOTAL -3.81% 15.32% 5.32% -12.15% 15.05% -18.64% -23.92% 0.85% 
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Table 36: Percent Change in Per-acre Input Use under Restricted Offset Eligibility82 
Percent change in per acre regional input use at $30/tCO2e with limited offset eligibility (annualized)    
  Nitrogen  Phosphorous  Potassium  Diesel Electricity  Gasoline Natural Gas Water  
Corn Belt 3.59% 14.54% 9.82% -14.32% 3.91% -6.85% 10.33% -0.67% 
Great Plains 3.13% -1.27% 59.38% -38.81% 66.79% -40.37% 65.80% 0.78% 
Lake States -9.95% 21.08% 19.78% -21.50% -13.47% -4.58% -38.16% -1.62% 
Northeast 3.39% 18.09% 5.92% 13.54% 1.97% 6.68% 0.00% 0.01% 
Pac. Northwest 1.94% 1.85% 190.55% -67.25% 226.00% -69.35% 0.00% -0.48% 
Pac. Southwest 2.32% 2.00% 97.21% -55.29% -87.64% 703.82% 0.00% -0.92% 
Rocky Mts.  1.86% 0.35% 34.89% -35.40% 53.92% -37.93% 53.00% 0.35% 
South Central  -5.28% 0.54% -12.55% -27.08% 3.81% -28.82% -13.35% -2.68% 
Southeast 6.65% 11.76% 1.81% -5.89% 12.43% -14.86% 0.00% 1.00% 
Southwest  4.12% 55.91% 114.69% -52.72% 132.47% -47.84% 0.00% -0.17% 
TOTAL 1.35% 10.00% 13.25% -18.21% 20.30% -22.36% -13.69% 0.87% 
Percent change in per-acre regional input use at $30/tCO2e with no offsets (annualized)     
  Nitrogen  Phosphorous  Potassium  Diesel Electricity  Gasoline Natural Gas Water  
Corn Belt 2.81% 15.18% 6.12% -6.56% -3.84% 0.97% 1.33% -32.78% 
Great Plains 2.76% -1.29% 46.37% -33.02% 44.22% -32.19% 45.60% 5.18% 
Lake States -10.31% 34.53% 15.52% -0.77% -48.07% 68.99% -72.47% -29.09% 
Northeast 1.66% 114.89% 4.76% 102.25% 1.58% 99.83% 0.00% 142.26% 
Pac. Northwest 0.64% -0.07% 134.30% -57.43% 139.08% -58.09% 0.00% -48.76% 
Pac. Southwest 1.85% 2.52% 87.69% -48.66% -89.63% 863.23% 0.00% -64.68% 
Rocky Mts.  -0.34% 4.15% 39.24% -37.94% 58.82% -43.53% 39.05% -47.65% 
South Central  -4.95% 21.04% -14.20% 11.60% -27.49% 13.49% -37.01% -7.57% 
Southeast 3.09% 38.34% -3.88% 22.02% -9.08% 31.47% 0.00% -26.37% 
Southwest  2.08% 55.79% 106.23% -44.29% 97.37% -44.95% 0.00% -28.77% 
TOTAL 0.42% 17.51% 12.32% -8.99% 4.88% -6.86% -20.76% -30.70% 
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7.2.5.3 Implications for Water Quality  
As with the previous chapter, it is important to keep in mind that minor changes 
in regional nutrient use can significantly impact nutrient constituents in ground and 
surface water supplies at different rates than the overall change in nutrients applied. For 
instance, under the full offset case I find evidence of increased nutrient use, but 
subsequent pollution decreases (Table 37) at higher CO2 prices. This is due to the 
regional distribution in changing crop management practices. Notice that N and P use 
decline substantially in the South Central (or Mississippi Delta) regions, where nutrient 
runoff is quite high.   
However, under the limited and no eligibility scenarios, nutrient use and 
pollution are impacted heavily by the magnitude of the carbon price.  At lower prices 
($15-$30), cropland expansion under the limited eligibility regime increases pollution, 
but this effect is reversed completely at $50/tCO2e.  Sources of nutrient pollution 
increase significantly under the no offsets case, but taper off at $50/tCO2e, reflecting 
higher input costs. This result indicates that a strong push for bioelectricity derived from 
AF sources could exacerbate existing water quality concerns.    
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Table 37: Environmental Impacts of Mitigation Scenarios (Annualized Percent 
Deviation from Base)83 
 
N Subsurface 
Loss 
NO3 Loss 
Runoff 
Percolation 
N Loss 
P Loss in 
Runoff 
P  Loss 
Sediment 
Full Offset ($15/tCO2e) -0.51% -0.57% -2.51% -0.52% 0.24% 
Full Offset ($30/tCO2e) -4.39% -5.38% -7.97% 3.21% -18.40% 
Full Offset ($50/tCO2e) -10.56% -13.90% -14.14% 2.62% -38.14% 
Full Offset with CRP 
($15/tCO2e) 0.60% 0.39% -1.55% -0.72% 1.21% 
Full Offset with CRP 
($30/tCO2e) -2.88% -4.59% -6.28% 2.88% -16.42% 
Full Offset with CRP 
($50/tCO2e) -8.71% -13.36% -12.44% 1.06% -35.15% 
Lim Offset ($15/tCO2e) 11.23% 1.38% -0.59% 2.33% 3.50% 
Lim Offset ($30/tCO2e) 13.89% -2.89% -5.38% 8.79% -16.53% 
Lim Offset ($50/tCO2e) -11.19% -12.91% -12.62% 7.52% -34.92% 
No Offset ($15/tCO2e) 47.03% 2.65% 3.85% 7.07% 7.75% 
No Offset ($30/tCO2e) 45.76% 2.40% 3.87% 8.84% 6.82% 
No Offset ($50/tCO2e) 30.96% -1.93% 1.39% 8.92% -4.03% 
 
7.3 Conclusions  
The results found here imply that: 
• AF can play a significant role in the U.S. GHG abatement portfolio, but not fully 
pricing all forms of emissions and sequestration not only reduces mitigation 
potential, but it can lead to indirect environmental co-effects, 
• Forest management and afforestation incentives appear necessary to achieve high 
domestic abatement levels  
• Cropland contraction and adoption of mitigation strategies pressure commodity 
markets, boosting output prices and producer welfare 
• Consumers would likely face higher food prices under a cap-and-trade regime, in 
addition to higher energy prices 
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• Higher prices and adoption of mitigation activities change long-term management 
strategies, reduce exports, and influence global agricultural markets (likely leading to 
leakage internationally) For some crops such as corn and wheat, export changes here 
are twice as great as those brought on by the RFS2 alone 
• Depending on the scope of the mitigation policy pursued, cropland use can expand or 
contract; forestland will likely increase, 
• Land use change is also affected by mitigation strategies; internalizing the carbon 
costs of land use transitions can reduce forest to cropland transitions, but boost 
cultivation of pasture and conservation lands. Cropland and pasture afforestation 
transitions are extremely valuable mitigation options, but reduced output 
domestically raises international leakage concerns,  
• Water use declines at a national level, but mitigation efforts boost water use intensity 
in regions with existing water scarcity concerns,  
• Other management intensity responses include increased N, P, and K applications, 
both in absolute and per-acre terms.  
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CHAPTER VIII  
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF BIOFUEL MANDATES AND 
OFFSET ELIGIBILITY RESTRICTIONS ON THE COSTS OF 
COMPREHENSIVE CAP-AND-TRADE: AN INTEGRATED 
MODELING APPROACH 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the previous mitigation results of the previous chapters to 
illustrate how the total costs of economy-wide GHG abatement in the U.S. under 
comprehensive climate legislation can be affected by biofuel mandates and offset 
eligibility restrictions. To understand how policy factors that limit terrestrial mitigation 
potential could change the full costs of GHG abatement, a reduced form emissions 
trading model of the U.S. economy is developed. This model combines important 
information from other sector-wide economic simulation models and be can be used to 
simulate GHG abatement, permit trading, and offset purchases under two recently 
proposed climate bills with unique provisions, HR 2454 or Waxman-Markey (W-M), 
and S 1733, or Kerry-Boxer (K-B). The following section provides some background on 
GHG emissions trading and the welfare effects of policies impacting offset supply or 
compliance obligations.  
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8.2 Background and Study Objectives 
The following diagrams provide a conceptual basis for this modeling approach. 
Figure 51 displays a case in which in overall cap is placed on emissions where one 
emitter with a marginal abatement cost schedule (MAC) and emissions compliance 
obligations defined as the difference between baseline emissions and the cap. In an 
economy represented by one aggregate emitter, total abatement costs will be equal to the 
area under the marginal abatement cost curve for the full range of emissions compliance 
(represented by area A).  
 
 
Figure 51: Abatement costs without emissions trading 
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Now, consider a case more consistent with comprehensive climate legislation. In 
the presence of a cap-and-trade system economic theory dictates that trading will 
commence until the marginal abatement costs of all emitters have been equilibrated.  
This equilibrium point represents the market price for pollution permits. The logic is 
similar in the case of offsets, as marginal abatement costs from the representative emitter 
should equilibrate to the market price for offsets (assuming no restrictions on offset 
provisions).  
Figure 52 displays this scenario in a simple form in which there is one emitter 
with a marginal abatement cost curve (MAC), and one offset supply source (OS1). The 
distance between the two vertical axes represents the total emissions reduction that must 
occur for the emitter to be in compliance under the cap (the difference between base 
emissions and the cap). In the absence of an offset market, the emitter would bear the 
full costs of compliance, or the entire area under the MAC curve (represented by the sum 
of areas A, B, and C). In the presence of an offsets market, the emitter has the option to 
purchase offset credits, thereby reducing total costs of compliance. The total costs of 
abatement in such a case would be the sum of the area underneath the MAC curve (A) 
and offset supply curve (B), respectively. This increases economic welfare by the area C.       
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Figure 52: Equilibrium condition for allowance and offset markets 
 
Using this framework, policy efforts that boost the marginal costs of supplying 
offsets will raise total mitigation costs (unless the policy simultaneously and 
equivalently decreases abatement costs for the emitter). As Figure 53 shows, more 
expensive offsets (i.e., increasing the slope of the offsets curve to OS2) increase total 
abatement costs by the area C1 relative to the prior case.  
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Figure 53: The effect of higher offset costs on total abatement costs 
  
Now consider a restriction on total offset supplies, such as legislative provisions 
in the W-M and K-B bills that limit total offset use for compliance purposes. This 
scenario is illustrated by Figure 54. If the use of offsets for compliance purposes is 
restricted, it is possible that this introduces a price discontinuity between the offset price 
(OP) and the allowance price (AP). Such a restriction raises total abatement costs 
relative to a scenario where offsets are unrestricted as a higher portion of the mitigation 
portfolio will come from abatement actions taken by the emitter. Abatement costs under 
a “low cost” offset regime are A+B+C+D. Raising the marginal costs of offsets 
increases total abatement costs further (by area E), but notice that this relative shift in 
total costs is smaller when offsets are restricted than when left unrestricted. Thus, 
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legislative provisions limiting total use of offsets for compliance can impact GHG 
abatement costs in addition to policy-induced shifts in the supply of offsets. However, 
such limits also serve as a buffer against over-reliance on offsets, which can be fraught 
with problems such as violations of additionality criterion.     
 
 
Figure 54: Restricting total offsets 
  
 
Now, consider a case in which the external policy affects the marginal cost of 
offsets and overall compliance costs simultaneously. This dissertation has shown that 
biofuel expansion can increase the cost of domestic offset supplies, but the existence of 
such mandates should reduce emissions relative to a no policy condition. In this case, 
two welfare effects must be considered, 1) the offset cost impact of biofuel mandates, 
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and 2) decreased abatement costs from lower compliance obligations for the 
transportation sector when biofuels are mandated (henceforth referred to as the biofuel 
emissions reduction effect). This scenario is illustrated by Figure 55. The top portion of 
the figure represents abatement costs under business as usual conditions. Notice here that 
compliance obligations are higher than the RFS2 scenario depicted by the bottom 
portion of the figure as there is no emissions reduction effect of biofuels (thus, a greater 
source of abatement is required in the baseline to meet the cap). With biofuel mandates 
(represented by the bottom figure), compliance obligations are lower as baseline 
emissions are reduced by the emissions reduction of biofuels.  However, the marginal 
costs of offsets increase. Total abatement costs are reflected by A2 + B2 + C2. Thus, one 
must compare areas A1 + B1  with A2 + B2 + C2 to determine the welfare effects of a 
mandate when baseline emissions are adjusted by the emissions reduction of biofuels.  
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Figure 55: The abatement cost implications of a policy impacting different offset 
supply and total compliance obligations 
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8.2.1 Objectives 
In this study I directly measure the impact of biofuel mandates or offset 
eligibility restrictions on the compliance costs of cap-and-trade legislation using a 
reduced form model of GHG mitigation in the U.S. economy. The problem with 
concentrating solely on the implications of biofuel policies on natural resource systems 
and markets is it ignores the economic welfare implications such policies present in 
other markets and/or sectors of the economy. For example, there is an emerging 
literature that discusses the welfare effects of various biofuel expansion policies on fossil 
energy markets and overall fossil fuel consumption (de Gorter and Just, 2009).  
However, FASOMGHG cannot isolate any of these welfare impacts as it is a partial 
equilibrium model with no energy sector representation. Other partial equilibrium 
models offer a very detailed look at the energy and transportation sectors (such as the 
National Energy Modeling System, or NEMS), but fail to provide a general equilibrium 
view and do not explicitly account for external mitigation from offsets. Furthermore, 
models such as FASOMGHG and NEMS usually require some exogenous policy input 
variable to simulate abatement responses to carbon price incentives (thus, allowance 
prices are not solved for endogenously).  
Computable general equilibrium models can avoid this shortcoming by capturing 
welfare effects of policies that crossover multiple sectors of the economy (EPA, 2010b; 
EPA, 2009). In a climate mitigation context, such models can solve for sectoral 
abatement and implied allowance prices endogenously once an economy-wide cap on 
emissions has been imposed. However, these models do not contain the level of sectoral 
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specificity and abatement options represented in partial equilibrium models, and 
generally do not fully capture resource consumption and investment decisions.  
This study attempts to bridge this modeling gap by incorporating the most recent 
data available on mitigation opportunities in fossil-fuel intensive economic sectors and 
offset availability in agriculture and forestry into a reduced form model of the U.S. 
economy that simulates emissions trading. Specifically, I use the Duke University 
Emissions Trading Model (DUET) to simulate emissions trading using sectoral 
abatement costs and offset supply information supplied by the Nicholas Institute version 
of NEMS (NI-NEMS) and FASOMGHG model, respectively. This study is a unique 
attempt to isolate the effects of biofuel policies and offset market restrictions on the 
costs of GHG abatement within the U.S.   
8.3 Duet Model Overview 
DUET is fully dynamic and can simulate economy-wide GHG emissions trading 
in the U.S. under alternative cap-and-trade schemes by allowing flexibility in different 
legislative provisions such as cap stringency, offset provisions, or sectoral 
inclusion/exclusion from the cap. DUET minimizes the total costs of economy-wide 
abatement inter-temporally by allowing pure mitigation (emissions reduction), emissions 
permit trading between capped sectors, and the purchase of offset credits from domestic 
and international sources. In addition, DUET allows for banking and borrowing of 
emissions permits. Consistent with legislative provisions, entities can bank emissions 
permits (credits) indefinitely, and can borrow from future compliance periods (though 
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these must be paid back at a premium at a later date). As the model operates in a 
discrete-time optimal control fashion, the stock of banked credits that can be used for 
compliance and baseline emissions from each sector are treated as state variables. 
Allowing banking and borrowing gives the model a solution in which equilibrated 
permit prices rise at the internal rate of discount (in this case, 5%).   
8.3.1 DUET Mathematical Structure 
Use of MAC curves to simulate emissions trading patterns across comprehensive 
cap-and-trade policies has been prominent in the economics literature (Atkinson and 
Tietenberg, 1991; Boehringer et al., 2004; Rose et al. 1998; Rose and Zhang, 2004; 
Stevens and Rose, 2002). DUET follows a similar conceptual structure as other existing 
models used to simulate emissions trading through the use of exogenously determined 
marginal abatement cost curve parameters. Ellerman and Decaux use country-specific 
MAC curves derived from the MIT-EPPA model to simulate emissions trading in a post-
Kyoto Protocol environmental under a number of different policy assumptions 
(including an all-inclusive global trading scheme compared to trading among OECD or 
Annex B countries only).  Boehringer et al., 2004 develop a static emissions-trading 
model used in the European Union, also with country-specific MAC curves.  
DUET’s inclusion of banking and borrowing possibilities mirror the dynamic 
structure of the emissions trading model presented by Rubin, 1996, an optimal control 
model developed to illustrate the effectiveness of banking and borrowing provisions at 
reducing compliance costs of a cap-and-trade system, as well as lowering social damages 
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of a pollutant84. Other analyses have employed dynamic emissions trading models with 
country-specific MACs to address international climate mitigation potential under 
alternative post-Kyoto scenarios (Brandt and Rose, 2002; Rose and Zhang, 2004). This 
study employs a similar empirical approach at a national level to address the costs of 
U.S. mitigation under alternative policy and market futures.  
The DUET model has a flexible mathematical structure that allows for emissions 
trading over some time interval t, between different sectors of the economy (j), and 
offsets are supplied to the market from multiple sources (k). Currently, the j capped 
sectors of the economy include residential, commercial, industrial, petroleum refining, 
and transportation. This sectoral disaggregation includes all major sectors that would fall 
under recent climate mitigation proposals, and which are the sources of the 
overwhelming majority of anthropogenic GHG emissions in the U.S. NI-NEMS has a 
detailed representation of fossil energy consumption in these sectors, and explicitly 
accounts for emissions from those activities. 
Offset supply sources currently include domestic (U.S.) and international to be 
consistent with legislative provisions restricting the total use of offsets for compliance 
purposes. Offsets include those from AF and non-AF activities. Each offset source 
(domestic and international) has a separate supply function that depicts the marginal cost 
and legislative provision (restriction) of each source.    
                                                 
84
 DUET operates in discrete time, while analytical model operates in continuous time.  
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Several parameters are included in DUET to depict different conditions that vary 
with specific climate legislation provisions or external policies impacting the marginal 
costs of offsets (such as biofuel expansion or offset eligibility restrictions). Emissions 
from biofuels are accounted for explicitly in the transportation sector baseline, consistent 
with EIA projections. Important parameters in DUET include:   
1. CAPt = Aggregate emissions cap for the entire U.S.  
2. CAP projections come from EPA estimates, and can vary from bill-to-bill  
3. Base_Emitjt = Baseline (projected) emissions by sector and over time 
4. Emissions projections come from the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA, 2009)  
5. Targetjt = This is an arbitrary initial allowance endowment used to initiate 
trading and sectoral abatement decisions. This distributes the emissions cap 
evenly across all sectors of the economy based on each sectors proportion of total 
baseline emissions.     
6. Off_availablekt = Sets a limit on the number of offset credits that can be 
purchased from each offset source (domestic, international).  
7. These values are set exogenously to mimic offset provisions in legislation (e.g. 
HR 2454 allows for 50-50 split between domestic and international offsets with a 
2 billion tonne CO2 limit annually, Kerry-Boxer is 75:25 domestic:international 
split, with the same total cap on offsets) 
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8. jα =  Marginal abatement cost curve parameters consistent with the estimated 
abatement portfolio of each sector.  MAC cuves can take a variety of functional 
forms. DUET has options for linear, logarithmic, and polynomial MAC 
functions.  
9. kβ =  Offset supply parameters  
10. ϕ =  Premium placed on emissions borrowed from future compliance periods.   
11. In HR 2454 W-M, this is 8% for permits borrowed in years 2-5 (no premium for 
year one)  
12. r = Discount rate (5%) 
DUET operates in an optimal control fashion, and includes state variables that 
evolve dynamically according to chosen abatement activities (including the emissions 
“bank” as described below). Endogenous variables in DUET include:   
1. Abatejt = Efficient level of abatement, or pure emissions reduction in time period 
t for each sector.  
2. Permit_selljt = Emissions permits sold by the jth sector for compliance in another 
sector. The variable transfers the right to emit from one sector to another.  
3. Permit_usejt = Emissions permits bought by the jth sector and used for 
compliance purposes in time t.  
4. Permit_bankjt = Emissions permits bought by the jth sector and banked for 
compliance purposes in later time periods.   
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5. SR_borrowjt =  Emissions permits borrowed from short run periods for 
compliance purposes in period t (in Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer, emitters 
can borrow one year into the future without paying a premium for borrowed 
allowances in the following year). Borrowed emissions permits must be paid 
back in the future compliance period from which the emitter borrowed. So, in the 
case of short run borrowing, the emitter faces a baseline emissions profile that 
includes borrowed permits from period t-1 in addition to baseline compliance 
obligations.    
6. LR_borrowjt = Permits borrowed from long run periods (in W-M case, these are 
permits borrowed in periods  t + 2, …, 5). There is an 8% premium for borrowing 
these permits—1 permit borrowed for use in time t reduces availability of 1.08 
permits in the future compliance period from which the permit was borrowed). 
Thus, this is a compliance transaction where “interest” is paid in credits. 
7. Offset_usejt = Offsets bought by the jth sector and used for compliance purposes 
in time t.  
8. Offset_bankjt = Offsets bought by the jth sector and banked for compliance 
purposes in later time periods.   
9. Bank_usejt = Permits or offsets bought and banked in previous time periods (t = 
t-M , . . . , t) used for compliance purposes in time period t  
10. Bank_Stockjt = Sets aside permits or offset credits to be used at a later date.  
This stock changes over time.   
11. Offset_sellkt = Offsets sold by the kth source in time period t 
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12. MACijt = Marginal abatement cost in period t for the ijth sector 
13. Offset_Pkt = Offset price by source for time period t 
14. Permit_Pt = Market-Clearing emissions permit price at time t (in $/tCO2) 
 
The following algebraic structure solves for market-clearing conditions in DUET:  
• Emissions for Compliance Obligation: Equates baseline emissions plus any 
additional compliance obligations due to short or long-term borrowing. Here, 
baseline emissions are exogenous parameters, but total emissions for compliance 
obligations (Cap – Emissions) evolve according to the amount of emissions 
permits borrowed (short or long run). Thus, emissions reductions occur relative 
to a revolving baseline that is a function of borrowing decisions over the time 
horizon.   
(Equation 28)   ( )
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• Permit Balance: Balances permits purchased in time t with permits sold, 
ensuring no excess supply or demand of tradable emissions permits on the 
market in all time periods (Walrasian equilibrium) 
 
(Equation 29)  
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• Offset Balance: Balances Offsets purchased with those sold in time t. 
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(Equation 30)  
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• Abatement Function: Determines the efficient level of abatement for the jth 
sector using a parametric representation of marginal abatement costs. This 
expression says that at a particular level of abatement for the jth sector, the 
corresponding marginal abatement cost (equivalent to the allowance price) would 
be MACjt. 
(Equation 31)        ,jt j jtMAC Abate j tα= ∀
 
 
• Offset Price Function: Similar to the previous equation, this Here, we use a 
general parametric function describing the supply of offsets that would be 
available at price Offset_Pkt 
(Equation 32)    Offset _ Pkt = βkOffset _ sellkt
 
 
• Offset Price Discontinuity: As domestic and international offset sources are 
subject to legislative provisions, it is possible that the supply of one of the two 
offset source could be exhausted in this modeling framework.  To handle this 
discontinuity, I add an arbitrary variable restricted to the positive domain that 
allows the  domestic offset price to continue to grow even after the allowable 
supply of cheapest source of offsets has been consumed:  
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(Equation 33)  " " " " 1_ _Domestic t International t tOffset P Offset P λ= +
 
 
• Permit Price Function: This equation denotes a market-clearing permit price 
that is equilibrates marginal abatement costs and offset prices across all 
sectors/sources (Permit_Pt). To account for the possibility that emitters exhaust 
the total source of offsets as stipulated by policy, another arbitrary variable is 
included here to deal with this potential discontinuity in prices between offset 
and emissions permit markets.   
(Equation 34)  2_ _ijt kt t tMAC Offset P Permit Pλ= + =
 
 
• Max Offsets : Sets a limit on offset sales by source to be consistent with 
legislative restrictions.  
(Equation 35)  _ _      ,kt ktOffset sell Off available k t≤ ∀
 
 
• Bank Stock Equation: Here, the stock of permits banked by capped sectors is 
treated as a state variable. As each sector can bank permits or offsets purchased 
in any given t and store them indefinitely, this equation illustrates the dynamics 
of permit “banking”. Beginning with the previous period’s (t-1) stock of banked 
emissions permits, the rate of change in stocked permits is equal to the amount of 
permits coming in, less those that are consumed for compliance purposes in time 
period t. 
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• Net Emissions Balance: This summarizes all abatement and permit/market 
offset activities. For borrowing, I sum over all long-run borrowing in the 
preceding 5-2 years, and divide by 4, which is a more tractable programming 
approach than trying to assign long-term borrowing to specific years.   
 
(Equation 37) 
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•  Emissions Cap Balance: This equation ensures that the economy-wide cap on 
emissions binds. Thus, net emissions across all sectors are equal to the cap (net 
emissions includes all deviations from the baseline—including abatement, 
offsets, and permits, banked or borrowed).  
(Equation 38)   1
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• Objective Function: Minimize the net present costs of abatement:  
(Equation 39) 
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8.3.2 Data and Development  
The DUET model uses explicit information on projected emissions for multiple 
sectors of the economy that are consistent with Energy Information Administration 
projections and projected emissions caps provided by proposed legislation. Since NI-
NEMS can only simulate time horizons ending in 2030, projected emissions were 
extrapolated beyond using the average percentage change in emissions by sector 
projected between 2012 and 2030.  Figure 56 displays the projected emissions (for all 
capped sectors in the U.S.) over time, relative to the caps imposed by W-M and K-B. 
The difference between projected and capped emissions in 2050 represents a shift of 
approximately 6 Gigatons of CO2, more than an 80% reduction in total projected 
emissions.   
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Figure 56: Net emissions projections relative to the W-M and K-B caps85 
   
To derive marginal abatement cost curve (MAC) parameters for each sector, the 
following steps were taken: 
1) NI-NEMS was used to assess mitigation in the residential, commercial, 
industrial, and transportation sectors in response to a carbon price signal86. 
Mitigation in NEMS includes energy switching, adoption of renewable 
energy, direct reductions in energy consumption, technology switching in 
power generation, and retrofitting of power plants for carbon capture and 
storage adoption. Seven different mitigation scenarios were run through 
NEMS to provide a comprehensive assessment of mitigation potential at 
various points in time for different magnitudes of the CO2 price (initial CO2 
                                                 
85
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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 NEMS is a widely applied model in energy policy.  For more information, please refer to:  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/overview/  
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prices were varied arbitrarily from $5-$36/tCO2). Prices were imposed 
beginning in 2012, rising at 5%. This provides a comprehensive range of 
CO2 prices consistent with recent climate policy analyses.  
2) Total mitigation potential for the U.S. was disaggregated into the economic 
sectors mentioned previously.  
3) The difference in baseline (projected) emissions and computed emissions 
across simulations were captured for each scenario and sector to match total 
abatement with each exogenous CO2 price point.     
4) Marginal abatement cost curves parameters were derived by regressing the 
CO2 price on total sectoral abatement. Several functional forms were tested, 
as were time trends. For simplicity and consistency across sectors I use linear 
MAC curve specifications, with the intercept set to the origin. Parameters are 
listed in Table 38: 
 
Table 38: Linear MAC Parameters Estimated Using NEMS (EIA, 2009)87 
Linear MAC Coefficient 
Transportation 0.7899 
Residential  0.1528 
Commercial  0.1405 
Industrial  0.2667 
Refining  1.1544 
*Dependent variable = Price ($/tCO2e) 
*Explanatory variable = Abatement quantity (Million tCO2e) 
 
                                                 
87
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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 Data points used to estimate MAC parameters are displayed by Figure 57. The 
highest marginal costs of abatement are found in the refining and transportation sectors 
(which includes emissions from residential vehicle use), due to the amount of fossil 
energy consumed in these sectors and the high costs of infrastructure improvement 
required to achieve meaningful emissions reductions. Industrial processes also face 
relatively steep abatement costs. Residential and commercial entities have the lowest 
abatement costs as significant emissions reductions are often possible with low-cost (or 
cost-saving) improvements in energy efficiency. To achieve an efficient level of 
abatement, high cost emitters in the refining and transportation sectors could purchase 
emissions credits from the low-cost emitters, essentially subsidizing emissions 
reductions or efficiency improvements in those sectors.   
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Figure 57: DUET marginal abatement cost curves by sector88 
 
A similar approach was taken to develop domestic offset supply curves. I use 
mitigation results derived directly from a set of runs evaluated in previous chapters (Full 
offset eligibility with the RFS2, and Limited offset eligibility with the RFS2), plus a 
specialized set of mitigation runs without the influence of the RFS2 to develop offset 
supply curves from US AF. The mitigation potentials from offset activities only 
(excluding emissions reductions from bioelectricity and reduced fossil fuel use) are 
summarized in Table 39. Notice that the existence of the RFS2 reduces total GHG offset 
potential by more than 20% at $15 and $30/tCO2e and by approximately 8% at 
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 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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$50/tCO2e. This is a significant loss in GHG abatement, and illustrates an external cost 
on the GHG market from an exogenous policy factor brought on by biofuel mandates. 
That is, when mandatory biofuel expansion is enacted with a comprehensive offset 
market, it consumes resources that could ultimately be used for mitigation (offset) 
purposes, which raises the costs supplying offsets. Restricting offset eligibility on top of 
the RFS2 decreases mitigation potential and raises the costs of offsets further. The 
implication is that not including forestry offsets (among others) into the allowable 
abatement portfolio reduces mitigation potential by more than 50% in the low CO2 price 
range. 
   
Table 39: Total Mitigation Potential from Offsets by Scenario (Million tCO2e 
Annuity)89 
 $15/tCO2e $30/tCO2e $50/tCO2e 
Full Offset Eligibility  
(without the RFS2) 
 
376.26 
 
617.80 
 
742.24 
 
Full Offset Eligibility  
(with the RFS2) 300.07 483.86 683.34 
(% difference) -20.25% -21.68% -7.94% 
 
Limited Offset Eligibility  
(with the RFS2) 148.79 272.92 419.38 
(% difference) -60.46% -55.82% -43.50% 
 
                                                 
89
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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 In addition to AF, there is potential for domestic offsets generated from activities 
such as reduced methane form landfills, petroleum, and natural gas operations. The US-
EPA as documented the potential of such offset sources and the marginal costs of each.  
I include the supply of other non-AF offsets into the general offset supply function for a 
comprehensive accounting of domestic offsets. From $5-$50, the supply of non-AF 
offsets ranges 69-119 million tCO2e year-1. Non-AF offset supplies are added to the 
FASOMGHG generated supply curves for AF offsets to expand the scope of domestic 
offsets. To generate AF offset supplies at $5/tCO2e, I multiply the estimated $15 level 
by 0.33.    
Offset supply for U.S. AF are generated for the three aforementioned scenarios 
by regressing price on annualized mitigation potential.  Curves are plotted through the 
origin. The estimated parameter is incorporated into DUET to represent the marginal 
cost of supplying domestic agricultural and forestry offsets across the three mitigation 
scenarios simulated Figure 58.   
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Figure 58: Offset supply curves across FASOMGHG mitigation scenarios 
evaluated90 
 
 For international offsets, I use data compiled by the US-EPA through personal 
communication (Alan Fawcett, personal communication, 2010; US-EPA, 2006). Similar 
data on international offsets are used in EPA analyses on the economics of climate 
change mitigation policies (EPA, 2009). The data are compiled by EPA from several 
independent modeling efforts using similar modeling techniques at various scales to 
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 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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develop marginal abatement cost curve estimates at international scales. The bulk of 
international offsets come from changes in forestry practices (namely, avoided tropical 
deforestation).  Notice that the sheer abundance of international offsets available implies 
extremely low marginal abatement costs (Figure 59). In general, the computed 
international offset supply parameter implies a source of offsets that more than 90% less 
expensive on the margin than domestic offsets.      
 
 
Figure 59: International offset supply and DUET parameter (Source: EPA, 2010) 
 
8.3.2.1 Scenarios Tested  
A number of factors can influence total abatement costs in a model like DUET, 
including MAC and offset supply function parameters, the stringency of the overall cap, 
assumptions about baseline emissions, and policy regulations regarding offsets. The 
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following scenarios provide a general look at the sensitivity of full-economy abatement 
costs to a comprehensive range of possible policy outcomes.   
8.3.2.1.1 Offset and Biofuel Scenarios 
This test for the influence of the RFS2 and offset eligibility restrictions on overall 
mitigation costs.  The base case represents full offset eligibility with no RFS2 mandates. 
Instead, biofuel projections consistent with the previous energy bill (RFS1) are imposed 
on the model at rates consistent with those discussed in the previous chapters. Then, the 
RFS2 mandates are imposed (also at rates discussed in previous chapters).  Finally, I 
restrict offset eligibility, limiting forest management and non-CO2 offsets in agriculture, 
consistent with scenarios applied in the previous chapter. 
8.3.2.1.2 Climate Policy Scenarios 
Cap projections, the phasing in of certain sectors into the cap, and offset 
provisions are modeled in accordance with two recent climate bills—H.R. 2454 
(Waxman-Markey, or W-M) and an alternative (but similar) bill proposed in the Senate 
in the Fall of 2009 by Senators Kerry and Boxer (referred to as Kerry-Boxer, or K-B). 
Major differences include the level of the cap in early periods of the bill, and most 
important to this analysis, domestic and international offset provisions. Both W-M and 
K-B allot a total of 2 billion t CO2 of offsets to be purchased for compliance purposes by 
capped entities, but the ratio of domestic to international in W-M (1:1) is less than in K-
B (3:1). Thus, international offset provisions are not allowed to exceed 500 million tCO2 
in K-B. As international offsets are expected to be less expensive than domestic 
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following estimates in the literature, reducing international offset potential would 
increase the cost of offsets and overall compliance costs.   
8.3.2.1.3  Emissions Adjustment Scenarios 
Since biofuels present a reduced carbon fuel alternative to fossil transportation 
fuels, it is important to account for the emissions displaced by biofuel consumption in 
the transportation sector under the RFS2. However, there is some ambiguity as to how 
transportation fuel consumption and emissions would evolve under an RFS2 regime—
recent evidence points out that such mandates can increase fossil energy consumption 
and emissions (de Gorter and Just, 2009). With this in mind, I present three cases for 
transportation emissions in the baseline, 1) unadjusted emissions consistent with EIA 
projections, and 2) adjusted emissions where the net biofuel emissions reduction of 
transportation fuels under the RFS2 is deducted from transportation sector emissions, 
and 3) adjusted emissions with 50% leakage from increased fuel consumption.   
This effectively raises emissions in the baseline to reflect a case where RFS2 
mandated biofuels are replaced with fossil fuel equivalents on a one-one basis (thus 
raising baseline emissions for the transportation sector). Increasing baseline emissions in 
transportation will add to the full compliance obligations of the sector (and economy), 
thus increasing the total costs of abatement.  Emissions reduction thresholds for biofuels 
as stipulated by the RFS2 (20% for corn ethanol, 40% for biodiesel, and 60% for 
cellulosic ethanol) are applied.  I compute the difference in biofuel production by fuel 
type between the RFS2 and AEO baseline cases (generated by FASOMGHG), then 
multiply this fuel volume by the aforementioned GHG thresholds, and the per gallon 
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CO2 equivalence of gasoline and diesel (0.0089 and 0.0099, respectively). The total 
emissions difference is then added to the transportation sector baseline, reflecting a case 
where baseline emissions are greater without the RFS2. The net difference adds 
approximately 3% to baseline transportation emissions over the long-term.  
The second adjusted emissions scenario considers 50% leakage in transportation 
emissions. That is, I consider a case where 50% of the emissions displaced by biofuels 
are outweighed by emissions gains from increased transportation fuel consumption (a 
case illustrating another potential leakage effect of biofuel policies, whereby stringent 
renewable fuels mandates increase net fuel consumption and hence emissions).      
8.4 Results and Discussion  
First, consider CO2 price paths under two example simulations. Under W-M 
conditions, estimated CO2 price points begin in the range of $14.91-$19.28 per tCO2 
(Table 40). This is similar to EPA’s analysis of the W-M Bill, which produced 
allowance price points ranging$13-$17 per tCO2 in 2015 (EPA, 2009). Results also 
compare favorably to the EIA analysis of HR 2454, which ran multiple sensitivity 
analyses around the W-M cap (EIA, 2009). Using the NEMS model, the EIA analysis 
estimated an initial allowance price of $17.9391. The difference in my estimates is due to 
assumptions regarding in technological advancement and abatement costs for capped 
entities between the NI-NEMS model and general equilibrium models applied by the 
EPA for climate mitigation analysis (ADAGE and IGEM). When emissions are adjusted 
                                                 
91
 Allowance prices rise at a rapid rate of 7.4% in the EIA analysis due to a high discount rate in NEMS.  
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in the transportation sector, however, initial price points in the absence of the RFS2 
increase to $16-$20.29/tCO2. The 50% leakage case results in a initial CO2 price that is 
very similar to the RFS2 unadjusted case under W-M, meaning that a leakage effect that 
reduces biofuel emissions reduction by 50% has roughly the same impact on equilibrium 
allowance prices as the increased costs of offsets brought on by the RFS2.    
For the K-B bill, initial price points are 30-33.4% higher than under W-M, due to 
more stringent cap requirements in early periods, and reduced international offset 
provisions. Holding baseline transportation emissions constant, the RFS2 increases the 
initial CO2 price point relative to the base by ~4-5%. Allowance prices in all scenarios 
rise at the internal discount rate of 5% as banking and borrowing of emissions credits are 
allowed; this is typical Hotelling behavior found in dynamic models. Under exponential 
price increases, minor differences in initial CO2 price points can create large differences 
in total mitigation costs as the price wedge between scenarios increases over time, as 
indicated by Figure 60.  
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Table 40: Estimated Allowance Prices for the Initial Time Period ($/tCO2e)92 
W-M Initial 
Allowance Price 
($/tCO2e) 
K-B Initial  
Allowance Price 
($/tCO2e) 
No RFS2 (Full Offset Eligibility) 14.91 19.28 
 
No RFS2 (Full Offset Eligibility with 
Adjusted Transportation Emissions)  16.00 20.29 
 
No RFS2 (Full Offset Eligibility with 50% 
Adjusted Transportation Emissions) 
15.45 
 
19.78 
 
 
With RFS2 (Full Offset Eligibility)  15.56 20.24 
 
With RFS2  (Limited Offset Eligibility) 17.63 20.30 
 
                                                 
92
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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Figure 60: Estimated allowance prices across climate mitigation and offset 
scenarios 
 
8.4.1 Difference in Total Mitigation Costs  
When the RFS2 is included, the increased price of domestic offsets affects the 
efficient allowance price path, and increases costs of abatement 5.58% under the RFS2 
and W-M scenarios (Table 41). This cost increase rises to approximately 6.4% under the 
K-B scenarios. The implication of this result is without the emissions reduction effect of 
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biofuels, the existence of the RFS2 can significantly affect long-term abatement costs by 
consuming resources that could be used more efficiently for abatement purposes. As K-
B restricts use of international offsets for compliance purposes, this puts additional 
pressure on domestic offset supplies, further amplifying abatement cost increases of the 
RFS2. Adding restrictions to offset eligibility on top of RFS2 mandates magnify 
abatement cost increases even further. Here, restricting forest management and non-CO2 
offset eligibility in the U.S. will boost total mitigation costs by more than 20% under 
base emissions.   
Adjusting emissions for biofuel reduction relaxes this effect to an extent. These 
results illustrate the importance of an inclusive offset policy.  Forest management 
activities present a number of institutional complications in terms of verification, 
monitoring, and enforcement, but could ultimately play a large role in the domestic U.S. 
offset portfolio. As agricultural resources and land available for mitigation purposes is 
ultimately constrained by the existence of RFS2 mandates, including forestry activities 
into the mitigation portfolio is important. 
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Table 41: Effects of Simulation Scenarios on Total Abatement Costs93 
    
Baseline 
Emissions 
 
 
 
  
 
Adjusted  
Emissions  
 
50% Adjusted  
Emissions 
    W-M K-B W-M K-B W-M K-B 
Full Offset 
Eligibility  Absolute Cost  
1,004 1,887 -997 -674 22 623
with the RFS2  
Difference from the no-RFS2 
Baseline  
  (Million $ Annuity)  
  (% Difference) 5.58% 6.42% -4.98% -2.11% 0.11% 2.03%
Limited Offset 
Eligibility with the  
RFS2 
Absolute Cost  
4,097 7,652 2,095 5,090 3,092 5,765
Difference from the no-RFS2 
Baseline  
(Million $ Annuity)  
  (% Difference) 22.76% 26.03% 10.48% 15.93% 16.40% 20.83%
 
This study has made an initial attempt to explicitly quantify the effects of biofuel 
mandates and domestic offset eligibility restrictions on economy-wide GHG abatement 
costs. Additional work is needed to refine sectoral MAC curves, more accurately model 
the expected change in baseline transportation (and refining) emissions under the RFS2, 
and understand the impact of U.S. biofuel policies on the costs of international offsets.  
This last point is particularly important, and represents the most natural extension of this 
analysis. As U.S. biofuel expansion drives land use competition domestically and 
                                                 
93
 Variable or scenario definitions are found  in the Nomenclature section 
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internationally, this will raise the costs of international offsets from sources such as 
avoided deforestation. 
 In summary, biofuel mandates increase the costs of supplying domestic AF 
offsets, which increases overall compliance costs of cap-and-trade. Restricting AF 
offsets further amplifies this cost increase. However, adjusting baseline transportation 
emissions by the emissions reduction of biofuels under the RFS2 adds to the compliance 
obligations for transportation and other sectors of the economy. In this case, the RFS2 
actually decreases costs of emissions, implying that the higher costs of offsets (by 
>10%) are outweighed by the impact of reduced compliance obligations in transportation 
(by ~3%). This result is driven by the relatively high marginal abatement costs of 
transportation. If leakage reduces the emissions reduction effect by 50%, there is no 
discernible change in abatement costs for a bill like W-M. Further work is needed to 
explore this affect with additional sensitivity around the emissions reduction under the 
RFS2. 
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CHAPTER IX  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation has analyzes the trade-offs between biofuel and carbon price 
based GHG mitigation policy.  More specifically the dissertation sought to improve the 
understanding of how the aforementioned policies would affect the domestic AF sectors 
in terms of production patterns, export market conditions, water use, welfare, land use, 
and management intensity using conceptual and empirical modeling procedures.  Several 
major results emerged from this effort and can be classed into conceptual and empirical 
findings: 
9.1 Conceptual Modeling Results  
First, a static conceptual was developed and used to show that:  
• Biofuel production mandates and biofuel type targets directed toward achieving 
GHG reductions can alter land use allocation and influence management intensity for 
energy and food cropping systems. Such policies raise prices of conventional 
commodities, and can induce leakage-- increasing GHG emissions from 
conventional production.  
• GHG carbon equivalent prices that are sufficiently high can reverse cropland 
expansion trends caused by the energy mandates; leading to higher net returns for 
landowners. However this boosts conventional and bioenergy prices further, 
increasing the potential for international leakage.  
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• Biofuel mandates and GHG intensity thresholds are competitive with the supply of 
GHG reductions from the land-based activities. 
• If land shifts into carbon sequestration and the subsequent commodity price feedback 
are large enough, landowners might respond by intensifying production (and hence 
emissions) to boost yield.  
• When extended to multiple regions, the model shows that intensification and land 
use change (with an accompanying sequestered carbon loss) can occur in less 
productive regions as a result of cropland contraction and land reallocation in more 
productive regions. 
However, while useful for policy discussion, static analytical models ultimately 
ignore the dynamics of the system plus abstract form a lot of on the ground realities. 
Simulation analysis using an extended version of FASOMGHG was used to evaluate 
long-term commodity price, welfare, production, and natural resource consumption 
trends under a variety of low carbon futures.  Many important findings emerged from 
this simulation analysis, as summarized below in subsequent sections.  
9.2 Empirical Results on Production and Land Use Change 
Simulation results indicate that crop and livestock production could be affected 
greatly, especially across mitigation scenarios where dedicated bioenergy feedstocks and 
carbon sequestration replace some conventional commodity production. This especially 
affects livestock production as reduced carbon policies incentivizes land use shifts out of 
cropland, and reduces the supply of feed-grains.  
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• The RFS2 stimulates long term cropland use above baseline levels, drawing 
land into cultivation from forests, pasture, and the CRP positive income and 
negative GHG effects, 
• When all offsets are eligible for payment, cropland use contracts and forest 
use expands substantially. At higher CO2eq prices, this contraction effect 
reduces cropland below baseline (no RFS2) levels,  
• Limiting offset eligibility causes smaller land shifts as the reduced emission 
benefits of moving out of cropland are not eligible and thus ony only 
contracts the cropland base below baseline levels at higher CO2eq prices. 
• Pursuit of bioelectricity as a mitigation option (instead of offsets) raises the 
value of cropland, often pushing grazing and CRP lands into production. 
• Restricting offsets and incentivizing bioenergy also boosts deforestation in 
early years of the time horizon, but this effect disappears in later periods. 
• The RFS2 could pressure on the CRP, leading to a significant loss in 
conservation acreage. Re-cultivating conservation lands can help to relax 
land value, commodity price and trade impacts of the mandates.   
• CRP continuation contributes to mitigation efforts by adding additional land 
resources for carbon sequestration or dedicated bioenergy production.  
In general, I have shown that land use patterns in AF are highly sensitive to 
alternative energy and mitigation policy scopes. Land use patterns, particularly for 
cropland, differ significantly by region. One of the important results of this dissertation 
is that evaluating aggregate or broad analytical effects of a policy tells an incomplete 
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story.  Regional shifts in production and strategy choice can have acute effects in regions 
with existing resource scarcity or environmental degradation potential. Additional work 
is needed to improve our understanding of the optimal role of land resources in a 
reduced carbon and enhanced biofuel economy.  
9.3 Management Intensity and Water   
Results concerning water consumption:  
• While recent literature has raised concerns regarding the effect of biofuel 
mandates on water resources, I find that the aggregate shift in irrigation water 
consumption is minimal at a national scale, but could be problematic at a local 
scale. 
• Aggregate water use declines under most mitigation scenarios, but the regional 
distribution of impacts warrants attention. Production shifts drive water 
consumption indirectly in regions such as Texas, the Great Plains, and the Pacific 
Southwest, which is troubling given those regions’ pre-existing water shortages.    
For management intensification I found that:  
• Nutrient use expands significantly under the RFS2, especially in  regions such as 
the Corn Belt and South Central United States where N and P pollution through 
runoff and leaching are significant environmental concerns.  
• Aggregate input use declines across most GHG carbon equivalent price 
scenarios, though I find evidence of per-acre intensification in nutrient use (and 
energy use in some instances). Altered production patterns stimulated by 
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terrestrial mitigation efforts imply higher use of nutrients per unit land in 
production, which counters previous claims that the existence of climate 
mitigation incentives could improve water quality (Greenhalgh and Sauer, 2005). 
However, this result is consistent with theory; a cropland contraction shift due for 
carbon sequestration can push production to the intensive margin.  
• Shifts in aggregate input use affect national indicators of environmental 
degradation; the RFS2 increases N and P pollution significantly (illustrating 
nonlinear pollution returns to increased nutrient application).  
• Mitigation only alleviates these concerns under the full offset eligibility case. 
Pursuit of dedicated bioenergy across the restricted offsets boosts indicators of 
water quality degradation.   
9.4 Commodity Markets, Welfare, and Exports  
Perhaps the most policy relevant set of results to emerge from this study is the 
implications of low carbon policy efforts on agricultural commodity prices, producer and 
consumer welfare, and export markets, including the following key results:  
• Commodity price effects of the RFS2 are generally lower than those found in 
previous studies, partly due to cropland expansion and intensification.  
• However, offset markets and bioenergy incentives boost prices significantly 
further reducing production and exports, suggesting that the “Food vs. 
Carbon” debate has merit if domestic offsets are to play a predominant role in 
a reduced carbon economy. Taking land out of production for mitigation can 
268 
 
 
have greater downstream land use effects than allocating land to biofuel 
production.  
• For welfare, the most important result from this study is that AF producers 
and landowners have the opportunity to see substantial long-term welfare 
benefits from renewable energy and climate policy while consumers lose 
considering AF consumption related welfare only (ignoring benefits of less 
imported fuel and climate change). The direct flow of offset payments and 
bioenergy revenue far outweighs the fossil fuel related input cost increases, 
refuting the claim of many agricultural stakeholders that comprehensive 
climate policy would significantly cost farmers. When compared to a future 
where real commodity prices continue to fall, economic prospects for 
producers and landowners appear much brighter under reduced carbon and 
biofuel policies.  
• Welfare gains vary by region and producer groups (with livestock producers 
bearing the brunt of feedstock price increases). 
• Consumers of AF commodities are worse off under climate mitigation 
regimes. Commodity price impacts faced by consumers should be more 
carefully weighed within the context of the general economy to truly 
understand the net effect of these impacts but that is beyond the scope of this 
study. 
•  Exports are lowered significantly relative to the baseline. The effect of 
mitigation efforts is much more pronounced on exports than the RFS2, again 
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supporting the notion that productivity decreases under a full offset market 
could imply much greater leakage effects than biofuel mandates.  
9.5 Effects of AF Policies on the Costs of GHG Abatement 
In the context of economy-wide GHG abatement, results show that:  
• AF can provide a significant source of offsets to capped entities at a relatively low 
cost, so policies that influence those costs can impact total abatement costs for the 
general economy.  
• The full costs of AF offsets depend greatly on the existence of the RFS2 and which 
offset activities will be considered eligible under a comprehensive climate bill. The 
RFS2 alone can increase the marginal costs of offsets by about 20%, but the net 
effects on total abatement costs depend on assumptions of baseline emissions in the 
transportation sector, and international offset provisions. 
• With a full emissions displacement effect, reduced abatement costs resulting from 
lower compliance obligations in the transportation sector outweigh the higher costs 
of offsets caused by the biofuel mandates  
• Limiting offset market participation by excluding forestry activities or limiting 
payment eligibility increases total abatement costs substantially (>20%).   
9.6 Research Limitations and Future Research Directions  
There are a number of limitations to this study that should be emphasized. Each 
provides a unique future research project:   
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9.6.1 AF Only Concentration 
The focus of this work has been squarely on AF welfare, with little regard to 
residual economic impacts caused by the policies in other sectors of the economy. While 
food prices and consumer welfare are captured endogenously, this fails to capture the 
potential substitution or income effects of such price shocks in a general economy 
framework.  Such a shortcoming might underestimate the full economic costs of AF 
GHG mitigation. 
9.6.2 Biofuel Market Penetration Assumptions 
This analysis uses exogenous parameters to represent total biofuel market 
production, with and without the RFS2 mandates in place. Then, mandates are locked in 
beyond the maturation of the RFS2 (in 2022). This procedure inherently ignores the 
possibility that the market and infrastructure necessary for biofuels could grow beyond 
or limit the RFS2 mandates. It is currently not well known how biofuel markets could 
evolve over time, both in the absence of policy, or beyond policy mandated levels. 
Without such information, additional sensitivity analysis is needed that tests the effect of 
alternative biofuel market growth trajectories.   
9.6.3 Direct Linkages with International Production Systems 
 The U.S. is a world leader in agriculture, producing more than 40% of the corn 
consumed globally. One must keep in mind that under current legislative proposals to 
reduce GHG emissions in the U.S., domestic offsets would compete to an extent with 
exports and international offsets. A more global analysis is needed. 
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9.6.4 No Direct Feedback from Groundwater Systems 
One weakness of this analysis is there is no direct feedback from water 
consumption on the stock and depletion rates of groundwater resources. Groundwater 
depletion from excessive agricultural withdrawals is a highly problematic, especially in 
regions where simulation analysis reveals agricultural expansion (the Southwest and 
Great Plains). While the empirical model used in this study is dynamic in many 
variables, stock and depletion effects of groundwater consumption are ignored. Future 
work will incorporate regional groundwater dynamics directly into FASOMGHG to 
model such a scenario.   
9.6.5 No Transportation MAC Adjustment without Biofuels  
As the previous chapter showed, the slope of the MAC parameter for the 
transportation sector drives much of the full abatement cost results. Transportation sector 
emissions are adjusted based on potential displacement value of biofuel replacement of 
fossil transportation fuels (following policy-imposed GHG reduction thresholds), but 
shifts in abatement costs caused by removing biofuel mandates are currently ignored. 
Presumably, removing the mandates could lower abatement costs in the transportation 
sector, but additional information is needed to accurately model the magnitude of this 
effect.    
9.7 General Conclusions  
This dissertation assesses some of the intersections of biofuel mandates and 
comprehensive cap-and-trade by considering potential natural resource implications of 
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these various policy drivers. The US AF sectors have the opportunity to contribute 
greatly to federal renewable energy or GHG mitigation targets. However, such 
contributions could dramatically alter the AF landscape by influencing land management 
decisions. Also, domestic GHG mitigation efforts in conjunction with the RFS2 can 
pressure agricultural commodity markets, leading to international leakage through land 
use change. This also raises concerns that the per-capita costs of climate mitigation may 
have been understated in previous economic analyses of U.S. climate bills that did not 
fully account for increased household food costs expenditures brought on by a successful 
domestic GHG offset market. Indirect consequences of domestic biofuel expansion merit 
policy attention, but have perhaps have been overstated in previous analyses. However, 
results indicate that comprehensive climate mitigation efforts and domestic offsets can 
potentially induce leakage at far greater rates than biofuel mandates. This result 
reinforces the notion that international offsets should play a critical role in domestic 
climate mitigation efforts as a buffer against international leakage caused by the 
combined market forces of domestic biofuel expansion and offset provisions.  
Domestic biofuel mandates and policies targeted at production systems that 
ensure GHG reduction thresholds could have indirect consequences in addition to 
leakage, such as reducing the available supply of terrestrial GHG offsets. This is the first 
study to directly model the influence of increased competition for land resources on 
climate mitigation costs. Perhaps a preferred policy would be one that sets a mandate 
without stringent GHG reduction thresholds and combines this with a market for carbon 
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offsets. This would increase the total supply of offsets (reducing total abatement costs) 
and could influence the reductions in intensity desired by biofuel policies.  
Pursuit of climate mitigation and movement to a renewable energy portfolio are 
lofty, achievable, and important policy goals that we should continue to pursue.  
However, managing land for food, energy, and carbon with a growing population and 
rapidly emerging global economies will not come without significant economic sacrifice. 
In order to maximize returns to land resources to satisfy these growing demands, 
technological advancement and enhanced global yield growth is imperative. 
Additionally, intensity-based incentives that credit GHG reductions and productivity 
improvements in the same metric could help alleviate leakage concerns by improving 
productivity (Murray and Baker, 2010).  
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